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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to elucidate the position of Japanese bank regulators in 
the international harmonising process of the capital standards set by the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision and in the domestic politics of banking 
regulation. An attempt is made to test a two-level-game model that positions 
Japanese regulators as the link between international and domestic politics. The 
thesis systematically assesses the strengths and the weaknesses of the two-level 
approach, and considers the validity of alternatives—systemic- and domestic-level 
approaches. The selection of case studies is made on such a basis: the case of 
negotiation processes and that of implementation. On the one hand, a close look at 
Japanese regulators’ preference formation and behaviour through a filter of the 
two-level-game framework allows us to better understand their behaviour at the 
negotiation process. The thesis presents a counterexample to mainstream 
systemic-level explanations about the forces leading to the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance’s negotiating position. The MoF was tactically motivated to use the 
internationally agreed rules and norms to legitimise its domestic policies and to shore 
up its position in the domestic politics. On the other hand, the thesis points out limits 
to the logic of two-level-game approach concerning implementation and compliance 
issues. The hypotheses derived from the logic of two-level-game approach do not 
sufficiently explain ineffectual Japanese compliance with the Basle Accord. Both 
domestic institutional “capacity” and the “willingness” of regulators are important in 
determining the degree of compliance. These institutional and intentional factors 
underline the possibility that the Basle rules can be sabotaged by vested interests at 
the implementation phase. With regard to implementation issues, therefore, more 
persuasive explanations come from the domestic-based argument that dysfunctional 
domestic institutions hampered Japanese credible commitments to the Basle Accord.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Japan and International Banking Regulation
1.1 Japan and the Basle Banking Regulation
1.1.1 Theme
The aim of this thesis is to elucidate the position of Japanese bank regulators in the 
international harmonising process of the capital standards set by the Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision (the Basle Committee, hereafter) and in the domestic politics 
of banking regulation.1 An attempt was made to test a two-level-game model that 
positions Japanese regulators as the link between international and domestic politics. 
The thesis systematically assessed the strengths and the weaknesses of the two-level 
approach, and considered the validity of alternatives—systemic- and domestic-level 
approaches. The selection of case studies was made on such a basis: the case of 
negotiation processes and that of implementation.
The two-level-game approach is one of the most popular theoretical frameworks in
the discipline of International Relations.2 It is based on assumptions that privilege 
neither domestic nor international factors. One of its distinctive hypotheses is that the 
interaction between domestic and international politics gives state actors a political 
tool to strengthen their autonomy and improve their maneuverability over domestic 
politics. To what extent does this hypothesis hold in the case of Japanese participation 
in an international regime for banking regulations?
On the one hand, the negotiation phase brings the strengths of the two-level-game 
approach into relief. In particular, the argument presents a counter-example to a 
“redistributive logic” of the Basle Accord: The American and British policymakers, 
whose banks were confronting a challenge from Japanese banks, exercised financial 
power to push Japan into an unfavourable multilateral framework; thereby forcing 
Japanese banks to raise their capital ratios.3 The two-level-game approach also differs 
from a bank-centred analysis emphasising market pressure as the driving force behind 
emulation of the regulatory standards initiated by the U.S. and U.K.4 Moreover, the 
approach provides additional evidence for the notion of Japan being a “reactive state”, 
while also refining and revising that concept.5 Even in the area of banking regulation, 
where bureaucracy has been often deemed to enjoy a high degree of autonomy, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF) was exposed to societal interests and had 
incentives to use external pressure, or gaiatsu, to attain its domestic goals.
2
On the other hand, the implementation phase highlights the weaknesses of the 
two-level-game approach. Although the international and domestic interplay gave 
Japanese bank regulators some degree of leverage at the beginning of the international 
regulatory harmonisation process, domestic reforms became almost irrelevant once 
capital adequacy got enmeshed in domestic bureaucratic and political processes during 
implementation stage. The latter point challenges the logic of two-level games, and 
requires us to consider possible alternative hypotheses about institutional inertia or the 
“stickiness” of domestic institutions.6 This domestic institutional stickiness again 
throws doubt on the existing analyses that emphasise systemic-factors such as market 
pressure.7 The way in which the Basle Accord was implemented in Japan came short 
of the spirit of the international regulatory standards throughout the 1990s in the face 
of international market pressures. The two-level-game approach and the 
systemic-level approach must then be strongly qualified at the implementation phase.
The argument based upon the two-level games is a modified version of Kapstein’s 
account of the Basle Accord, viewed through the eyes of a country that negotiated its
O
way into an international regulatory agreement launched by the U.S. and the U.K. 
Kapstein explains how a regulatory dilemma between keeping domestic banks 
competitive and the financial system stable led to the Basle Accord. The thesis 
considers how Japanese regulatory officials dealt with a similar dilemma by
participating in international negotiations. In addition, it addresses the issue of 
implementation and compliance, which Kapstein does not sufficiently examine. In 
developing the argument, the thesis examined Japanese regulators’ preferences, 
negotiations, and implementation of international agreements. Preferences are defined 
as specific policy choices that actors believe will serve and satisfy their fundamental 
objectives or interests. As Chapter 3 elaborates, such interests for regulators include 
economic, domestic political, and international relational objectives. Regulators 
choose a particular set of policies, which is supposed to be good enough to meet the 
objectives, within the confines of the present perceptions and evaluations. In this 
regard, the thesis assumes that individuals operate with bounded rationality,9 and 
differs from the two-level-game framework developed by Helen Milner, within which 
state negotiators are assumed to be rational actors maximising their goals by choosing 
the best or optimal course of action from all possible alternatives.10 The notion of 
bounded rationality is suggestive, especially when we examine the preference 
formation and behaviour of Japanese regulators in the dramatically changing 
environments of the late 1980s and the 1990s.
The terms negotiation and bargaining are used interchangeably, and refer to “a 
sequence of actions in which two or more parties address demands and proposals to 
each other for the ostensible purposes of reaching an agreement and changing the
4
behaviour of at least one actor”.11 Under the two-level-game framework, Japanese 
regulators are assumed to be involved in both international and domestic negotiations. 
Implementation refers to a sequence of actions by regulators to carry out the terms of 
an agreement with their foreign counterparts. It includes the effect that such an official 
agreement may have later on the behaviour of regulators and that of banks. It is one 
thing to negotiate rules, some of which are of a fairly general nature, and even to adopt 
them as national standards; it is another for countries to implement them effectively. In 
order to comprehend the process of development of banking regulations, it is 
important to examine how Japanese regulators actually behave, rather than how they 
change banking regulations.
1.1.2 Financial Globalisation and Capital Regulation
The re-emergence of global finance has posed substantial political and economic 
challenges to states. One of them is how to regulate financial institutions and markets. 
The expansion of cross-national financial transactions has created more closely 
integrated national financial systems, which made it extremely difficult, if  not 
impossible, both technically and politically for individual states to effectively regulate 
financial activities on a unilateral basis. The high degree of integration means that an 
incident in one country, in effect, has an impact on other countries; therefore, a bank’s
5
failure in a country may have negative consequences on national banking systems of 
the others. Domestic regulatory efforts to make banks less likely to fail, by themselves, 
cannot adequately cope with this externality.
Cross-national regulatory disparities also generate competitive inequity that raises 
political concerns over distributive issues. Banks in less restrictive national regulatory 
systems can take advantage of the regulatory differentials. In other words, banks that 
are subject to unilaterally strict regulations in their home country will find themselves 
at a competitive disadvantage to international rivals. In the mid-1980s, for example, 
seriously competitive pressures from Japanese banks’ low-capitalisation led American 
bankers to turn to politicians and policy makers to nullify the unilateral effort to 
reinforce American banks’ capitalisation.12
In the field of international banking, several factors increased pressure on national 
regulators to establish common regulatory rules in order to respond to the challenges 
facing them. The Basle Committee, consisting of bank regulators representing the
Group of Ten countries and Luxembourg, was a vehicle for advancing internationally
11common banking regulations. One of the major developments in this realm is the 
establishment of international bank capital adequacy standards. Capital adequacy 
standards refer to a type of regulation that requires banks to hold sufficient capital 
against the risks of potential and unexpected losses arising from their business
6
operations. This is normally measured as the ratio of capital to some quantum of on- 
and/or off-balance sheet engagements as variously defined. In 1988, the Basle 
Committee agreed on a common regulatory framework with minimum capital 
requirements for credit risk—the risk that those whom banks lent to might go 
bankrupt—undertaken by internationally active banks. This was known later as the 
‘Basle Capital Accord’. In 1996, in response to the rapid involvement of banks in the 
securities’ markets, whether directly or through affiliated firms, the Accord was 
amended to incorporate market risk—the risk of losses in on- and off-balance sheet 
positions arising from movements in market prices. This was called “the 1996 
Amendment to the Basle Accord to Incorporate Market Risk”.
Participation in international regulatory harmonisation has inherent domestic 
political implications; Japan is no exception. Each national regulator has developed its 
own regulatory system in line with its financial structure, tax system, and accounting 
practices. Banking regulation is not an isolated system, but rather it is deeply rooted in 
a broader domestic institutional context. Specifically, since capital adequacy standards 
were not tightly enforced in Japan prior to the 1988 Basle Accord, Japan’s 
participation in the international agreement had significant domestic political and 
economic consequences. Furthermore, the 1996 Amendment put emphasis on the 
greater role of the market in regulation and on the self-responsibility of regulated
7
groups, which was fundamentally different from the traditional practice of Japanese 
banking regulation. These regulatory developments at the international level had 
implications for the domestic politics of rule change, adoption, and implementation in 
Japan.
The Basle Capital Accord was a high-profile event in Japan. Not only financial 
circles but also even ordinary people knew it. After the 1990 collapse of the financial 
bubble in Japan, Japanese banks could no longer pursue market-share as they had in 
the 1980s with little concern for profitability and due capitalisation, in order to 
maintain the required capital-to-asset ratios. Outcries against the Basle Accord broke 
out from the Japanese banking industry.14 An editorial of a leading Japanese financial 
magazine, Kin-yDZaisei JijyQ was concerned about the impact of the Basle Accord on 
Japanese banks. Parodying the Manifesto o f the Communist Party, it said, “A spectre is 
haunting the world of international finance—the spectre of the Basle Accord”.15 
Furthermore, in the midst of the 1990s’ financial and banking disasters, the “second 
defeat” or “money defeat” argument became popular.16 Japan’s post-war economic 
prosperity sometimes conveyed the impression that Japan was an ultimate winner of 
World War II, but, according to the argument, in reality Japan lost the post-war 
competition over economic wealth at a fundamental level. Throughout the post-war 
era, the international monetary and financial system had been structured as the one
8
through which Japanese wealth was transferred to support the U.S. hegemony. In this 
argument, the Basle Accord was compared to the Battle of Midway, which was a 
turning point on the Pacific front of World War II.
Despite the above eccentric arguments, Japanese banks are still operating with 
weak capital structures, and the degree to which the Basle Accord affected Japan is 
questionable. At the same time, under the sluggish economy, difficulties for Japanese 
banks in meeting the Basle standards have been growing. In addition, the severity of 
the domestic banking problems of the late 1990s politicised the issue of capital 
adequacy requirements and activated politicians, who were less keen to strictly 
comply with international regulatory standards. Since capital adequacy requirements 
were frequently seen as a main source of a credit crunch, and in a country already 
suffering financial distress, their strict implementation was expected to lead to the 
deterioration of the existing credit crunch.17 Such factors explain the importance of 
correctly understanding how the preferences and bargaining positions of Japanese 
actors were formed and to what extent the Basle Accord was effectively carried out in 
Japan. The thesis attempts to answer the above questions by testing the 
two-level-game framework and several alternative systemic- and domestic-level 
approaches, as well as providing a detailed case study.
The existing literature in International Political Economy on the Basle process is
9
relatively inadequate in terms of providing a comprehensive survey covering Japanese
1 ftdomestic politics. Most of the literature highlighted the role of international 
regulatory regimes in improving the international financial stability, the issue of 
international distributional problems, or the role of market forces. In addition, while 
the process through which American domestic politics triggered the U.S. initiative in 
promoting international regulatory co-operation has been well examined, Japan is 
usually treated as a unitary actor pursuing harmonised and monolithic preferences, 
particularly with regard to the international competitiveness of Japanese banks. By 
stressing tensions between the preferences of Japanese regulators and those of private 
banks, however, this study marks a departure from the view of Japan as a unitary actor.
1.2 Potential and Limits of a Two-level-game Analogy
1.2.1 The M oF’s Position in the Basle Negotiation Process
A two-level-game framework demonstrates how the interplay between 
international and domestic politics affected the preference formation and bargaining 
behaviour of the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF). The two-level-game approach 
hypothesises that the MoF simultaneously pursues different international and domestic 
goals. According to the hypothesis, on the one hand, the ministry can negotiate with its 
foreign counterparts the specifics of the Basle standards in order to protect the
international competitiveness of Japanese banks. On the other hand, the MoF can use 
foreign pressure to pursue its domestic goal of legislating for capital adequacy rules, 
which the ministry is unable to put in place due to opposition from banks. The 
two-level-game framework itself is not novel, but this perspective sheds light on the 
behaviour of the MoF in the Basle negotiations; little attention was given to this 
analysis in the existing literature.
The question of where Japanese regulators stood on the process of international 
banking regulation was addressed by several systemic-level approaches. Most 
researchers of International Political Economy who study the 1988 Basle Accord focus 
on its distributional impact. Thomas Oatley and Robert Nabors provide the strongest 
form of the distributional argument in their account of the “redistributive logic” of the 
Basle Accord: a powerful state, driven by domestic concerns, disproportionately 
shapes an international regime to serve its domestic groups’ interests at the expense of 
those of other states.19 This logic “parsimoniously” illustrates the significant role of 
U.S. domestic interests in generating the U.S. initiatives. It argues that the Accord was 
intentionally designed by the U.S. policymakers to “transfer income from Japanese 
commercial banks to compensate American commercial banks for the costs of 
[otherwise unilateral] regulation”, and was successfully negotiated “only through U.S.
90policymakers’ use of financial market power”. Oatley and Nabors assert that the
11
01Japanese were the “primary targets”.
In a highly integrated international financial system, asymmetrical inter­
dependence among states is a source of power.22 Typically, the ability to grant market 
access to financial institutions, or, alternatively, to threaten market closure underlines 
the power resources of the U.S., which possesses the largest and most dynamic 
financial markets in the world. The importance of the U.S. financial markets causes 
asymmetrical international interdependence from which “vulnerability” of other states 
and potential power of the U.S. derive. This suggests that, despite Japan’s creditor 
status and international expansion of Japanese financial firms, the systemic weakness 
of Japan in the realm of international finance came from asymmetry of vulnerability of 
Japanese banks vis-a-vis the American counterparts. This weakness pushed Japan into 
an unfavourable multilateral framework; thereby forcing Japanese banks to raise their 
capital ratios in the case of the 1988 Basle Accord, and forcing Japanese regulators to 
adopt a set of new regulatory norms and methods based on the 1996 Amendment. 
According to this account of the redistributive logic, the Japanese were as a whole the 
losers of the Basle process.
Although the Basle Accord adversely affected Japanese banks after the 1990 
collapse of the financial bubble, the Basle negotiation process did not completely 
correspond to the redistributive logic in the way Oatley and Nabors assert. The
importance of the U.S. power does not necessarily mean that the U.S. foisted its 
preferences on an unwilling Japan. Nor does it mean that the U.S. preferences 
overwhelmingly determined the actual content of the multilateral accord. When we 
decide who exercised power over whom, we need to know something about the ex ante 
preferences of the actors. While Oatley and Nabors treat Japan as a unified front 
seeking competitive advantage, Japanese regulators and private banks did not have 
identical preferences toward the Basle process and the regulators had domestic reasons 
for strengthening their capital adequacy rules. The treatment of Japan as a monolithic 
actor by Oatley and Nabors cannot adequately explain the MoF’s behaviour.
While the redistributive logic highlights the most powerful states’ motivation to 
establish international banking regulations, another variant of systemic-level 
approaches focuses on market pressure as a driving force behind emulation of 
developments in international regulatory standards. With regard to Japanese banks’ 
rapid increase in their capital ratios in the late 1980s, Beth Simmons posits the
O'Xinfluence of “market pressure logic”. She argues that the 1987 U.S.-U.K. bilateral 
proposals for common capital adequacy requirements promoted the regulatory 
innovation as a focal point for other countries’ regulators to emulate. Specifically, 
regulatory changes in the dominant financial centre gave the rest of the world not only 
competitive incentives to catch up with the regulatory change in order to maintain or
13
attract business, but also market pressures for conforming to the regulatory 
environment of the dominant centre. This implies that Japanese participation in the 
Basle rules is market-driven, rather than politically- or institutionally-driven. Japanese 
banks themselves were aware of the costs, in terms of credit ratings and international 
business reputation, of adopting lax capital adequacy rules. This argument from 
market pressure logic, however, clouds the dynamics of the domestic politics in which 
the MoF attempted to solve the regulatory dilemma. A focus on the MoF better 
illuminates the true dynamics at play than the theory of market pressure logic can.
A third type of systemic-level explanation highlights the existence of an 
international regime—set of norms and rules on which states’ expectations converge in 
certain issue-areas—in banking regulation.24 Some argue that the international regime 
helps states to mitigate collective action problems among them and enables 
participating states to enjoy collective gains, such as a more stable international 
financial system. Others suggest that the regime promotes the trans-national diffusion 
of regulatory norms, which are eventually embodied in domestic regulatory systems. It 
is argued that through this process of ideational diffusion, the regime constrains and 
shapes domestic rules, practice, and behaviour. Surely, the role of the regime in 
affecting the behaviour of states should be considered, but, like other systemic-level 
explanations, the regime explanation does not sufficiently focus on domestic factors,
14
such as the interests of domestic banks and domestic political structure. In short, the 
regime explanation should be supplemented by analysis of domestic and international 
factors.25
1.2.2 Implementation Issues
The above section shows the potential of the two-level-game approach to 
contribute to the understanding of how international and domestic political forces 
interact to produce policy outcomes, and to offer an explanation different from 
systemic-level explanations about forces leading to the Japanese MoF’s negotiation 
position. However, the state of the weak capital structures of Japanese banks in the 
1990s (i.e., implementation issues) challenges or qualifies the validity of the 
two-level-game approach.
In October 2002, Takenaka Heizo, the newly appointed Joint Minister for 
Economy and Financial Services, officially admitted that Japanese banks were in a 
much worse shape than the repetitive claims of Hakuo Yanagisawa, his predecessor, 
and in need of drastic reform. His initial ideas for reform, which have been 
subsequently emasculated by political pressure, included a wide array of stringent 
measures, ranging from a stricter assessment of loan classification and better 
provisioning against bad loans to a cap on deferred tax assets, which amounted to
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about half of big banks’ core capital.27 It is widely believed that the banks need more
-no
than two or three times their current loan-loss reserves to be adequately provisioned. 
Reclassifying non-performing loans certainly reveals that the banks are 
under-provisioned and under-capitalised. In essence, subtracting them would send 
many banks’ capital adequacy ratios below the 8 percent level that the Basle Accord 
requires.
Such state of Japanese banks means that a country that adopts international 
standards for prudential regulation as national standards does not necessarily follow 
the spirit of such international standards. Although proposed changes to the Basle 
Accord have been made to come into effect in 2006 or 2007, the Basel Capital Accord 
has been a keystone of a global regime for financial regulatory standards. It has now 
been adopted by over 100 countries. Apparently, as Figure 1.1 shows, major Japanese 
banks managed to meet the 8 percent minimum capital requirements in the 1990s. 
However, this numerical compliance with the Basle rules in itself does not ensure that 
the international standards of capital adequacy were strictly carried out in Japan nor 
that Japanese regulatory policies were geared up to deliver on internationally accepted 
supervisory practices. One of crucial problems of international regimes is the capacity 
to enforce or deliver on decisions.
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Figure 1.1 Shift in Japanese Major Banks' Basle Capital Ratios
(Simple Average)
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Notes: The simple average of the risk asset ratios of the major banks (city banks, long-term credit 
banks, and trust banks), of which the number of those adopting the Basle rules is 21 (1992.3 
-1996.3), 20 (1996.9-1997.3), 19 (1997.9), 18 (1998.3), 17 (1998.9), 16 (1999.3), 14 (1999.9), 
12 (2000.3), 11 (2000.9-2001.3), and 10 (2001.9).
Source: various issues of Analysis o f  Financial Statements o fA ll Banks, Japanese Bankers 
Association.
A source for this considerable slippage between actual and putative capital 
originates in the nature of the Basle Capital Accord as a set of international regulatory 
standards for capital adequacy requirements: “Standards relevant for sound financial 
systems set out what are widely accepted as core principles, good practices, or 
guidelines in a given segment of the financial system and cover specific functional 
aspects of the system”. For standards to be accepted widely, they are often 
formulated in a fairly general form of broad guidelines. Under the framework of the 
Basle Accord, several important elements are placed at national discretion. Reaching
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an agreement on international standards and even adopting them as domestic standards, 
therefore, are different from effectively implementing them. Furthermore, for the 
Basle minimum capital adequacy requirements, numerical compliance with that 
minimum ratio (i.e., 8 percent) does not mean effective implementation. Various 
factors, including the accounting principles, affect the risk-weighted capital ratios, and 
therefore national regulators can help their banks to achieve the minimum ratio by 
adopting lenient policies. Assessments of implementation need to be interpreted using 
various policy areas related to the capital bases and assets of banks.
Implementation and compliance issues serve as a test for the logic of two-level 
games, because, as seen above, the state of Japanese capital adequacy requirements 
fell short of the spirit of the Basle Accord throughout the 1990s. Although the 
two-level-game approach hypothesises that developments in international standards 
towards prudential regulation give bank regulators external leverage to cope with 
domestic status quo interests and to deliver on what they agree with foreign 
counterparts, a shift in the Japanese banking regulatory system towards prudential 
regulation has not sufficiently occurred yet. It is true that by emphasising a potential 
tension between state negotiators and their domestic actors, the two-level-game 
framework points out the possibility that the credibility of an official commitment to 
an international agreement is low. However, it is important to know why and under
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what conditions defection from international regimes can happen. Systemic-level 
approaches provide poor explanation for the Japanese compliance issues either.
In Japan, where banking regulation based upon informal but institutionalised 
networks among regulators, banks and politicians (as opposed to arm’s length 
regulation) had prevailed and a severe credit crunch was observed in the latter half of 
the 1990s, strict implementation of capital adequacy ratios was on a collision course 
with the status quo interests. If the international and domestic interactions did not give 
Japanese regulators incentives and/or political leverage to carry out prudential capital 
adequacy requirements, it is necessary to offer alternative possible hypotheses 
addressing the problem of bureaucratic politics and implementation. A network state 
hypothesis, which argues that various actors concerned were embedded in an informal 
regulatory network in Japan and policy behaviour began to be constrained by the 
embedment in the 1990s, provides alternative explanations for the issue of 
implementation.
1.3 The Plan of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I, consisting of Chapters 2 and 3, considers 
theoretical background of international banking regulation. Following an argument on 
the economic rationale for banking regulation, Chapter 2 explores a political and
economic view of capital adequacy requirements. A focus is on the roles that bank 
capital plays in both prudential regulation and banks’ competitiveness. The chapter 
also provides a brief history of the Basle Committee, and presents a concise 
explanation of capital adequacy requirements of the 1988 Basle Accord and the 1996 
Amendment.
Chapter 3 offers hypotheses on bank regulators’ behaviour in the process of 
international regulatory harmonisation. To this end, the chapter first outlines a set of 
policy behaviours and economic outcomes against which to test the hypotheses. The 
chapter then develops three sets of hypotheses: a model based upon the logic of 
two-level games; a model emphasising the centrality of domestic institutions in 
defining the probable course of regulatory policy; and systemic-level models 
assigning greater emphasis to either inter-state power relations or market forces.
Having established an analytical basis for exploring Japanese commitment to the 
Basle process, the thesis turns in Part II to an empirical consideration of the 1988 Basle 
Accord, the 1996 Amendment, and the implementation of the Basle capital 
requirements. Chapter 4 provides a historical overview of the development of capital 
adequacy requirements in Japan, and the Basle Committee’s efforts to deal with issues 
of bank capital adequacy in the early and mid-1980s. The chapter sheds light on the 
learning process at the Basle Committee that facilitated a relatively synchronous and
coherent response to the proliferation of off-balance sheet activities (a consensus on a 
system of risk-weighted capital requirements) and developed a new method of the 
tiered framework of capital. Such developments affected Japanese regulators’ 
perception of capital adequacy requirements, but the Chapter points out their abortive 
attempts to introduce effective domestic capital rules in the Japanese institutional and 
political context.
Having developed an in-depth understanding of the historical context, Chapter 5 
examines Japanese regulators’ preference formation, international and domestic 
bargaining positions in the negotiations leading up to the 1988 Basle Accord. 
Analytical concerns are over Japanese regulators’ pursuit of different objectives at the 
international and domestic levels: internationally, they tried to mitigate negative 
impacts of the new rules on the international competitiveness of Japanese banks, and 
domestically, they attempted to introduce statutory capital adequacy requirements that 
private banks had fended off.
Revealing the political process that led up to the 1996 Amendment, Chapter 6 
considers a new configuration of the Basle regulation-making process. Such a new 
configuration reflected two developments. First, financial regulation became esoteric, 
thereby increasing the importance of knowledge as a source of power. Second, a 
domestic banking turmoil affected Japanese regulators’ preference formation and
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bargaining positions. Simultaneously, the chapter considers how new Basle-inspired 
regulatory norms were used as a domestic political tool by the MoF in the midst of 
banking disasters.
Chapter 7 examines the implementation aspects of the Basle capital adequacy 
requirements in Japan, and critically challenges the logic of two-level games as well as 
that of systemic-level approaches. The chapter argues that inadequate institutional 
capacity to deal with non-performing loans held by banks renders the Japanese 
compliance weak since the Basle rules came into effect in March 1993. In addition, the 
banking crisis in November 1997, in general, and the onset of a credit crunch which 
severely hit the LDP’s constituencies, in particular, politicised the issue of capital 
adequacy rules and led to further deviation from the international regulatory standards.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarising the main arguments and findings. 
The thesis brings the strengths and the weaknesses of the two-level-game approach 
into light. On the one hand, the two-level-game approach has the potential to 
contribute to a better understanding of how international and domestic political forces 
interact to produce policy outcomes at the negotiation stage. The thesis finds that the 
two-level-game model can present a counterexample to the existing analyses that 
emphasise systemic-factors such as inter-state power relations and market forces. On 
the other hand, there is room for qualifying the validity of the two-level-game
approach, especially during implementation. The approach fails to adequately explain
domestic stumbling blocks to implementation of and compliance with the Basle
Accord. An approach assigning more weights to domestic politics and institutions can
provide more explanatory power. After discussing various findings, the concluding
chapter presents their broader implications for international regulatory standards.
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Part I Theoretical Background
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Chapter 2
Politics of International Banking Regulation
2.1 Introduction
Until the mid-1970s, there was no significant international mechanism for exchanging 
information among national bank regulators, let alone co-ordinating national 
regulatory arrangements. 1 Peter Cooke of the Bank of England once noted, 
“Supervisors were still very much domestically orientated within the framework of 
different national banking systems”. Regulatory and supervisory practices of banks 
functioned purely on a national basis. However, changes occurring in the structure of 
the international financial market operations in general, and the magnitude of bank 
failures of which impacts effectively went beyond national boundaries in particular, 
called into question the domestically-orientated premises on which banking regulation 
had been based. The rapid growth of cross-border financial transactions increased
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pressures upon major countries to agree to some form of common rules to regulate and 
supervise the international financial market.
Since the late 1950s when the offshore Eurocurrency market gathered momentum, 
international finance has witnessed the accelerating process through which a greater 
degree of freedom was allowed to banks and, accordingly, international capital 
mobility has increased. By the mid-1980s, Peter Drucker observed “the emergence of 
the ‘symbol’ economy—in capital movements, exchange rates and credit flows—as 
the flywheel of the world economy, in place of the ‘real’ economy—the flow of goods 
and services”.3 However, this evolution of freer financial markets did not consist only 
of an overwhelming force in reducing and removing regulatory rules. In fact, the 
introduction of more competition within a market requires increasing the strength of 
regulation and supervision for more competitive markets to mitigate market failures.4 
In 1974, in response to the increasing cross-border financial transactions and 
successive failures of internationally active banks, the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision was set up as an international body bearing responsibility for exchanging 
information and co-ordinating national banking regulations. Although the framework 
for international banking regulation had been developed on an ad hoc basis and 
consequently a patchy international regulatory scheme was established so far, the 
Basle Committee over the next three decades drew the line of responsibility for
supervising internationally active banks, set up the specified qualitative principles of 
effective banking supervision, and established international standards for capital 
adequacy requirements.
This chapter aims at discussing basic ideas about capital adequacy requirements 
and the Basle Committee. The first section will review economic rationale for banking 
regulation and examine politico-economic views on banking regulation with special 
reference to capital adequacy requirements. The second section will briefly sketch the 
process of establishing the Basle Committee. The gist of the 1988 Basle Accord and 
the 1996 Amendment to Incorporate Market Risk will be presented.
2.2 Theory and Practice in Banking Regulation
2.2.1 Economic Rationale fo r  Banking Regulation: Protecting Public Interests 
As per a textbook, the two main reasons for bank regulation are to provide consumer 
protection and to ensure the systemic stability of the credit order.5 The fundamental 
characteristics of financial intermediation under conditions of imperfect and 
asymmetric information underpin these two theoretical rationales. Consumer 
protection is necessary: first, because the financial institution in which depositors hold 
their funds may fail; and, second, because of the possible unsatisfactory conduct of 
business of a financial institution with its clients. Individual customers, especially in
the retail sector where the costs of acquiring information are particularly high and the 
ability and opportunity to do so is also limited, are not in a perfect position to assess 
the safety and soundness of financial institutions. In addition, when principals and 
agents are not equally well informed, more informed agents are able to take 
opportunities and not to carry out appropriate business practices in dealing with less 
informed principals. Bank regulation, including certain guidelines of information 
disclosure, is designed to mitigate these market failures under imperfect information.
The other rationale for bank regulation derives from the necessity to safeguard the 
payments system from possible systemic shocks. Systemic regulation is regarded as 
necessary because the social costs of the failure of an individual bank might possibly 
exceed the private costs for the bank’s shareholders. The possibility that a run on a 
bank gives rise to a destructive impact on the whole of a nation’s economy stems from 
the unique features of banks’ operations: the pivotal position of banks in the economy; 
the dense interconnectedness of banks in their gross positions in clearing systems and 
in inter-bank deposits; the nature of bank contracts (contracts for liquid deposits that 
finance the acquisition of non-liquid assets of uncertain value); and adverse selection 
under asymmetric information. As a result of these characteristics of the banking 
industry, bank regulators give careful consideration to problems of a possible chain 
reaction triggered by a single bank’s failure. The probability that the failure of a single
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bank will cause a systemic problem may be low, but, if systemic failure were to occur, 
the social and political costs could be enormous. From this standpoint, the public 
provision of a “safety net”, such as deposit insurance and lender of last resort facilities, 
is justified in order to prevent runs on banks. Regulatory capital is also required for 
banks in order to cushion the probability of insolvency and to restrict banks’ imprudent 
risk taking.
As far as they go, the economic rationales take account of the destructive blow of 
potential bank runs on the economy, as well as asymmetric information and 
principal-agent problems concomitant with financial services. These rationales can be 
naturally applied to international banking. “Financial globalisation” implies that a 
collapse of an international bank may possibly trigger negative externalities through 
the international interdependence of the payments system and the inter-bank market. 
This is one of the challenges that financial globalisation has posed to regulators, since 
regulatory systems have traditionally functioned on a domestic basis.
The economic rationales for banking regulation suppose that regulatory authorities 
are providing public goods, i.e., the maintenance of the systemic stability of the credit 
order and the protection of consumers. However, in reality, there is a large array of 
interests which influence the regulation-making process. Such interests may well be 
pulling in different directions since regulation not only provides public goods, such as
safety nets, but also constructs institutional arrangements of markets that can 
potentially confer asymmetric advantages upon some and costs upon others.6 Thus, the 
regulation-making process in itself is inherently the subject of political conflict among 
various interests. Tracing such a political process helps us to understand and explain 
the question of why a certain form of international regulation has emerged.
2.2.2 Political Perspectives o f  International Banking Regulation 
This section considers the various motives that drive regulators and private banks to 
take part in the international regulation-making process. First of all, a bank regulatory 
authority is a bureaucratic organisation. As most studies of bureaucracies show, on the 
one hand, regulators act to increase their organisational powers. Morton Halperin and 
Arnold Kanter identify five goals of bureaucratic organisations: first, to defend the 
bureaucracy’s essential mission or purpose; second, to defend/expand the bureaucratic 
“turf”; third, to maintain the organisation’s autonomy; fourth, to maintain morals 
within the organisation (which serves to make sure the organisation functions well); 
and fifth, to make sure that the organisation’s budget grows.7 As for bank regulators, 
stressing their duty of maintaining the sound and stable credit order serves as the first 
bureaucratic goal, and the pursuit of effective regulatory measures is associated with 
the second and third goals.
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On the other hand, the “regulatory capture” approach of economics demonstrates 
that the bureaucracy, the economic regulatory authority in particular, is likely to be
o
held “captive” by well-organised specific private interests. According to this 
perspective, the ability of the regulator to maintain autonomy in formulating and 
implementing policies vis-a-vis the regulated group is open to question, and the 
regulation-making process is subject to the economic interests of the regulated group. 
The key insight of these different approaches to the bureaucracy’s role is that bank 
regulators have to deal with various elements that are pushing and pulling the 
regulatory policy in different directions. These multiple objectives pursued by 
regulators are put into several hypotheses in Chapter 3.
International co-ordination of national regulatory systems possibly resolves 
problems of balancing national regulators’ multiple objectives in highly integrated 
financial markets. Firstly, as Richard Cooper argued, policy co-ordination among 
nations is an increasingly important means for state policy-makers to pursue their 
domestic goals in an interdependent world.9 The system of nationally-regulated 
financial systems leads to a situation where different banks are subject to different 
regulations. Regulatory imbalance makes it difficult to pursue the soundness and 
stability of a national banking system in a highly integrated and competitive 
international banking market. This is because disparities in national regulations will
induce banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage and cause several harmful 
consequences to national banking supervision. International co-ordination to eliminate 
such regulatory imbalance, ceteris paribus, could contribute to an improvement in 
financial systemic stability.
Secondly, in terms of inter-state distributive implications, a multilateral approach 
to regulatory harmonisation seems the best means of resolving a policy dilemma with 
which the increasing necessity of imposing prudential regulation presents national 
regulators.10 On the one hand, the increase in banks’ risk-taking as a result of 
international operations propounds the necessity of reinforcing regulatory means of 
curbing imprudent risk-taking by banks. The failure to contain banks’ reckless 
risk-taking would lead unavoidably to an explosion in the costs of keeping the public 
safety nets for the banking industry in place, since the authority would be forced to bail 
out a growing number of troubled banks. This concern prevents bank regulators from 
pursuing a simple policy of “competition in laxity” or a “race to the bottom”, and 
motivates them to adopt countervailing regulatory measures.
On the other hand, given a regulatory authority’s interest in protecting and 
promoting the international competitiveness of the national banking industry, it would 
be undesirable for such regulatory authorities to impose unilateral regulatory 
restrictions. Thus, regulators confront a dilemma: more regulated financial systems
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may be safer, but their banks under stricter domestic regulations also operate at a 
competitive disadvantage. In addition, cross-national differences in govemment-bank 
relations make it more complex. In the case of banks’ capital adequacy, in the 1980s 
market agents recognised lax capital mles in Japan and France, but credit rating 
agencies saw the strong protection of banks by national governments in these countries 
as a source of high ratings. In this situation, international regulatory co-ordination 
could ensure some sort of a competitive “level playing field” for international banks, 
while permitting national regulators to keep the costs of the public safety nets under 
control.11
From the viewpoint of private banks, the issue of a level playing field sparks off the 
self-interested behaviour of banks. Without globally homogeneous regulation, there 
will be competitive imbalance in the system, with different banks subject to a different 
national structure of banking regulation. Certain groups of banks subject to lax 
regulations can take advantage of this imbalance. This raises the question of 
competitive inequality. When banks find themselves at a competitive disadvantage 
against international competitors that allegedly enjoy regulation-induced advantage at 
home, they tend to turn to their home governments in pursuit of what they call a “fair” 
or level playing field. Creating this level playing field could eliminate some sources of 
regulation-induced advantage, by imposing extra regulatory costs on the banks that
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enjoy such an advantage.
A mismatch between markets and political frameworks in terms of market 
governance, which has been produced by the globalisation of banking activity, has also 
motivated internationally active banks to engage in building common rules and 
standards for self-governance.12 Until recently, compared with the securities industry 
in which self-regulation practices have traditionally been established, the banking 
industry did not develop international self-regulatory bodies.13 However, the rapid 
development of private banking operations, which outpaced the ability of regulators to 
grasp it, has recently induced such private organisations as the Group of Thirty and the 
Institute of International Finance (IIF) to call for self-governance for the banking 
industry. They committed themselves to lobbying vis-a-vis the inter-state regulatory 
body, the Basle Committee.
The Group of Thirty, established in 1978, which includes senior representatives 
from regulatory authorities, the private sector and academia, cover a wide range of 
international financial problems and it is not a narrowly focused banking association.14 
Yet, as seen below, it has recently become eager to establish private-sector-led 
regulatory schemes in international finance. The IIF (founded in 1983 in Washington 
by major commercial banks from North America, Europe and Japan) is a private 
initiative acting to exchange information between borrowing countries and member
banks, and it has been active in the developing and transition economies’ debt deals in
the 1980s and 1990s.15 It was not until the early 1990s that the IIF started to play a 
significant lobbying role in mediating between leading international banks and the 
Basle Committee on behalf of the former.
Private interests have the motivation to complement or replace inadequate 
inter-state regulatory co-operation. Given the differences in national structures, history, 
culture, interests and viewpoints, any international harmonisation of banking 
regulation turns out to be a political compromise. From the private banks’ point of 
view, it is both unsatisfactory from the outset and simultaneously not flexible enough 
to amend in the light of changing financial environments. This image of inter-state 
regulatory co-operation as counterproductive was recently expressed in a report by the 
Group of Thirty:
Even with full understanding of these new challenges and the best of intentions 
to address them [changing financial environments], supervisors find themselves 
hemmed in by national legislative mandates and agency practices, often based on 
a sectoral approach. They face political constraints arising from the issues of the 
moment when legislation is drafted. Such legislation may compel supervisors to 
act in a fashion which is unnecessarily at odds with the market unless they 
receive specific legislative authority to change the way they do business.
So cooperation among national and functional supervisory agencies alone is 
unlikely to produce adequate oversight of global institutions on the time scale 
that the problem demands. As new issues arise, each supervisor will adopt its 
own reporting requirements to deal with them. Not only will reporting vary from 
country to country as it has in the past, but it may be inconsistent with the 
practices of private managements and markets.16
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The report explicitly suggests that the formulation and application of standards be 
better assigned to private sector initiatives.17 The point of this argument is that by 
improving market efficacy, private sector regimes with better expertise and more 
flexibility can more efficiently provide an international public good than national 
regulators.18 Even in the name of the improvement of market efficiency or the 
provision of international public goods, however, less altruistic considerations are 
clearly underlying motivations for private banks in constructing a self-govemance 
regime. After all, it will be in an initiator’s interest to establish a regulatory standard in 
its own favour. Several leading banks’ appeal for the regulatory use of their internal 
risk models to set capital adequacy limits in the 1990s thus largely stemmed from this 
motivation. As banking regulation has become more knowledge-demanding, private 
banks with expertise obtained the ability to present regulators with “problem-solving 
guides” of how to achieve their regulatory goals, thereby becoming more influential in 
determining the direction of regulation.
The distributional bias of regulation underpins one aspect of the politics of banking 
regulation. Recognition of its importance leads private banks, along with regulatory 
authorities, to actively participate in the regulation-making process, thereby highly 
politicising it. A formation of, or a change in, international regulation has inherently 
distributive consequences for the domestic polity and within the international system
once we understand that our attention is drawn to a political process in which 
competing interests interact with one another in pursuit of favourable distributional 
outcomes. The regulatory structure is constructed through political processes, and 
inevitably reflects the configurations of power relations among relevant social groups.
2.2.3 Role o f  Bank Capital: A Politico-Economic View
The concept of capital adequacy requirements (i.e., the regulation requiring banks to 
hold the minimum amount of capital in relation to their assets) is not an entirely novel 
idea. However, given financial liberalisation and the widely recognised deterioration 
of banks’ capital bases, the renewed interest in bank capital requirements has been 
observed since the late 1970s. Although the technical approach to capital adequacy 
requirements has changed according to innovation in international finance, the
19importance of capital adequacy as a linchpin of prudential regulation still remains.
If the establishment of banking regulation in general is the subject of political 
conflicts, how does the regulation of bank capital adequacy in particular matter in the 
politico-economic context? Among other regulatory measures, why did the 
harmonised standards for capital adequacy become a major policy issue? Answers to 
these questions are found in regulatory and competitive implications that bank capital 
has.20
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From the viewpoint of regulators attempting to curb the potential of the systemic 
risk of the banking system, the importance of bank capital derives from the roles it 
plays in depositors’ confidence, banks’ soundness and banks’ risk-taking incentives. 
First, the proportion of capital to deposits is seen as an indication of the extent to which 
depositors are underpinned by shareholders. It sustains the confidence of depositors by 
demonstrating the existence of a basic fund for absorbing loss. Second, the relation of 
capital to certain categories of assets is an important indicator of a bank’s ability to 
withstand adversity. Technically, capital resources are deemed to play a “buffer” role 
against unidentified losses, so that capital must be freely available to meet future,
91unexpected losses. Thus, by requiring banks to hold a minimum capital level, there is 
less likelihood of bank failure, ceteris paribus.
Finally, a risk containment aspect of capital adequacy requirements is assigned to 
its role by relating capital adequacy to risk-weighted assets (risk asset ratios). The 
mere addition of capital to the bank’s balance sheet without due sensitivity to the risk 
exposure of individual banks may cause a reshuffling of the bank’s portfolio from less
99risky to riskier assets and/or off-balance sheet assets. However, by relating capital to 
the varying degrees of risk involved in the spectrum of bank assets and in the 
contingent liabilities off the balance sheet, the risk asset ratios affect the structure of 
the balance sheet, the maturity pattern of assets and liabilities, and the quality of the
asset portfolio. These aspects of capital adequacy have been regarded as increasingly 
important in an era of financial liberalisation.
The strict framework of banking regulation, of which the origins were traced back 
to the 1930s in many countries, has begun to erode. As a result of deregulation m 
many countries, banks gained a greater degree of freedom to engage in various 
financial services. In addition, several parallel developments in monetary issues added 
greater volatility to interest rates and asset prices, and led to greater uncertainty.24 
Countervailing supervision appeared necessary in order to deal with this apparent 
increase of risks and risk-taking associated with the greater freedom of banks and a 
turbulent financial environment. It was against this background that revamping or 
re-introducing capital adequacy requirements emerged as a regulatory policy response 
to liberalised banking in many countries.25 Particularly, the importance of bank capital 
as both a buffer against unexpected losses and as risk containment increased since 
liberalisation advanced.
Attempts to strengthen capital adequacy rules, however, tend to provoke political 
reactions from the banking industry. As seen above, the process of changing the 
regulatory framework involves a shift away from a particular balance of costs and 
benefits for the actors involved towards another pattern. In particular, a change from 
competition-restricting regulations such as interest rate ceilings and the segmentation
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of financial systems towards stricter capital adequacy requirements meant that some of 
the costs of regulatory protection are transferred to the banks themselves. In the case of 
Japan in the early and mid-1980s, regulators tried to revamp the existing capital 
adequacy requirements as a countervailing measure against financial liberalisation, 
but this ended in failure due to strong political opposition from the banking industry. 
Private banks had vested interests in lax capital adequacy requirements. They did not 
want to bear the costs that the new stricter capital ratio regulation would have 
generated. Such political conflict over regulation-induced costs and benefits 
represented the problem of who would bear the costs of financial liberalisation.
Political conflicts over capital adequacy requirements are fuelled by intensive 
international competition—a significant feature of the modem banking industry. The 
role that capital plays in affecting banks’ international competitiveness sheds light on 
the “level playing field” argument. Since the regulation requires banks to put aside 
certain amounts of capital in relation to assets, the level of capital affects the return 
required by shareholders. A bank with a lower capital requirement would be able to 
price its products more competitively, as its threshold return would be lower. Thus, lax 
national capital requirements would generate a source of competitive advantage 
vis-a-vis those banks subjected to more rigid national capital mles. By the same token, 
cross-sectoral disparities in capital requirements, for instance, between securities
houses and banks also have become a matter of concern as the dividing line between 
the two industries has increasingly blurred. In short, the influence of capital on the 
competitiveness of banks highlights a political aspect of capital adequacy 
requirements. In other words, the international harmonisation of capital adequacy 
rules inherently causes a new pattern of gains and losses within the international 
financial system. This distributional implication pushes regulators and private banks 
into negotiations and bargaining in the regulatory harmonisation process.
It should be noted, however, that low capital ratios are not the only source of 
regulation-induced cost advantage for banks. Banks can benefit from other domestic 
regulation-related factors, such as market entry restrictions and ceilings on interest 
rates for deposits. Therefore, the importance of capital in affecting banks’ 
competitiveness cannot alone explain why capital adequacy requirements emerged on 
the international agenda in the 1980s. It is necessary to consider the regulators’ 
perspective of bank capital as a vital regulatory tool under the advancement of 
financial liberalisation. Thus, the politics of capital requirements should be examined 
in a dynamic context encompassing economic interests and regulatory norms.
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2.3 Creation of the Basle Committee: Economic and Political Conditions
2.3.1 International Financial Turmoil in the Early 1970s
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, until 1990 called the Committee on 
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, was founded by the Group of Ten 
countries at the end of 1974 in response to the Bankhaus Herstatt Crisis. The Basle 
Committee comprises representatives of the central banks and supervisory authorities 
of the G-10 countries and Luxembourg—arguably because of its importance as a 
banking “safe haven”. The Committee provided a forum to improve information 
exchange among bank regulators and to develop general principles for bank 
supervision.
Until the establishment of the Basle Committee, there was little communication 
among bank supervisory authorities of the major financial powers, let alone 
co-ordination or co-operation. Even the mutual understanding of one another’s 
regulatory and supervisory systems was usually limited and of academic rather than 
practical value. Given the basic premise that banking was a “domestic” industry, not 
surprisingly, banking regulation had been a purely domestic function. Banks took most 
deposits by, and made most loans to, residents denominated in the domestic currency. 
While there were banks with branches and subsidiaries overseas, those branches and 
subsidiaries engaged in local markets in which they were located, and their assets were
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77mainly financed by local deposits. Overseas operations of this type had relatively 
limited impact that those branches and subsidiaries negatively affected their parent 
banks in home countries, and so limited impact that would pose concerns with the 
regulatory authority responsibility for that parent bank.
Growing offshore pools of U.S. dollar deposits and the rapid growth of the 
multinational companies, however, gave rise to fundamental changes in the structure 
of the banking industry in the early 1960s. Domestic regulatory constraints pushed 
British and American banks to engage in offshore dollar business for their corporate 
clients in the late 1950s and during the 1960s, respectively. Since then, the 
Eurocurrency market gathered momentum and the growing interdependence of banks 
through the interbank market transcended national boundaries. The interbank market 
is a feature of the contemporary financial system: banks takes funds from, and lends 
them to, not only their customers, but also each other through various money markets. 
Thanks to the development of interbank market, banks could engage in loan business 
and foreign exchange trading with not only funds at their disposal but also those 
borrowed from other banks or financial institutions. In the early 1980s, interbank 
funds amounted to around 70 percent of the international banking market—much 
larger than the comparable ratio for the U.S. domestic banking market.29
Though the volume of foreign exchange trading was large enough to put severe
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pressure on the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, it was not until major 
countries’ foreign exchange rates had been left to float that its volume truly grew. The 
quantitative hike in foreign exchange trading was associated with high volatility of 
foreign exchange rates. When government intervention and capital controls 
constrained an exchange rate at a fixed level despite market pressures, as under the 
Bretton Woods system, the market was normally unanimous on both the destination 
and timing of fund movements. Funds tended to flow in one direction and to stay in the 
strong currency until devaluation occurred. In contrast, when rates became free to float, 
market expectations diverged substantially and capital movements became highly 
sensitive to shifts in expectations. New information tended to induce rapid reversals of 
positions. The rate fluctuated continuously and sometimes destructively as news was 
interpreted and reinterpreted. Each time this happened, large quantities of funds could 
be switched into or out of a particular currency. The result was a much greater volume 
of trading and volatility of exchange rates.30
While sharp currency movements provided banks with the new possibility of
31enormous profits, foreign exchange business introduced new risk profiles. 
Speculation on the direction of a currency movement offered high risk/high return 
opportunities, and foreign exchange dealing became a major source of revenue. 
Excessive foreign exchange speculation in theory could be curbed by relevant
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managerial measures and internal controls: clear limits on a bank’s position in various 
foreign currencies; internal controls to ensure the obeisance of such limits; and a 
system of credit analysis to ensure borrowers could repay their foreign loans.
In the early 1970s, these measures, in reality, faced several difficulties. Intense 
competition among banks tended to lead managers to set lax foreign exchange limits in 
order to meet the demand of clients. There were also technological difficulties at that 
time. In the earlier stages of the floating exchange rates system, most banks had not yet 
developed internal accounting and operating systems giving managers “real-time” 
data on the banks’ foreign exchange positions. Given the lack of experience, the 
volatility of asset prices, and the difficulty of cross-border credit checks, credit 
judgements for international business was far more difficult than that used in purely 
domestic lending. Furthermore, there remained difficulties of shielding themselves 
from fraudulent or imprudent behaviour by some account officers and traders.
In fact, losses caused by unauthorised foreign exchange dealing were particularly 
heavy in the early 1970s. Union Bank of Switzerland lost approximately 150 million 
dollars in this way, Lloyds Bank International lost 77 million dollars, and Banque de
' X ' XBruxelles something less than 40 million dollars. These instances of huge losses 
international banks incurred indicated the difficulty of foreign exchange business and 
the importance of relevant banks’ internal control procedures and adept experience.
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Only a year after exchange rates began to float did the combination of the growing 
interbank transactions through the euromaket with the expanding foreign exchange 
dealing in an imprudent manner propound a serious challenge to bank regulators. The 
Bankhaus Herstatt, a German bank, incurred 450 million dollars of foreign exchange 
losses, and West German authorities closed it on 26 June 1974. The abrupt manner in 
which the bank was shut down made matters worse by bringing foreign exchange 
transactions conducted between Herstatt and foreign banks (i.e., part of the transaction 
involving Herstatt’s payment to the foreign banks) to a sudden halt. The foreign banks 
were not able to receive payments for currency that they had forwarded to the German 
bank immediately prior to its close. This brought about a temporary crisis of 
confidence in both international foreign exchange markets and interbank markets. All 
but the most well known and respected financial institutions, were excluded from 
foreign exchange transactions and interbank loans.34
2.3.2 The Basle Committee: Its Political Origin and Development 
The failure of Herstatt revealed not only the vulnerability of international banks and 
potential cross-border repercussions of bank failures, but also the cross-national 
asymmetrical distribution of the costs generated by such bank failures. While the 
former served as a catalyst for much rethinking of traditional, domestic-oriented
attitudes within bank regulatory authorities, the latter had political implications, 
particularly for the dominant international financial centres. States with international 
financial centres were more exposed to the powerful international contingent effects of 
banking crises than others. In particular, the United Kingdom, where the City of 
London hosted more than two hundred branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks by 
the early 1970s was concerned with the clarification of regulatory responsibility for 
international banks.35 Against this political background, the Basle Committee was 
established by the Governors of the G-10 countries under the strong initiative by the 
Bank of England.
The Committee consisted of representatives from central banks and from some 
other banking regulatory authorities. Table 2.1 shows the composition of the Basle 
Committee membership in 1988. Regulator meetings of the Basle Committee are 
usually held three to four times a year at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
headquarters, which also provides a secretariat and administrative support. A detail 
often overlooked or confused is that the Committee is not actually part of the BIS. 
There is also a chairperson who does not act as one of the representatives of his own 
country, but who is responsible to the Governors as a body and who reports to them on 
the committee’s activities.
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Table 2.1 Membership of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
(1988)
Member States Representative Institutions
Belgium Banking Commission 
National Bank of Belgium
Canada Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
Bank of Canada
France Banking Control Commission 
Bank of France
Germany Federal Banking Supervisory Office 
Deutsche Bundesbank
Italy Bank of Italy
Japan Bank of Japan 
Ministry of Finance
Luxembourg The Luxembourg Monetary Institute
Netherlands The Netherlands Bank
Sweden Sveriges Riksbank
Royal Swedish Banking Inspectorate
Switzerland Swiss National Bank
Swiss Federal Banking Commission
United Kingdom Bank of England
United States Federal Reserve Board 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Secretariat Bank for International Settlements
Source: Porter (1993) Table 3.1 p. 57.
The Basle Committee was founded as a permanent standing committee to exchange 
information among bank regulators on international banking activities. The 
Committee operates without any extensive formal mandate or any constitution or 
bylaws, and serves as an informal forum for ongoing co-operation on banking 
regulatory matters. Its decision-making is based upon consensus among its members.
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This decision-making mechanism carries weight with the importance of mutual 
understandings and learning at the Committee.
Initially, the Basle Committee did not attempt to harmonise the existing national 
regulatory systems, because of a heterogeneous membership and the diversified 
regulatory practices among them. In order to mitigate flaws in the existing system, 
most of which derived from a lack of information exchange among national regulators, 
instead, the committee set forth three principles. First, the Committee attempted to 
identify gaps in the supervisory coverage of international banking. Second, it provided 
an opportunity for banking supervisors to learn from one another and thereby 
contribute to the stability of the international banking system. Third, it provided a 
forum in which potential dangers within national banking system could be addressed 
before they led to a crisis.36
The first fruit of the Basle Committee’s work was to agree upon a framework for 
allocating regulatory responsibility, particularly in respect of solvency, liquidity, and 
foreign exchange operations and positions, for the large networks of internationally 
active banks (i.e., subsidiaries, branches and joint ventures).37 The 1975 Basle 
Concordat placed primary responsibility for the supervision of international banks’ 
solvency on the regulatory body of the home country where the parent bank was 
headquartered; while it assigned primary responsibility for the supervision of liquidity
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to the authorities of the host country. In the case of subsidiaries, the host authorities 
should bear primary responsibility for the supervision of solvency.
While the Concordat was seen as a first step towards establishing an internationally 
accepted approach to banking regulation, there were many important problems 
unsolved. The problems included, for example, which central banks should act as a 
lender of the last resort, how to sort out a troubled bank committing a serious fraud, 
and how to iron out cross-national differences in the effectiveness to carry out 
regulation and supervision. Being faced with these practical difficulties, the 1975 
Concordat was revised in 1983 and 1992, in the wake of the 1982 scandal of the Banco 
Ambrosiano and the 1992 scandal of the Bank for Credit and Commerce International, 
respectively. Through these revisions, the Concordat re-emphasised home country 
control, but simultaneously strengthened the position of a host country authority, 
especially regarding the right to gather information on branches and subsidiaries from 
home country authorities and to impose restrictive measures necessary to satisfy its 
prudential regulatory concerns. This essentially reflected American preferences.39 The 
focus was on reducing the costs of financial failures to states with the major 
international financial centres, notably the U.S.
From the 1974 establishment of the Basle Committee until the early 1980s, 
Japanese regulators played a subordinate role. The rapid post-war economic growth
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facilitated Japan to participate in international financial institutions since the early 
1960s. When the Group of Ten, the club of industrial countries that discussed the 
creation of additional IMF reserves, was established in 1961, Japan was one of its 
members and took part in the creation of the General Arrangements to Borrow. In 1964, 
Japan restored convertibility on current account, and became a member of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. However, during the 1974 
crisis of confidence in both international foreign exchange markets and interbank, the 
so-called “Japan premium” loomed. It reflected the fact that Japanese banks did not yet 
build the basis of international operations. Japanese regulators also did not play an 
important role in coping with the international financial instability during this period.40
In parallel with the development of the Basle Concordat, the Basle Committee 
began to be concerned about the erosion of bank capital levels since the early 1980s, 
and played an important role in harmonising national capital adequacy standards over 
time. The proliferation of a certain type of capital adequacy requirements, i.e., risk 
asset ratios, among the member states by the mid-1980s was attributed to the learning 
process at the Committee. Japan and the U.S., of which domestic capital rules were 
relatively underdeveloped, began to adopt this particular type of capital adequacy 
requirements. As Chapter 4 examines in more detail, the Japanese effort to update 
domestic capital adequacy rules failed due to the domestic opposition, but it indicates
that regular study and discussion of the regulatory systems used in each of the member 
states enabled Japanese regulators to learn about new developments in regulatory 
techniques.
To say that the Basle Committee has provided an institutional framework for the 
learning process, however, is not to suggest that the regulatory development in the 
Basle Committee was politically neutral. To the contrary, the development of the 
international harmonisation of capital adequacy requirements reflected the interests of 
the powerful states with the major international financial centres. As mentioned above, 
international standards for capital adequacy requirements have the asymmetrical 
distribution of costs and benefits within and across countries. This distributional 
consequence should be taken into account.
The idea of “fairness” is central to understanding the domestic politics of 
international banking in the American context.41 As Kapstein points out, on the one 
hand, the American initiative in the Basle Accord can be seen as a long-term 
stabilisation strategy of strengthening international banks in the wake of the serious 
debt crisis in the early 1980s 42 For American banks, on the other hand, the goal of 
creating a level playing field is to establish a fair competitive environment in which 
foreign banks cannot explore the advantage of their lax domestic regulations. This 
logic underlined American banks’ intense lobbying against unilaterally strict capital
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rules in the U.S. and for harmonising cross-national differences. Given this political 
background, American regulators decided to take the initiative in pursing collective 
action at the Basle Committee.43
It should be noted, however, that European integration had significant effects on 
the Basle process prior to the American initiative. Following the first EEC Banking 
Co-ordination Directive of 1977, the EEC Advisory Banking Committee defined a 
number of observation ratios in 1980, and ‘risk asset ratios’ was one of them. European 
regulators developed the idea of the risk-weighted capital adequacy on which the 
Basle Committee drew when initiating its own work on capital adequacy requirements 
in the early 1980s.44 Furthermore, in order to level a playing filed between the banking 
and securities industries, the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) was established in 
1993. The CAD became a base for the 1993 Basle proposals for market risk regulation. 
In order to reduce the costs of adjustment, European members of the Basle Committee 
had a strong incentive to make Basle capital rules compatible with European rules.
As regards Japanese participation in the international regulatory harmonisation 
process, several principals and pressures for participation are deemed to work. At the 
international level, they include regulators’ concerns over financial stability, pressure 
exerted by the United States, and market pressure. At the domestic level, political, 
economic and institutional factors affected the course through which regulators
participate in the international harmonisation process. In Japan, domestic capital rules 
were not institutionally developed and private banks took the advantage of such lax 
regulations before the Basle Accord, and the economy plunged into severe recession in 
the 1990s. Such domestic factors were crucial in determining regulators’ preference 
formation, negotiation positions, and implementation. Several hypotheses on 
consequences of international and domestic factors and their interactions will be 
examined in Chapter 3. The following sections will provide rough sketches of the 1988 
and 1996 capital adequacy regulations.
2.3.2 The 1988 Capital Adequacy Accord
While these initial works of the Committee focused primarily on the delineation and 
co-ordination of regulatory responsibilities, the Committee’s attention turned to the 
substance of prudential regulatory norms. This led up to the establishment of a set of 
common capital adequacy requirements, the Basle Capital Accord. As in the case of 
the initial Committee’s works, the focus on the importance of solvency in the 
supervisory processes was observed in the following discussion of ways of measuring 
and setting standards of capital adequacy.45 As the domestic politics of capital rules 
prior to the Basle Accord and Japanese participation in the Basle negotiations will be 
considered in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, only the gist of the minimum
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capital standards is given here.
As Figure 2.1 shows, internationally active banks were required to keep the ratio of 
capital to risk-weighted assets (a risk asset ratio) more than 8 percent. Under the Basle 
rules, regulatory capital, which was the numerator, consisted of two parts: core capital 
(Tier I) and supplementary capital (Tier II). Tier I was defined as shareholders’ equity 
and disclosed reserves, and had to account for at least half of the bank’s total capital. 
Tier II comprised less “pure” capital, i.e., undisclosed reserves, general provisions, 
asset revaluation reserves, hybrid capital instruments and long-term subordinated debt. 
Meanwhile, the bank’s assets, or its credit exposure in more general terms, were the 
denominator. Bank’s assets on the balance sheet and its off-balance sheet exposure 
were divided into broad categories, and each of the categories was weighted according 
to risk. For example, while the multiplier 1 (100 percent) was placed as a risk-weight 
on corporate loans, the multiplier 0 (0 percent) was placed on cash and OECD 
countries’ national bonds. These asset categories were then simply added together.
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Figure 2.1 The 1988 Basle Capital Accord
Capital (Tier I + Tier II) >  g
R isk-w eighted  Assets: (cash, OECD bonds  x 0%) + (mortgage loans x 50% ) + (loans x 100%) etc.
Notes: Tier I capital consists of capital stock, capital reserve, retained earnings, and etc. 
Tier II capital consists of 45% of unrealised capital gains, general provisions, 
subordinated debt and etc.
Tier I capital must account for at least half the numerator.
The Basle Accord was not an international treaty but rather a “statement” or a set 
of “recommendations”, therefore it was not legally binding. The Basle Committee also 
did not state any sanction about the banks’ failure to meet the required ratio of 8 
percent. The implementation of the minimum standard was left to the national 
government’s discretion. Although the Basle Accord was directed to the committee 
member countries, the Committee made every effort to have the Accord recognised by 
as many non-member countries as possible. In 1988, the International Conference of 
Banking Supervisors, consisting of bank regulators representing about 100 countries, 
was held in Tokyo and discussed the world-wide promotion of the Accord.46
2.3.3 The 1996 Amendment to Incorporate Market Risk
The rapid involvement of banks in the securities markets, whether directly or through 
affiliated firms, propounded serious regulatory concerns and led bank regulators to
develop prudential mechanisms for the control of the additional risk incurred by the 
banks in this manner. In 1996, the Basle Committee agreed on the amendment of the 
Basle Capital Accord in order to address the problem of banks’ involvement in the 
securities markets. While the 1988 Basle Capital Accord required banks to set aside a 
minimum amount of capital to guard against the risk that those they lent to might go 
bankrupt (so-called credit risk), the 1996 Amendment applied capital charges to the 
risk of losses in on- and off-balance-sheet positions arising from movements in market 
prices (so-called market risk). Chapter 6 addresses the negotiation process of the 
Amendment and Japanese participation.
As Figure 2.2 shows, while under the 1988 Basle Accord the ratio of capital was 
related to risk-weighted assets that were measured by the single method, bank assets 
were divided into trading and banking books under the rules of the Amendment. Risk 
exposure in each book, and in turn required capital, were separately measured. The 
trading book consisted of short-term transferable securities; the banking book 
comprised the rest of financial business. The banking book was still subject to the 
existing 1988 rules. New measurement methods, either the standardised method or 
banks’ internal model, were used for the trading book. With regard to capital, a new 
category of capital, Tier III, was added only to cover market risk (see Figure 2.3). Tier 
III was short-term subordinated debt. Under the 1988 rules, only long-term
subordinated debt was allowed to be counted as part of Tier II. Yet, as securities 
regulators widely allowed securities houses to regard short-term subordinated debt as 
part of capital, the Basle Committee permitted banks to count it as capital that only 
covers market risk.
Figure 2.2 Conceptual Pictures of the 1996 Am endm ent
A ssets
(loans,
securities
holdings,
trading
portfolios)
etc. \  ^
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book
\
| Capital | 
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book
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the 1988 Basle Accord the 1996 Amendment
Figure 2.3 The 1996 Am endm ent
Capital (Tier I + Tier II) Capital (Tier I + Tier 11+ Tier III) ^ 0 o/
' +  -■ x  lA.J  d  o  /o
E (asset categories in banking book x risk weights) market risk in trading book
Notes: Tier I capital consists o f capital stock, capital reserve, retained earnings, and etc. 
Tier II capital consists o f 45% o f unrealised capital gains, general provisions, 
long-term subordinated debt and etc.
Tier III consists o f  short-term subordinated debt, and is allowed to be counted as 
part o f capital only to cover market risk.
Mark risk in trading book is measued by either standardised methods or 
banks’ internal models.
12.5 is the reciprocal o f 8 %.
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The 1996 Amendment represented a milestone in the development of 
international banking regulations in terms of regulatory methods: for the first time, 
banks were allowed to use their own risk models for estimating capital requirements 
for market risks that they were taking. Such regulatory facilitation of banks’ internal 
risk models was the first contribution to the on-going overhaul of the 1988 Basle 
Capital Accord, which will come into effect in 2006 or 2007. The proposed new Basle 
Accord will use the banks’ own internal ratings where these are judged robust, and 
effectively allow banks with sophisticated risk management systems to hold less 
capital.47 Among regulators, bankers, and economists, it is frequently claimed that 
given the growing complexity of financial transactions and the development of private 
sector risk management, one-rule-fits-all type capital adequacy requirements are no 
longer efficient for regulating leading banks possessing sophisticated risk 
management skills and, therefore, there is no alternative but to delegate part of the 
regulatory functions to the banks. Thus, the 1996 Amendment stood at the crossroads 
in the development of international banking regulation. It signalled a shift towards a 
new division of labour between the regulators and the regulated, and a more 
sophisticated approach to regulation which would be compatible with both banks’ 
in-house control models and their internal risk management systems.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter argued economic rationales for and political implications of international 
banking regulation, with special reference to capital adequacy requirements. Banking 
regulation never emerges in a political vacuum. Given a general trend towards 
financial liberalisation and external economic shocks such as the debt crisis, 
regulatory importance of capital brought capital requirements into the spotlight. 
Namely, while banks gained a greater freedom of operations throughout the 1980s, 
they continued to reduce their capital-to-asset ratios that were deemed as buffers 
against unexpected losses and risk containment. It sparked off regulatory concerns by 
regulators. At the same time, competitive conditions of banks are uniquely sensitive to 
the level of capital requirements. This nature of capital has provoked political 
concerns among interested actors including the regulators and the regulated.
Regulators and banks interpreted their interests under changing economic and 
political conditions and interacted with one another in pursuit of their own interests. In 
particular, political conflicts were over regulatory scope (Which assets and which 
banks should be regulated?), the definition of regulatory capital (Of which 
components should capital be made?), and the measurement framework (How should 
risk be estimated?). The thread of argument about these political questions is running 
throughout this research.
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The creation and development of the Basle minimum capital standards is a 
dynamic political process in which domestic and international political forces interact 
to produce outcomes. The next chapter will develop several hypotheses drawing on the 
logic of two-level games and consider possible alternative hypotheses based upon 
domestic institutional explanations.
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Chapter 3
Two-level Game Model and its Alternatives
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to offer hypotheses on bank regulators’ behaviours in the
process of international regulatory harmonisation. To this end, the first section
outlines a set of policy behaviours and economic outcomes against which to test the
hypotheses. The second section presents three sets of hypotheses: a model based
upon Putnam’s two-level games; a model emphasising the centrality of domestic
institutions in defining the probable course of policy; and, systemic-level models
assigning greater emphasis to either inter-state power relations or market forces.
The two-level game model sees state negotiators as actors in pursuit of their
preferences, and hypothesises several strategies with which negotiators can improve
the opportunity to take advantage of the international and domestic interaction. Some
might argue that, under the logic of two-level games, a negotiating officer is an agent
on behalf of his/her domestic constituents and thus cannot have endogenous
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preferences. As Putnam mentions, however, relaxing this assumption of state 
negotiators as agents sheds light on the motives and strategies of the negotiator to 
cope with his/her competing priorities.1 The domestic institution model hypothesises 
that the informal nature of regulatory network in Japan is a major source of 
“institutional stickiness” or institutional inertia, which hampers a smooth shift 
towards rule-based, arm’s-length prudential regulation. The image of systemic-level 
models hypothesising that structural factors determine the course of policy stands in 
sharp contrast to the image of state negotiators are enmeshed in domestic Japanese 
bureaucratic and political processes, which the other hypotheses assume.
3.2 Indicators of Credible Commitment
How can we know a given country’s adherence to the Basle Capital Accord? The 
Basle Capital Accord is a set of international standards for capital adequacy 
requirements. For international regulatory standards to be promulgated widely, they 
must be general enough to accommodate variations in national traditions and 
economic cultures as well as different national financial system structures. Precisely 
because of this nature of international standards, the Basle Accord gave national 
regulators wide discretionary powers to determine the exact way in which it was 
operationalised within their jurisdiction. This makes it difficult to evaluate a given 
country’s commitment to the Basle Accord. For example, merely meeting the
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minimum requirements alone is questionable when accounting standards are 
inadequate and/or when definitions of impaired loans and required provisions are 
loose, since there can be considerable slippage between actual and putative capital. 
Japan has been accused of both.2
Just looking at the numerical achievements of Japanese banks, therefore, is not 
enough to evaluate implementation—a sequence of actions by regulators to carry out 
the terms of an international agreement. It inherently requires considerable 
judgement about compliance—the degree to which national regulators, and 
ultimately private banks themselves, adhere to the spirit of an international 
regulatory accord. In terms of regulatory prudence, the object of capital adequacy 
requirements is to make individual banks more resilient to unforeseen losses, thereby 
increasing the safety and stability of the banking system as a whole. For individual 
banks to be more resilient, both the quality and the quantity of capital are of 
importance. For national regulators to strictly comply with prudential regulatory goal 
of monitoring bank solvency, therefore, they must ensure that related policies support 
the goal of prudential regulation. In other words, discretionary policies working 
against this regulatory goal are deemed to move away from meeting the principles 
for the prudential practices in capital adequacy requirements. Reaching an agreement 
on international standards and even adopting them as domestic standards—“formal 
compliance”— should be distinguished from effectively implementing them—“real
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compliance”.
To analytically examine the indicators of credible commitment to or real 
compliance with the Basle Accord, capital adequacy requirements are cast as a set of 
norms:
(1) Capital adequacy is a tool of monitoring bank solvency, and thereby a 
linchpin of prudential regulation.
(2) Bank regulators should make efforts to make regulatory capital-to-assets 
ratios more closely attuned to the reality of banks’ financial states.
(3) Bank regulators should promptly act to cope with insolvent or 
undercapitalised banks.
All three norms are related. The monitoring of bank solvency by regulators is the 
core of prudential regulation. A capital-to-assets ratio is an index of bank’s solvency. 
For monitoring function to be effective, banks’ capital ratios must precisely mirror 
their financial strengths. It is true that, in reality, it is technically challenging to have 
the balance sheet of a bank exactly reflect its true economic value because not only 
mark-to-market accounting in general but also market-based estimates of the bank’s 
franchise value or goodwill need to be fully considered. What the second norm 
requires, however, is to devise the measurement of capital ratios in a less distorted
way, thereby having capital adequacy ratios more accurately reflect a bank’s 
financial status. The monitoring of accurate capital ratios is a necessary condition for 
bank regulators to swiftly take corrective actions against weakly-capitalised banks. 
These norms and measures are the baseline against which this study analyses policy 
choices regarding a given country’s commitment to international capital adequacy 
requirements.
The following help define indicators of credible commitment to the Basle Capital 
Accord or lack thereof:
(1) Numerical compliance with required capital adequacy ratios—banks are at 
the very least required to meet the capital adequacy ratios. Falling short of 
this criterion clearly signals non-compliance.
(2) Statutory capital adequacy rules—statutory rules are necessary, if not 
sufficient, for rules-based, arm’s-length prudential regulation, which helps 
reduce the tendency of “regulatory capture” and the scope of regulatory 
forbearance. A lack of statutory rules weakens credible commitment to the 
Basle Capital Accord.
(3) Accounting principles, and loan classification and provisioning 
rules—accounting and provisioning rules are crucial for reducing uncertainty 
about banks’ financial states and the quality of capital and assets. Opacity in
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these rules is likely to result in a considerable gap between real and putative 
capital and therefore means a weaker commitment to the Basle Capital 
Accord.
(4) Regulators ’ prompt corrective action—to the end of prudential regulation, 
bank regulators are required to swiftly take corrective actions against ailing 
banks (e.g., closing down of undercapitalised banks or re-capitalising weak 
banks in exchange for rigid restructuring plans). While a failure to promptly 
act undermines the credibility of Basle adherence, the institutionalisation of 
regulators’ prompt corrective action will reduce the scope of regulatory 
forbearance and thereby increase credible commitment.
Rigid adherence to the norms of capital adequacy requirements requires bank 
regulators to place these above-mentioned policy behaviours ahead of other concerns. 
Even if these policy behaviours may contribute to the long-term and general gains in 
terms of promoting financial stability, however, they may unevenly impose 
short-terms costs on various segments of society. For example, when banks make 
efforts to increase their capital ratios by shrinking their loans, a so-called credit 
crunch is likely to hit small- and medium-sized businesses lacking alternative sources 
of financing through the capital markets.3 A radical shift towards prudential 
regulation under a banking crisis may require the unpopular policy of using public
money to bail out ailing banks. Especially when the sloppy management and fraud of 
the banks concerned are revealed, the use of taxpayers’ money is especially 
unpopular. Politicians may take the blame. To curb such public criticism, the use of 
public money to recapitalise banks will be offered with strings attached, and 
inherently invites political interference in bank’s management and lending decisions. 
Therefore, bankers are often reluctant to ask for the infusion of public funds.
In short, there are various forces pulling and pushing in various directions as to 
compliance with the Basle Accord. In order for countries to comply with the spirit of 
the Basle Accord, national bank regulators must have enough domestic support to 
pay for the short-term costs. For countries to effectively defect from the Accord, they 
must have enough political forces to press for leniency in prudential regulation and to 
break their commitments.
The next section will provide several hypotheses on political forces affecting the 
course of banking regulation. The four indicators of numerical compliance, statutory 
rules, accounting principles, and regulators’ prompt action are policy behaviours and 
economic outcomes against which to test the hypotheses in the empirical part of this 
thesis.
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3.3 Hypotheses on Japanese Commitments to the Basle Accord
3.3.1 Two-Level Game Hypothesis
3.3.1.1 Two-level Game in International Banking Regulation
The two-level game framework is one of the most popular and influential conceptual 
building-blocks in the subject of diplomacy and international cooperation, and 
international relations in general.4 Although it has been the subject of modification 
since its elaboration in the late 1980s, it has remained central to research in the 
discipline.5 The basic proposition is that state negotiators are typically playing in 
two political “games”; that is, they are engaged in domestic and international politics 
simultaneously. The international and domestic interplay not only constrains policy 
makers, but also creates new possibilities for creative statecraft. One of the most 
distinctive features of the two-level-game logic is that “domestic policies can be used 
to affect the outcomes of international bargaining, and that international moves may 
be solely aimed at achieving domestic goals”.6 The two-level-game approach 
assumes that each state negotiator is constrained by his/her domestic win-sets, 
defined as the set of potential agreements that would be accepted by the most 
powerful domestic groups. The approach propounds a wide range of bargaining 
strategies with which state negotiators manipulate the configuration of domestic and 
foreign win-sets in order to achieve their preferences.
The politics of international financial regulatory co-operation can be understood
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Qin terms of a two-level-game analogy. Bank regulators attending the Basle 
negotiations are supposed to engage in negotiations with foreign counterparts at the 
international level, and each of them simultaneously is concerned with the domestic 
implications of the international negotiations. This perspective helps us to 
hypothesise regulators’ behaviours in the process of international regulatory 
harmonisation.
Since the late 1950s, when the offshore Eurocurrency market gathered 
momentum, international finance saw states giving banks an ever-increasing degree 
of freedom; leading to a concomitant increase in cross-border financial transactions.9 
A deepening of financial interdependence among countries posed substantial political 
and economic challenges to bank regulators. One of them is that bank regulators are 
faced with a potential dilemma between the maintenance of a sound domestic 
banking system and the economic interests (or international competitiveness) of 
domestic banks under the condition of highly integrated financial markets.10
On the one hand, the increase in risk-taking approach of banks accompanying the 
expansion of their international operations necessitates regulatory means of curbing 
their imprudent risk-taking. The unique importance of banks in the payment system 
underpins the maintenance of the sound banking system as a public good.11 In 
addition, failure to contain banks’ reckless risk-taking would lead unavoidably to an 
explosion in the costs of maintaining public safety nets for the banking industry,
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since the authorities would be forced to bail out a growing number of troubled banks. 
Thus, the inept handling of a banking disaster by regulators puts political pressure on 
the regulators themselves. To put it another way, the pursuit of prudential regulatory 
measures serves the regulators’ goals of defending their essential mission and
1 9bureaucratic “turf’, and maintaining the organisation’s autonomy.
On the other hand, bank regulators need to be concerned with the economic 
interests of private banks. As the “regulatory capture” literature clearly shows, 
regulated groups with high stakes in the regulation-making process can prevail in 
struggles with other interests.13 Since capital adequacy requirements transfer some 
of the costs of regulatory protection from consumers to banks themselves, banks 
have incentives to mobilise politicians and to block the introduction of such 
regulations. According to this line of argument, for bank regulators to minimise 
politicians’ intrusion into the making of regulations, it is necessary to keep the banks 
satisfied that they are getting a fair deal.14 In addition, given the growing 
internationalisation of banking operations, bank regulators have an interest in 
protecting and promoting the international competitiveness of their national banking 
industry. It would be undesirable for such regulators to impose unilateral regulatory 
restrictions that put their domestic banks at a competitive disadvantage against 
international competitors. The adoption of stricter requirements for banks enjoying 
lax domestic capital adequacy requirements means not only imposing extra
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regulatory costs on the banks, but also eliminating some sources of 
regulation-induced advantage.
Bank regulators thus confront a dilemma: more regulated financial systems might 
be safer, but banks placed under stricter domestic regulations would also operate at a 
competitive disadvantage. A multilateral approach to regulatory harmonisation seems 
the best means of resolving the policy dilemma with which the increasing necessity 
of imposing prudential regulation presents national regulators.15 International 
regulatory co-ordination could ensure some sort of a competitive “level playing 
field” for international banks, while curbing domestic opposition and permitting 
national regulators to pursue prudential regulation.
Furthermore, international banking regulations, which were laid down by the 
Basle Committee, can be seen as an international regime—a set of “implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.16 The Basle 
Committee has constructed an institutional platform in which its member regulators 
regularly gather, pool their expertise, and develop international standards for banking 
regulation. This suggests that developments in regulatory norms and methods at the
17Basle Committee can be translated into a national level.
The autonomy of national regulators, however, is not self-evident at the domestic 
level, and therefore transnational proliferation of certain regulatory methods is
74
subject to domestic politics. There is disagreement over the degree of state autonomy 
in the literature of Japanese banking regulation. While some argue that Japanese
bank regulators enjoy a high degree of autonomy, others argue that they are subject
18 • to regulatory capture. As far as the issue of domestic capital adequacy rules in
Japan is concerned, it is difficult to say that bank regulators enjoyed a high degree of
autonomy. In contrast, the capital adequacy rules were effectively watered down in
Japan. As seen below, the logic of two-level game shows several strategies that bank
regulators can use to shore up their policy autonomy.
3.3.1.2 Insights from a Two-level-game Framework: Regulators’ Strategies 
Informed by the two-level-game approach, this section considers various strategies 
with which the Japanese MoF sorts out the regulatory dilemma between keeping the 
domestic banking system sound and Japanese banks internationally competitive. The 
two-level-game approach assumes that each state negotiator at the international 
negotiating table is constrained by his/her domestic win-sets, defined as the set of 
potential agreements that would be accepted by the most powerful domestic groups. 
The two-level-game approach helps us comprehend how domestic policies can be 
used to affect the outcomes of international bargaining, and how international moves 
may be utilised to attain domestic objectives. The typology of strategies for 
simultaneously exploiting both domestic and international politics in a bargaining
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situation is examined here.
One strategy drawn from the two-level-game approach is what Putnam labels 
“reverberation”, i.e., international pressures change the domestic power balance or 
the preferences of domestic groups.19 This implies that international actions can be 
employed to change outcomes in the domestic arena. By joining international 
regimes or linking issues in international negotiations, negotiating officers can use an 
internationally agreed issue as external leverage to withstand domestic opposition, to 
legitimise unpopular policy goals, and thereby to shore up their autonomy vis-a-vis 
domestic interest groups.
The MoF is assumed to have multiple, potentially conflicting objectives (i.e., 
keeping the domestic banking system sound and domestic banks competitive) and to 
have partial autonomy. That is to say, although the ministry has its own objectives, its 
capacities to achieve them are not necessarily ensured. State capacity to achieve 
policy preferences is not determined independently of societal pressures. Nor is state 
autonomy automatically derived from the domestic institutional setting. Instead, state
autonomy depends upon policymakers’ statecraft, using which they strive to achieve
• 20policy goals. The extent to which policymakers attain their own preferences is 
contingent upon their skill in conducting negotiations with societal actors and is 
determined exogenously.
It can also be interpreted in terms of the issue of regulatory independence.
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Regulatory and supervisory independence of the financial sector is seen as a key 
element in maintaining financial stability, but in reality many national authorities 
lack such independence.21 The regulation-making process is likely to be exposed to 
pressure from both the banking industry and politicians. Joining an international 
regulatory agreement can be seen as a supplementary policy for resolving a lack of 
regulatory independence. Thus, one of incentives for joining international 
agreements is a regulator’s perception that resources available domestically are 
inadequate to sort out a politically controversial issue, and that “reverberation” might 
provide additional leverage with the regulator.22
The two-level interplay also gives regulators strategies to reshape the 
configuration of the win-set of domestic constituents with the aim of reaching an 
international agreement and/or increasing their international bargaining position. One 
of those strategies is what Putnam terms “synergistic issue linkage”: by linking a 
tough policy issue with more popular policy measures, negotiators can enlarge the 
size of domestic win-sets.23 A larger domestic win-set gives negotiating officers 
more leeway to reach a compromise with their foreign counterparts. Another strategy 
is the manipulation of asymmetric information between negotiating officers and 
domestic constituents.24 During international negotiations, regulators may be able to 
take advantage of their exclusive power to negotiate with their foreign counterparts 
and the uncertainty of the domestic constituents about the content of the negotiations.
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These strategies tell us where to look to understand how the two-level interaction 
created room for the MoF to manipulate domestic politics in pursuit of its desired 
international outcomes.
Behind this hypothesis, there is an assumption that bank regulators are the sole, 
formal interface between domestic and international domains,25 and simultaneously 
they are enmeshed in domestic and international institutions. At the domestic level 
the focus is on relationships between regulators and banks which are most affected 
by the regulatory change associated with international co-operation. At the 
international level, only regulators attain formal access to the negotiation table. 
Private actors and politicians normally do not have direct channels to international 
negotiations in Basle, and therefore turn to regulators in order to inject their 
preferences into the negotiation outcomes. Although this highlights the distributive 
nature of international regulation, an international institutional setting provided by 
the Basle Committee has also enabled the collective work among its members to play 
a significant role in diffusing certain regulatory norms. By locating regulators at the 
link between international and domestic institutions, this assumption allows 
regulators to play a pivotal role in balancing domestic and international concerns.
The above argument implies that the MoF was playing domestic and international 
games simultaneously. At the international level, the MoF negotiated with its foreign 
counterparts with the aim of maintaining the international competitiveness of
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Japanese banks. At the domestic level, the ministry used the international 
negotiations to manipulate domestic politics and to strengthen the domestic capital 
regulation which private banks had blocked.
3.3.2 Domestic-level Explanation: A Network State and Institutional Inertia 
An alternative explanation for Japanese participation in the Basle process accords a 
central role to domestic institutions. While the logic of two-level game approach 
emphasises regulators’ statecraft to pursue their preferences, an institutional approach 
explores the reason why institutions centred on informal models of interaction may 
turn out to be particularly “sticky”.26
3.3.2.1 Japan as a Network State
Looking at the institutionalised relations among state bureaucracy, politicians of the 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and interest groups, Daniel Okimoto 
provides a breakthrough in the issue-based classification of Japan’s policy-making
onprocesses. He sees Japan as a “network state”. A network state is defined as “one
28able to exercise power only in terms of its network of ties with the private sector”. 
On the one hand, various institutional arrangements in the Japanese political 
economy may give state bureaucracy policy measures with which to intervene in the 
marketplace. On the other hand, bureaucratic power is institutional-driven; that is, it
emerges from specific institutional structures of LDP-bureaucracy-interest group 
alignments and the political exchanges that take place among them. This means that 
the autonomy and power of bureaucracy varies noticeably between and within the 
different sectors. Thus, autonomy is a matter of degree and the degree varies across 
bureaucratic jurisdiction.
In order to examine the basis for outstanding variations across sectors in the 
degree of which Japanese industrial policy is politicised, Okimoto divides 
policy-making processes into four categories according to modes of state-society 
relations: “clientelistic linkages”, “reciprocal patronage”, “generalised support”, and 
“public policy feedback”.29 In each category, the bureaucracy, the LDP and interest 
groups form a distinct mode of their connections and political exchanges.
Firstly, the type of “clientelistic linkages” covers sectors of solid, traditional 
support groups for the LDP (agriculture, the medical professionals, small- and 
medium-scale businesses, and so on), and LDP members continuously intervene in 
policy-making in pursuit of votes in exchange for favourable legislation, subsidies, 
generous tax treatment and other promotional policies. Ministries having jurisdiction 
over these sectors are exposed to LDP’s interventions. In such political exchanges, 
the interrelations among the LDP members, the interest groups and the ministries 
concerned have been rigidly routinised over decades, and the policy-making process 
has been highly politicised. Secondly, “reciprocal patronage” type is based on the
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recycling of political patronage and has the similar configuration of political 
exchanges to that of “clientelistic linkages”, but the relations among bureaucrats, the 
LDP politicians and interest groups are less routinised than those of clientelistic 
linkages. The industries that can mobilise local votes, such as construction, housing, 
and real estates, fall into this category.
Thirdly, big business and financial firms fall into the category of “generalised 
support”. In contrast to the former two types of political exchanges characterised as 
LDP’s massive intervention, according to Okimoto, this third category is typified by 
LDP’s slight intervention and strong bureaucracy-industry relationships. Political 
contributions from these sectors to the LDP are enormous, but not tied to specific 
issues and policies; rather their aims are to secure a general favourable business 
climate under the rule of the conservative government. Thus, there is rarely an 
intrusion by the LDP politicians into the policy-making processes regarding these 
sectors and thereby the bureaucracies having jurisdiction over these sectors (i.e., the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry - MITI [currently the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry] and the MoF) can enjoy a high degree of autonomy. 
The bureaucracy-industry relationships are the central linkages for this type of 
political exchanges.
Finally, “public policy feedback” type revolves around such issues as 
environmental preservation and social welfare in which “floating voters” or
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independent, non-clientelistic voters are interested. Any particular interest groups and 
bureaucracies that would be involved in this type cannot be specified.
Okimoto concludes “the secret of the power of the Japanese state [i.e.,
outstanding variations across sectors in the degree of which Japanese industrial
policy is politicised] thus embedded in the structure of its relationship to the rest of
society”.30 His study has, at least, two implications. One is the shift from a focus on
the state’s role in the idea of “Japan, Inc.”, which regards Japan as a unified front,
 ^1 •towards the broader interest in the relationships between the state and society. This 
shift mirrors the emergence of “new institutionalism” in comparative politics.32 
Although in his study of the Japanese industrial policies in high-technology sectors, 
Okimoto claims an autonomous role for MITI in implementing industrial policies, he 
also pays close attention to mutual communication and consent between the MITI 
and the industry prior to the formation of industrial policies.
The other implication that Okimoto’s study generates is the shift from the 
aggregate-level perspective of policy-making towards the sectoral perspective. This 
shift took place along with the growing literature on sectoral policy network or 
sectoral governance.34 The literature suggests that the aggregate-level perspectives 
of policy-making patterns cannot be simply applied to examine state-society 
relationships in a specific issue area.35 Although it might be possible to characterise 
the Japanese style of state-society relations as a whole in terms of certain singular
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ideas and institutions, this overall characterisation does not preclude considerable 
variation across sectors. Namely, it is necessary to devise a more relevant framework 
with which to narrow our focus to more specified policy issues and circumstances.
According to Okimoto, financial issues are categorised as “generalised support”, 
where there is little intervention of the LDP, and for which the relationships between 
the MoF and private financial firms are the crucial linkage.36 However, the mode of 
relationships among bank regulators, LDP politicians and banks is still open to 
question. As seen below, contrary to Okimoto’s classification, banking regulation is 
likely to be subject to societal interests, and bank regulators enjoy less policy 
autonomy than usually expected.
3.3.2.2 Informal Network in Banking Regulation: Network State Hypothesis 
Developing the perspective of Japan as a network state, Jennifer Amyx argues that in 
the realm of banking regulation, various actors concerned were embedded in an 
informal relational network, and policy behaviours began to be constrained by the 
embedded nature in the 1990s.37 This leads to a network state hypothesis: 
dysfunctional domestic institutions hamper Japanese credible commitments to the 
Basle Accord. The informal relational network functioned very well during the rapid 
growth period of Japan. Once several favourable conditions that used to underlie the 
informal networks eroded, the same network generated inertial tendencies and
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constrained more than empowered the government in its policy options and decisions. 
For this study, three pillars of the informal network of the Japanese banking 
regulation are examined here. They are the Japanese Diet’s oversight of bank 
regulators; the MoF’s relational ties with banks; and bank governance structure (main 
bank system).
Firstly, institutional arrangements for the Japanese Diet’s oversight of bank 
regulators had a principal-agent problem between regulators and politicians. When 
principals (politicians) and agents (regulators) are not equally well informed, more 
informed agents are able to take opportunities and not to carry out appropriate 
practices in dealing with less informed principals. Diet members were not in a 
perfect position to monitor and assess the behaviour of the MoF due to institutional 
deficiency of the oversight of regulators, and therefore they employed “fire alarm” 
rather than “police patrol” oversight of the MoF.38 Under this sort of oversight, as 
long as the financial system was perceived as stable, politicians neither closely 
watched over the regulators nor intervened in the regulatory policy-making process.
Secondly, informal, exclusive connection between the MoF and individual banks 
were carried out through several channels: daily face-to-face contacts between bank 
employees called MoF-tan (MoF-handlers or liaisons) and Banking Bureau officials 
of the MoF; the assumption of posts in private banks by retired MoF officials 
(so-called amakudari or “descent from heaven”); and the temporary assignment of
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private sector employees to positions within the MoF (so-called ama-agari or “ascent 
to heaven”). These informal liaison channels enabled MoF officials to convey advice 
to banks as well as to detect problems at the early stage and, if necessary, to arrange 
an assisted merger between an ailing bank and a stronger one behind closed doors to 
preclude formal failure. Banks were cooperative in sharing information with the MoF 
in the expectation that the MoF would come to rescue when they were in trouble, and 
banks cooperated in arranging the rescue operations because the MoF awarded the 
licence of extra branch offices to cooperative banks.
Accounting rules were also set through exclusive networks revolving around the 
MoF. The Business Accounting Council, an advisory panel to the MoF, played a 
pivotal role in determining accounting rules. The council consisted of academics, 
journalists and industrialists. MoF officials, however, played key roles in screening 
potential members, setting agendas, and conducting meetings.40 There was no 
independent, private accounting rule-setting organisation in Japan41. The MoF had 
discretionary powers over the accounting rules setting process.
Thirdly, a so-called “main bank” system, which was based on the implicit and 
informal but long-standing relationships between banks, their client firms, and 
regulatory authorities, played a crucial role in monitoring loan portfolios.42 The 
relationships between the firm and its main bank served five functions: (1) a main 
bank provided loans and was a major creditor; (2) a main bank committed bond issue
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related services; (3) a main bank was a major stockholder; (4) a main bank carried 
payment settlement accounts; and, (5) a main bank supplied management 
information and resources and acted as a rescuer of financially depressed firms.43 
These long-standing relationships of that system had served to reduce uncertainty 
and transaction costs.
The network state hypothesis argues that these informal forms of banking 
regulation turn out to be a stumbling block to credible commitment to the Basle 
Accord when they are stressed. As regards the MoF-politician relations, the “fire 
alarm” oversight of the MoF induces the regulators to exercise forbearance policy in 
dealing with non-performing loans (NPLs). In moments of crisis, the MoF has 
incentives to conceal the real picture of NPLs from politicians, since the disclosure 
of regulatory breakdown is likely to trigger political intervention and reduce 
policy-making autonomy—one of the MoF’s main organisational interests. This is an 
institutional source of regulatory forbearance and hidden defection.
Once it becomes obvious that financial instability hits those social groups with 
which LDP politicians establish personal and clientelistic relationships, however, the 
politicians will intervene in the regulatory policy-making process. For politicians 
whose prime concern is their re-election, adherence to international regulatory 
standards or the pursuit of prudential regulation is secondary. Compared with 
regulatory authorities and banks, therefore, politicians are less worried about the
costs of defection and sometimes prioritise policy objectives rather than the strict 
implementation of prudential banking regulations. In particular, during an economic 
downturn, politicians are often willing to sacrifice regulatory prudence in order to 
pull the economy out of recession. This is in particular the case for capital adequacy 
requirements, since they are frequently seen as a main source of a credit crunch, and 
in a country already suffering financial distress, their strict implementation leads to 
the deterioration of the existing credit crunch. Furthermore, the costs of credit 
crunches are concentrated on politically sensitive sectors such as small- and 
medium-sized businesses and the construction industry. These politically powerful 
borrowers are highly dependent on bank credit, thereby being vulnerable to credit 
crunches. Thus, the severity of the domestic economic problems politicises the issue 
of capital adequacy requirements and activates politicians who are less keen to 
strictly comply with international standards.
The relations between the MoF and banks changed significantly after the 
ministry’s fiasco of the 1981 Banking Act.44 MoF officials failed to calculate 
acceptable compromises with the banks. It led the officials to rethink the way of 
communication with the banks. Hereafter, ministry officials saw relations with 
MoF-tan as a means for obtaining information from private banks. The MoF’s 
capacity to arrange informal rescue operations also gradually eroded in parallel with 
financial liberalisation. For example, branching authorisations no longer provided
banks with incentives to cooperate with the MoF. As foreign financial institutions 
tied up Japanese banks’ NPLs in derivative transactions, information on the real 
magnitude of the NPL problem was leaked to the market in the late 1990s. These 
changes hindered the MoF’s capacity to arrange mergers behind closed doors.45
The breakdown of the MoF-led rescue operations revealed the problem that the 
main bank system per se did not devise proper corporate governance of banks 
themselves. Main banks were reluctant to allow their borrowers to default, partly 
because it would negatively affect their monitoring reputation in the loan markets 
and partly because it was main banks that had to absorb some of the losses incurred 
by other creditors. Most banks still continue to extend new loans to debt-burdened 
companies, often in exchange for only modest restructuring plans. They also 
restructured nonviable loans by reducing interest rates and extending their maturity. 
In addition, weak corporate governance of banks puts little pressure on managements 
to maximise profitability (low profitability meant that they had small amount of 
retained earnings to deal with NPLs) and to take proactive action to address 
mounting NPLs, resulting in an unnecessary protraction of the crisis.46
It should be noted that the informal nature of banking regulation functioned 
under historically specific conditions. A set of protective, competition-preventing 
regulatory measures, consisting of ceilings on interest rates, segmentation of the 
whole financial system, regulations on newly opening branches, and insulation from
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foreign competition underpinned the informal regulatory systems. In addition, 
generally favourable economic conditions worked on the informal system. In the 
period of overall growth in the economy, troubled banks were the exception rather 
than the rule. None of these three conditions held in the 1990s after the collapse of 
the financial bubble.47 In short, once these favourable conditions had gone, the 
once-effective modus operandi of informal regulatory networks became 
dysfunctional and the closely embedded linkage among the actors concerned turned 
out to be a source for institutional inertia blocking credible commitments to 
international regulatory standards.48
3.3.3 Systemic-level Explanations
Systemic-level approaches hypothesise that pressure for participation and 
compliance arises through various mechanisms at the international level, and explain 
compliance mechanisms in terms of some international bonus or sanction costs 49
3.3.3.1 Redistributive Logic
The structuralist tenet of Kenneth Waltz argues that as anarchy is the ordering 
principle in the international system, units (states) seek, at a minimum, to survive, 
and in such a self-help system the survival of states entails responding to relative
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power of others.50 This line of argument stresses the role that power distribution 
among states plays in determining outcomes, and it assigns less importance to the 
independent role of international institutions, especially in economic realms.
Although his emphasis on the anarchical nature of the international system and 
on the importance of inter-state power distribution is highly influential, Waltz’ 
persistence in privileging military security is not necessarily echoed by scholars in 
the field of international political economy. Challenging the Waltzian 
conceptualisation of international politics, Keohane and Nye emphasise 
“asymmetrical interdependence” as a source of power, and suggest the need to 
specify the context, that is to say, the issue-areas.51 In each issue-area, asymmetrical 
interdependence among states generates unique power relations, and therefore 
military resources are not necessarily useful when employed, for example, in a 
financial context. Even Robert Gilpin, a structural realist emphasising the inter-state 
power distribution as the chief explanation for outcomes, argues that economic 
interdependence creates “economic power which one actor can use against 
another”. In the realm of the politics of international banking regulation, according 
to this perspective, relative size and importance of a national financial market within 
the international system determine the international power configuration. Abilities to 
offer international lender-of-the-last-resort services, to grant market access to 
financial institutions, or, alternatively, to threaten market closure, underline power
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resources of a state which possesses large and dynamic financial markets.
Oatley and Nabors specifically apply this line of argument to the Basle 
international banking regulation, which is here labelled the “redistributive logic” of 
the Basle Accord: a powerful state, driven by domestic concerns, disproportionately 
shapes an international regime to serve its domestic groups’ interests at the expense 
of those of other states.53 Predictably, the crude application of the systemic-level 
perspective is prone to pay insufficient attention to domestic factors. Oatley and 
Nabors solve this problem by incorporating the positive theory of economic 
regulation in order to explain preference formation in the powerful state. Their 
approach somehow derives from an influential analysis by Jeffrey Freiden about 
distributional impacts of international financial flows on domestic social groups.54 
He suggests that the increase in capital mobility does not automatically determine a 
set of policy options of states, but rather it causes various social groups to form 
different policy preferences. Oatley and Nabors argue that for American 
policymakers, the Basle Accord was a political tool for solving competing policy 
preferences between banks and taxpayers in the U.S.
Oatley and Nabors claim the Japanese financial sector’s asymmetry of relative 
“vulnerability” vis-a-vis the Anglo-American counterparts, or the high “opportunity 
costs” of losing their markets, endowed the U.S. with financial power (threatening 
market closure) against Japan.55 The American regulators, together with the British
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whose banks were also confronting the challenge from Japanese banks, exercised the 
financial power to push Japan into an unfavourable multilateral framework; thereby 
forcing Japanese banks to raise their capital ratios. This logic parsimoniously 
illuminates the significant role of the U.S. domestic interests in generating the U.S. 
initiatives. It argues that the Accord was intentionally designed by the U.S. 
policymakers to “transfer income from Japanese commercial banks to compensate 
American commercial banks for the costs of [otherwise unilateral] regulation”, and 
was successfully negotiated “only through U.S. policymakers’ use of financial market 
power”.56 They assert that the Japanese were the “primary targets” and were as a
cn
whole the losers of the Basle negotiations.
3.3.3.2 Market Pressure Logic
With regard to Japanese banks’ rapid increase in their capital ratios in the late 1980s, 
Beth Simmons points out the influence of “market pressure logic”.58 International 
banking has one distinctive feature: the great concentration of financial power in one 
or two countries (i.e., the U.S. and the U.K.) by virtue of their market size, efficiency, 
and internationalisation of markets, and the sophistication of regulatory structures. 
For this reason, Simmons argues, there is considerable market pressure on 
non-Anglo-American banks to follow a regulatory standard adopted in the dominant 
financial centres. Banks are not competing for international business on price alone,
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but rather they are concerned about reputation and do not want to be perceived as 
inferior institutions. By the same token, national regulators are also afraid of 
developing a reputation of their banks as poorly regulated, thereby emulating the 
regulatory structures adopted in the dominant financial centres.
Based upon this observation, Simmons argues that the 1987 U.S.-U.K. bilateral 
proposals for common capital adequacy requirements promoted the regulatory 
innovation as a focal point for other countries’ regulators to emulate.59 Specifically, 
regulatory changes in the dominant financial centre gave the rest of the world not 
only competitive incentives to catch up with the regulatory change in order to 
maintain or attract business, but also market pressures for conforming to the 
regulatory environment of the dominant centre. It implies that Japanese participation 
in the Basle rules is market-driven, rather than politically or institutionally-driven. 
Simmons sees the Basle Committee as a facilitative institution pooling and 
exchanging technical expertise, and her emphasis is on strong market-based 
incentives that encourage the rest of the world to converge on the U.S.-U.K. 
regulatory innovation. In short, Japanese banks themselves were aware of the costs, 
in terms of credit ratings and international business reputation, of adopting lax capital 
adequacy rules.60
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented different types of hypotheses: a two-level-game model, a 
network state model; and two systemic-level modes, redistributive logic and market 
pressure logic. The two-level-game model emphasises the implications of the 
international and domestic interaction for regulators’ strategies to pursue their 
preferences. The network state model attributes the informal nature of banking 
regulation to institutional obstacles for credible commitment to the Basle Accord. 
The redistibutive logic assigns greater importance to inter-state power relations. The 
market pressure logic sees financial markets as a sort of participation and compliance 
mechanisms.
This chapter has also outlined a set of indicators of policy behaviours and 
economic outcomes against which to test the hypotheses. Evaluation of national 
commitment to the Basle Accord is particularly difficult due to its general contents 
leaving a range of discretionary powers to national bank regulators. Four policy 
behaviours and economic outcomes are deduced from three norms of capital 
adequacy requirements. These indicators establish a vantage-point from which the 
test of the above mentioned hypotheses are carried out in the empirical part of this 
thesis.
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Part II Empirical Studies:
Japan and the Basle Capital Accords
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Chapter 4
A Pre-Basle Accord History of Capital Standards: 
Japan and the Basle Committee
4.1 Introduction
As has been argued in previous chapters, the roles which bank capital plays in
prudential regulation and competitiveness politicise the regulation-making process at
the domestic and international levels. A given country’s commitments to prudential
regulation in general and capital adequacy requirements in particular are a highly
political matter. This chapter will consider a history of capital adequacy requirements
in Japan and the regulatory development at the Basle Committee prior to the 1988
Basle Accord. Only a historically sensitive examination can allow us to recognise the
political arena within which relevant actors are positioned.
How did Japanese regulators traditionally formulate and exercise capital adequacy
requirements? How did international institutions provided by the Basle Committee
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affect Japanese regulators’ perceptions of capital adequacy measures? To what extent 
and how did domestic institutions and private interests matter in the regulation-making 
and implementation processes? To answer these questions is not only interesting in 
terms of theoretical concerns over international regulatory harmonisation, but also 
provides a starting point for examining Japanese commitments to the Basle Accord.
4.2 A Brief History of the Politics of Japanese Capital Adequacy Requirements
4.2.1 The Structure o f Japanese Banking Regulation
Both the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) were bank regulators 
in Japan until the 1998 establishment of the Financial Supervisory Agency (renamed 
the Financial Services Agency in 2001).1 The MoF had wide-reaching powers over the 
financial and monetary realm, ranging from fiscal and monetary policy, the tax 
collection, the government budget arrangement, the government bond flotation, to the 
regulation and supervision of financial institutions. The ministry had seven Bureaux. 
Among them, the Banking Bureau, the Securities Bureau, and the International 
Finance Bureau were responsible for financial regulation in private sectors. The 
Banking Bureau and the Securities Bureau monopolised the supervisory responsibility 
over the banking sector and the securities sector respectively. The International 
Finance Bureau oversaw the overseas operations of Japanese financial firms and the
operations of foreign financial firms in Japan. The Banking Bureau was central to the 
regulation of private banks, or private depository institutions, and thus was a key actor
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in “policy networks” revolving around the issue of capital ratio rules. While the 
Securities Bureau and the International Finance Bureau were not directly responsible 
for capital adequacy requirements for banks, they were involved in the policy network 
regarding capital rules when related policies touched their jurisdictional boundaries. 
These bureaux did not have a monolithic view of the issue of international 
convergence of capital adequacy requirements.
The BoJ, the central bank in Japan, is the secondary bank regulator. It is not legally 
a government body, but a special corporation outside the framework of the 
government. However, it had rarely enjoyed full independence of the government 
since its foundation in 1882, until the 1998 review of the Bank of Japan Law. In 
particular, the wartime Bank of Japan Law (1942) confirmed the bank’s subservience 
to the government and was designed to commit the BoJ to war fighting rather than the 
stabilisation of the currency. The Law was not revised during the post-war occupation 
and remained effective.3 Despite its subordinate status, the Examination Bureau at the 
BoJ carried out regular audits on banks, and collected information more than the 
Banking Bureau possessed. Rather, the Banking Bureau had to depend on the 
Examination Bureau for gathering detailed information on individual banks. Further,
the BoJ had been a member of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) since its 
establishment in 1930, with the exception of suspension years after World War II 
(1950-70), and after the 1974 establishment of the Basle Committee the BoJ sent its 
officials to the Committee.4 Figure 4.1 describes the basic framework of Japanese 
banking regulation until 1998.
Figure 4.1 Financial Regulation Framework in Japan 
(until 1998)
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It was not until the mid-1980s that the MoF started to send its officials to the Basle
Committee at the BIS. Since then, Japanese participants in the Committee became two
bodies, the BoJ and the MoF. At first, the International Finance Bureau of the MoF
despatched its officials to the Basle Committee. Once it was recognised that the
prospected subject of discussion was central to banking regulation, however, the
MoF’s Banking Bureau took over the membership of the Committee in the winter of
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1986.5 Since the Banking Bureau monopolised authority over banking regulation 
including capital adequacy requirements, the Banking Bureau effectively became a 
primary negotiator in international negotiations over capital adequacy requirements 
and the BoJ took a secondary role. At the domestic level, the Banking Bureau 
continued to be the representative body of Japanese regulators in policy networks 
regarding capital adequacy rules.
Private banks are classified into several sub-sectoral groups according to their 
business in which each type of bank is permitted to engage.6 The city banks with close 
ties to large industrial enterprises and with a nation-wide network of deposit-taking 
branches; the long-term credit banks issuing long-term bank debentures in exchange 
for lending long-term loans to industry; the trust banks accepting large-denomination 
trust accounts and pension funds from businesses, issuing long-term debentures, and 
making long-term loans to industry; and one specialist foreign exchange bank, make 
up so-called “big finance”. In the early 1980s, private banks began to enlarge their 
international operations. Therefore, when international capital adequacy rules became 
international agenda, they were at the centre of a policy network revolving around that 
issue. At the other end of scale are the smaller banks, including a large number of the 
regional banks, the credit associations, the credit co-operatives and the agricultural 
co-operatives.7 In the mid- to late 1980s, backed by the strong yen and booming asset
prices, some of the top regional banks embarked on international business, but the 
majority of the regional banks and other small institutions operated domestically. They 
assumed they were insulated from impacts of international convergence of capital 
adequacy requirements for international banks. When changes in domestic regulations 
in association with international negotiations affected their interests, however, they got 
involved in policy networks revolving around the issues of the international capital 
accord.
There were several organisations that function as what Peter Katzenstein calls 
“nodes of the policy network” in which the regulatory authorities and the regulated 
sector continually exchanged their views on financial matters.8 The private banks 
tended to collectively work to support their own positions vis-a-vis the MoF. The 
Federation of Bankers’ Associations of Japan (FBAJ) was the umbrella organisation 
for the banking sector. During the period discussed here, four city banks (Dai-Ichi 
Kangyo, Fuji, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui), of which head offices were in Tokyo, took the 
chair in one-year rotation. The chair bank staffed the FBAJ with a dozen of their 
officials to support the chairman. As seen below, representing the whole bank industry, 
the FBAJ actively voiced its views on capital adequacy requirements. Besides the 
FBAJ, each type of banks established its own association with its own distinct interests, 
such as the City Bank Roundtable, the Federation of Regional Bankers’ Associations
and so on. Each association fine-tuned its interests and hammered out a common 
position vis-a-vis the MoF on matters of banking administration.
It did not necessarily mean, however, that banks always succeeded in forging a 
cross-sectoral common preference. Especially when issues concerned intruded 
sub-sectoral vested interests, disputes between the sub-sectors were evident. Indeed, 
private banks established a common ground with regard to general rules of capital 
adequacy, but discussion on specific policy means of securitisation of bank assets, 
which would help banks to increase their capital-to-asset ratios in general but erode 
monopoly profits of certain types of banks, provoked sub-sectoral disputes within the 
banking industry. An association of each banking type played a significant part in this 
kind of sub-sectoral disputes. In short, these self-organised associations were 
important in the process of forming regulation.
In addition to the self-organised bodies, advisory policy councils in the MoF, such 
as the Financial System Research Council (FSRC), played a significant role in 
connecting regulators and private banks. The FSRC was a formal advisory council, 
consisting of senior businessmen, financial industry representatives and others, with 
Banking Bureau officials attending as advisors. Its main purpose was to facilitate an 
exchange of opinions among knowledgeable people.9 Masaru Mabuchi emphasised a 
role of the FSRC in providing private banks with opportunities to express their
opinions.10 He argued that the FSRC served to introduce organised interests into the 
policymaking process through participation of interest groups, and, at the same time, 
functioned as an intermediary of MoF’s view to private sector. However, MoF officials 
played key roles in screening potential members, setting agendas, and conducting 
meetings,11 and reports and recommendations published by the FSRC are not 
necessarily compatible with preferences of private banks. Therefore, the FSRC was 
not a corridor through which specific private interests were straightforwardly injected 
into policy-making, but rather as an arena in which various interpretations of interests 
contested with one another.
Intervention by politicians was occasional, but had influence over policy 
outcomes.12 In the 1980s, “big finance” was one of the biggest private-sector 
contributors to political parties, with almost all of the money going to the ruling 
conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Such huge contribution from ‘big 
finance’ was to ensure the generally favourable environment provided by the LDP’s 
conservative, stable rule, and usually not to call for specific favours. However, when 
negotiations with the MoF broke down or the MoF ultimately intended to take the 
initiative in setting new rules unfavourable to banks, banks were likely to turn to Diet’s 
individual influential LDP members for support. Small banks traditionally established 
close relationships with Diet’s members from their districts through political
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contributions, because much of their concerns were at the local level. The actual
intervention from the LDP and even the potential threat of political intervention
11affected outcomes of the regulation-making process.
Under this domestic institutional structure, the MoF had multiple objectives, and 
therefore had to balance various concerns. In addition to regulatory objective of 
maintaining the stable credit order, the MoF had to consider the economic interests of 
banks (economic objectives) and increase its own political manoeuvrability in order to 
pursue desired policy outcomes (domestic political objectives). It means that MoF had 
a partial state autonomy. The MoF’s ability to achieve these objectives thus depends on 
its statecraft to manipulate politics.
4.2.2 Historical Overview o f Capital Adequacy Requirements 
In Japan, capital adequacy requirements had a long history, at least on paper. It was not 
until the early 1980s, however, that Japanese bank regulators started to pay serious 
attention to bank capital adequacy. This section examines relationships between the 
regulators and the regulated, which revolved around the issues of capital adequacy 
requirements, before the U.S. took the initiative in international regulatory 
harmonisation. Lacking a statutory basis and any sort of enforcement mechanisms, 
Japanese capital adequacy rules were less than effective at the time.
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As in other industrialised countries, the banking industry was highly regulated in 
Japan. An array of competition-preventing regulations and administrative actions was 
sometimes referred to as the “protective convoy system”.14 The system consisted of 
four main institutional pillars: ceilings on interest rates, segmentation of the whole 
financial system, regulations on new branches, and insulation from foreign 
competition. Just as in wartime transport ships were gathered when crossing the high 
seas to enable the fast escort ships to protect the slower ones, the Japanese financial 
system was characterised as one in which the large, efficient banks kept a slower pace 
with the small and inefficient banks. Within the framework, all banks, even the most 
inefficient, were led to grow at the same rate and none was allowed to go bankrupt. 
While the protective convoy system limited price competition among banks and 
guaranteed them a steady source of comfortable profits, it was deemed sufficient to 
keep Japanese banks sound throughout the period of the post-war economic recovery 
(the 1950s-60s).15
The protective convoy system was not created in a political vacuum. In the early 
1950s, in the course of the dispute over the post-war reconstruction of the Japanese 
banking system, the MoF proposed several plans to transfer some of the costs of 
regulatory protection towards banks themselves through such measures as a margin 
risk reserve against bank deposits. However, faced with strong resistance from banks,
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those attempts ended in failure.16 The power with which banks resisted the MoF’s 
regulatory pressures derived from three institutional structures.
Firstly, private banks enjoyed systematic favouritism by the government during the 
early post-war period, which enabled them to quickly seize the opportunity of their 
restoration, while the overall Japanese economy struggled in the immediate aftermath
1 7of war destruction. Financial regulatory institutions served to create the bank-centred
patterns of corporate finance which entrenched their influence: what Kent Calder had
1 8named as the “Bankers’ Kingdom”. Secondly, a well-organised association of the 
banking industry also survived the post-war de-concentration of economic power. The 
FBAJ emerged as a successor of the war-time self-regulation body of the banking 
industry and helped banks exchange their views to hammer out a common stance 
vis-a-vis the MoF on matters of banking administration when possible. Thirdly, the 
banking industry was long one of main sources of political contributions to the ruling 
conservative party. These special politico-economic positions of banks endowed 
banks with power. Borrowing words of a Japanese economist, private banks were “the 
linchpin of the Japanese political economy”. 19 When Japanese bank regulators 
attempted to establish such unfavourable regulations as capital adequacy standards, 
they found banks hard to deal with.
In the absence of statutory forms of regulation over banks’ operating and balance
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sheet ratios, the MoF used “administrative guidance”, non-legal guidelines issued by 
the ministry, to regulate banks’ balance sheet ratios. Requiring banks to hold a 
sufficient level of capital in relation to their holding deposit was part of this 
administrative guidance. In 1954, the MoF issued administrative guidance regarding 
capital ratios and required banks to hold capital-to-deposit ratios of 10 percent.21 In the 
literature on Japanese politics, administrative guidance was sometimes understood as a 
powerful form of policy leverage that could deliberately enhance bureaucrats’ degree
99and range of control far beyond that suggested by the formal legal parameters. 
However, as shown in Figure 4.2, such administrative guidance was less than effective. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, average capital-to-deposit ratios stood 
approximately at 6 percent, and fell to around 3 percent in the early 1980s. In sum, the 
1954 administrative guidance regarding capital adequacy ratios was not effectively 
enforced.
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Figure 4.2 Capital-to-Deposit Ratios of Japanese City Banks
(1964-1986)
%
Notes: Capital consists o f equity, loan loss reserve, reserve for retirement, and other reserves.
Deposit consists of deposits, negotiable certificates for deposit, and debenture.
Source: own calculations based on data from various editions of Analysis o f  Financial Statements o f  
All Banks , Federation of Bankers' Associations of Japan.
Notwithstanding low levels of capital, the stability o f the banking system was
maintained by a continually growing economy and the protective convoy system. In
the 1970s, however, the pillars of the competition-preventing regulations, such as
interest rate controls, entry restrictions and the segmentation of financial institutions,
began to cave in. The financial system adapted a series of new conditions: the slower
economic growth, the rapid increase in government bond issuance, a chronic trade
surplus, technological innovation, and the burgeoning external expansion of
manufacturing industries and banks.23 Since the mid-1980s, new factors deriving from
the Japan-U.S. trade friction also spurred financial liberalisation in Japan.24 Though
the pace o f financial liberalisation in Japan was slow, the MoF officials recognised that
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further liberalisation would be inevitable sooner or later.25 They began to assign their 
greater emphasis to supervision of banks’ balance sheet ratios. It was against this 
background that Japanese regulators began to shift their regulatory emphasis to 
supervision of banks’ capital adequacy ratios—an area where regulation had not been 
implemented effectively under the 1954 administrative guidance.
As for most of the other members of the Basle Committee, by the late 1970s 
Japanese regulators embarked on the reinforcement of bank capital adequacy. In 
March 1979, the Financial System Research Council (FSRC), advisory council of the 
Banking Bureau of the MoF, published a report advocating a stronger MoF oversight 
power with sanctions, stricter net-worth ratios and more rigid disclosure rules for 
banks. The report said that “the net worth of a bank is the basis of confidence in the 
bank’s solvency.” Based on the FSRC’s report, the MoF proposed a new banking law
7Qto the Federation of Bankers’ Associations in March 1981. Alongside strict 
disclosure rules, the proposal included a provision regarding the maintenance of sound 
management, which required banks to make efforts to improve their capital levels. 
Since this provision was deemed a new statutory source of the MoF’ control over 
banks’ capital levels, the banking industry felt unhappy. Claiming self-responsibility 
for maintaining own financial soundness, banks lined up against the MoF’s proposals 
and turned to the LDP for support. In the deliberations of the LDP’s Policy Affairs
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Research Committee, the MoF’s initial proposals were considerably revised and the 
capital adequacy provision was deleted. To secure favourable revisions in the MoF’s
proposals, banks allegedly paid 500 million yen to individual influential LDP
11
politicians in unreported contributions on top of their usual contributions. The 1981 
revision of the Banking Act, in short, failed to get legally binding capital adequacy 
requirements on the statute book
4.3 Early Efforts of the Basle Committee: A Growing Consensus
4.3.1 The Idea o f Risk-Weighted Assets: Learning and Ideational Diffusion 
By the late 1970s, almost all members of the Basle Committee had reviewed or 
redefined their own domestic approaches for monitoring banks’ capital adequacy. 
However, momentum towards international convergence had not yet gathered. There 
was a range of national diversity in approaches to capital adequacy requirements 
among the Committee members, reflecting the unique historical development of the 
national financial system. These differences of approach made it impossible to make 
meaningful cross-country comparisons of capital adequacy. Moreover, in the 1970s, 
there was little consensus in the Committee about the value of such comparisons.34
It was, nevertheless, the progressive, and prospectively dangerous, erosion of 
capital levels of international banks that facilitated a consensus among the Committee
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members on the general need to address the issue of capital adequacy on an 
international scale during the late 1970s and the early 1980s.35 Not only the U.S. but 
also other countries experienced a general decline in their banks’ capital ratios. They 
had either already taken preventive action to end any further deterioration, or were 
about to do so. The worry of bank regulators was fuelled by the pace at which banks 
were expanding their international lending, particularly to developing countries. 
Against this background, the Committee members began to exchange information 
with one another on different approaches to capital regulations.37 In a communique 
issued by the BIS in 1980, the Basle Committee members reaffirmed the cardinal 
importance attached to the maintenance of sound banking standards, in particular
'J  Q
regarding capital adequacy, liquidity and concentration of risks.
One of the biggest fruits of these early efforts was a growing consensus on a 
risk-weighted capital adequacy requirement as a preferable formula for measuring 
assets. In the early 1980s, the Basle Committee members were divided into two groups 
according to the methods of calculating banks’ assets. While most of European 
countries took a risk-weighting approach, the others including Canada, Italy, Japan 
and the U.S. took a gearing ratio approach. The former weighted assets according to 
the risk exposure of banks’ asset portfolios, and the latter related capital funds to the 
unweighted total of the balance sheet without sensitiveness to the risk exposure of
individual banks. Risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements were developed and 
adopted in Continental Europe. Countries in which capital adequacy was traditionally 
governed by formal prudential ratios, such as Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, 
introduced risk asset ratios (i.e., the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets) in the late
- J Q
1970s. British bank regulators, previously taking informal approaches to banking 
regulation and paying little attention to bank capital adequacy, also began to establish a 
statutory basis for banking regulation in response to the secondary banking crisis of 
1973-75, and the harmonisation requirements of the 1977 EEC Directive on banking.40 
In 1980, the Bank of England began to use two capital ratios, a gearing ratio and a risk 
asset ratio, as a basis for assessing capital adequacy.41 Following the first EEC 
Banking Co-ordination Directive of 1977, the EEC Advisory Banking Committee 
defined a number of observation ratios in 1980, and risk asset ratio was one of them. 
These ratios were introduced for observation purposes, but the Directive apparently 
sought the possibility that harmonised prudential ratios might be applied in the longer 
term. In short, European regulators developed the idea of the risk-weighted capital 
adequacy on which the Basle Committee drew when initiating its own work on capital 
adequacy requirements in the early 1980s.
Latecomers to the risk weighting approach, such as the U.S. and Japan, began to 
adopt the approach in the mid-1980s. In the U.S., the notion of risk weighting itself
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was not novel. Indeed, it was favoured as early as the immediate post-war period, but it 
was soon abandoned due to technical problems. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
American federal regulators had different stances on capital adequacy. It was not until 
1981 that the three federal bank regulatory bodies (the Federal Reserve Board, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporate) could agree on uniform domestic capital adequacy standards.42
With regard to the re-introduction of a risk-weighting approach in the U.S., 
problems developed in adjusting a common stance among the federal regulators. 
While the OCC and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York were keen on the 
re-introduction of the risk-weighting approach, FDIC Chairperson William Seidman 
insisted on the traditional gearing approach. There were two reasons for his objection. 
One was that the risk-weighted system would have too much impact on the selection of 
banks’ asset portfolios. The other was that the risk-weighted system previously 
introduced by the Fed was too complex to be effectively implemented, and the system 
died out in the course of time 43 With regard to his first reason, Seidman seemed to be 
naive about market principles and overestimated the value of a simple, 
non-risk-weighted system of capital adequacy. Indeed, the collapse of Continental 
Illinois in May 1984, where the gearing ratio was relatively high at 5.8 percent, 
demonstrated that straight gearing ratios could be misleading and even perverse.44
Concerning technical difficulty, the experience of European countries, especially the 
U.K., helped American regulators study the risk-weighting system further. Eventually, 
Seidman changed his mind, and in remarks at a banking conference, he thanked the 
Bank of England “for providing us with the results of their analysis on 
off-balance-sheet risk”.45 In January 1986, the Federal Reserve Board proposed a 
risk-weighting approach to domestic capital adequacy requirements; the OCC and the 
FDIC were expected to follow with similar proposals 46 The Fed’s concrete proposals 
mentioned that “ ...adoption of this proposal would begin to bring capital adequacy 
policies in the U.S. more closely in line with those of other major industrial 
countries”.47
In line with this trend, Japanese banking regulators began to share the idea of 
risk-weighted assets as a preferable measure of bank capital adequacy. As will be 
discussed in the next section, following the International Finance Bureau’s 
experimental introduction in the summer of 1985, the 1986 capital guidelines of the 
Banking Bureau adopted a risk-weighting approach as the method of relating capital to 
the size of banks’ overseas assets. In forming the guidelines, Japanese regulatory 
officials referred to risk-weighting approaches of other countries, that of the U.K. in 
particular. Japanese regulatory officials mentioned that although crude classification 
of risk weights remained problematic, “the risk asset ratio under the risk-weighting
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approach was obviously better than the gearing ratio” .49
One of major reasons why the risk-weighting approach became popular was a 
change in the international financial markets: the proliferation of off-balance sheet 
activities by internationally active banks. A range of new categories of off-balance 
sheet business, particularly various forms of underwriting commitment (note issuance 
facilities and revolving underwriting facilities—NIFs and RUFs) and interest and 
exchange rate related “derivatives” (options, swaps, futures, and so on) were 
introduced. The gearing approach was deemed to provide banks with an incentive to 
expand off-balance sheet activities, which were not captured by the approach, and to 
focus on higher risk assets at the expense of low-risk, liquid assets within the balance 
sheet.50 Conversely, by relating capital to the varying degrees of risk involved in the 
spectrum of bank assets and in contingent liabilities off the balance sheet, the 
risk-weighting approach was expected to contain banks’ reckless risk-taking.
Despite the growing consensus on the risk-weighted approach, much remained to 
be done. Two problems in particular arose. One was cross-national differences in risk 
weightings. Each national regulator developed risk-weighted capital adequacy 
requirements different from others’, and this resulted in a situation where risk 
weightings applied to similar categories of assets varied. The other was rapid and 
continuous innovation of new off-balance sheet instruments. Though the simple
framework of measurement employed in many European countries had included 
traditional off-balance sheet engagements with either a 50 or 100 percent risk weight, 
many of the new innovations were not yet captured in the reporting systems and 
therefore were not incorporated into measures of capital adequacy.
In 1984, the Basle Committee founded a working group to conduct a detailed study 
of off-balance sheet risks to determine the extent to which off-balance sheet risks were 
being captured in the members’ prevailing supervisory mechanisms, and the degree to 
which they were subject to capital requirements. In early 1986, the working group 
released a report listing a series of common definitions for a plethora of off-balance 
sheet instruments, both new and traditional, and the degree of risk they entailed, 
though no specific capital requirements for various risk categories were prescribed.51 
The results of this working group contributed to the formation of a consensus 
regarding risk weights of bank assets. An agreement on the weighting of bank assets 
according to risk was crucial to the consequent accord on capital adequacy standards, 
by forming a consensus on the technique of measuring assets. Were it not for such 
agreement, there could have been no common ground as to how to determine the asset 
side of capital-asset ratios.
The growing consensus on the risk weighting approach exhibits an approximation 
to “learning”, defined by Ernest Haas as “the process by which consensual knowledge
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is used to specify causal relationships in new ways so that the result affects the content 
of public policy”. In response to the expansion of banks’ off-balance sheet activities, 
new regulatory methods of incorporating off-balance sheet items into risk weightings 
were introduced, tested, and adopted, thereby producing new consensual knowledge. 
This knowledge was constructed through regular interactions among the member 
regulators, which were made possible by institutional arrangements of the Basle 
Committee. Through the learning process, the members of the Basle Committee 
arrived at a common understanding of what was challenging the existing procedures of 
capital adequacy requirements, as well as a shared perspective on how to cope with it. 
Transnational ideational diffusion came with this learning process. Japanese regulators 
also re-defined their policy objectives along with what they learned at the Basle 
Committee.
4.3.2 Problem o f Defining Capital: A Prototype o f  a Tiered-capital Framework 
A diversity in national definitions of capital still raised problems with which the Basle 
committee had to cope. While there was a consensus on the notion of risk assessment 
as an evaluation tool, differences of opinion on a definition of the capital elements to 
be included in the measure were still too great for any acceptable compromise to be 
quickly reached.54 There were three main problems concerning the capital side of
capital-asset ratio standards:
(1)how to define and value capital;
(2) how to develop a formula that measures capital’s adequacy; and,
(3) the minimum level of capital considered “adequate”.55
A complicating factor was the differential treatment of reserves across countries. 
The various types of reserves, which differed in their financial and accounting features 
as well as their abilities to absorb losses, had traditionally been regarded as regulatory 
capital in some member countries. First of all, therefore, it was necessary for the 
Committee members to build a common technical understanding with the aim of 
working “towards a common view among member countries of the main constituent 
elements of capital...”.56The Committee also needed to analyse different kinds of 
ratios (risk-weighting vs. gearing vs. risk-asset vs. risk-deposit vs. large loan-exposure 
ratios, and so on) and assess their usefulness.57
These issues were not only technical but also inherently political. In general, 
tougher capital adequacy requirements would result in new costs to the banking 
industry. Hence, regulators faced opposition from entrenched interests in their 
respective banking industry. A change in the definition of capital would affect 
measured capital ratios and thus alter the market’s perception of the financial strength 
of the banks. It implied that a certain change in the capital definition would possibly
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impose higher costs on specific groups of banks than others. This distributional 
concern could trigger political reaction from negatively affected countries. 
Furthermore, a national definition of capital reflected a unique set of country-specific
CO
accounting practices, banking activities, tax systems and regulatory tradition. Thus, 
a change in the capital definition may cause political disputes within the domestic 
policy, and individual regulators did not easily abandon their regulatory systems.
Regulators were aware of these technical and political difficulties in finding a 
generally acceptable basis for reconciling the diverse approaches to capital adequacy 
existing within the member states, and were reluctant to commit themselves to hasty 
efforts to converge. The first initiative to accelerating the pace of international 
harmonisation came from American domestic politics.59 International regulatory 
harmonisation was deemed to serve to resolve a policy dilemma that American 
regulators confronted at home. Faced with the debt crisis in the early 1980s, American 
regulators sought to tackle this problem through an increase in the resources of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, the request to Congress for an IMF 
quota increase triggered strong demands for tougher regulatory means, reflecting voter 
unwillingness to bear the costs of reckless bank lending practices. The unilateral 
introduction of stricter domestic financial regulation, however, generated opposition 
from American commercial banks because the tighter domestic regulation would
erode their competitiveness vis-a-vis international competitors. In this climate, 
international harmonisation of capital adequacy requirements appeared the best means 
of achieving stricter regulation without weakening the banks’ international 
competitiveness.60 Congress passed the International Lending Supervisory Act (ILSA), 
which required the regulators to consult with regulators from other countries with 
regard to international harmonisation of capital adequacy requirements and to make 
efforts to reach an agreement. This domestic political climate led to the U.S. initiative 
in advancing international harmonization of capital adequacy rules at the Basle 
Committee.
In accordance with ILAS, Fed chair Paul Volcker presented Congress’ request for 
more harmonised capital rules to his fellow regulators at a meeting in Basle in May 
1984.61 However, according to one Fed staff member who was present, his remarks 
were “greeted with a yawn”.62 Peter Cooke, the chair of the Basle Committee, received 
a personal mandate by other members to develop recommendations for:
(1) assessing the comparability of different measures of capital adequacy; and,
(2) attaining over time comparable and adequate minimum international capital 
standards.63
In contrast to the Volcker presentation, this mandate suggested a more moderate pace 
at which international harmonisation would take place. As Volcker and the Treasury
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Secretary Donald Regan put it, in a May 1984 report to Congress, “the difficulties 
involved.. .were recognized as substantial”.64 Throughout the spring and summer of 
1984 there was no breakthrough towards a single generally accepted method of 
measuring capital adequacy.
Instead of a leap forward into a formulation of a single measure, there was a slow 
development to a generally accepted one. During 1983, a “general framework” for 
measuring capital was adopted in order to observe the capital positions of international 
banks.65 The framework was designed not to replace individual national standards, but 
rather to compare and analyse banks’ capital positions by means of the different 
approaches used in the Committee’s member countries. Reflecting the diversity of 
definitions of capital among the members, several alternative definitions of capital, 
such as narrow and wide definitions (i.e., to what extent should less “pure” capital be 
counted?), were included in this general framework. The study based on the general 
framework was conducted with two aims in mind. Firstly, the usefulness of 
international comparisons of bank capital should be ensured. Secondly, whereas the 
members recognised that this particular effort could not automatically lead to any 
narrowing of national capital adequacy standards, they did not lose sight of this 
long-term goal.66
The above efforts served to develop a “tiered approach”, as opposed to a single
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measure, which was expected to overcome rather deep-rooted different opinions on 
the appropriate elements to be included in the capital base for any common measure. 
This framework aimed to establish common ground into which different countries’ 
systems could be fitted. As Table 4.1 exhibits, within this framework, admitted 
elements of capital were to be categorised roughly in descending order of quality, and 
different readings of capital adequacy could be derived according to narrower or wider 
definitions of the capital base. The most restrictive definition consisted of only Tier 1, 
and the most liberal was Tiers 1-5 inclusive. Cooke mentions that the “idea was that 
this framework would allow all countries to slot into the system and produce 
illustrative figures which could be read alongside those for other countries”.
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Table 4.1 Elements of Capital in the Original Tiered Framework (1983)
Tier Elements of capital Countries which did not recognise these 
elements as being within capital in their 
accounting or supervisory systems
1 Issued and fully-paid ordinary shares 
Non-redeemable preference shares 
Share premium
Retained profit and general reserves
None
2 plus Undisclosed reserves Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Sweden, United Sates
3 plus Asset revaluation reserves Canada, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
States
4 plus General provisions Germany
5 plus Subordinated debt (up to a 
maximum of 50% of items 1 to 4)
Germany, Italy, Japan
Note: Subsequent to the development of the original tiered framework, a new tier of “hybrid
capital instruments” was introduced between 4 and 5 to accommodate the new capital 
instruments which were developed in the market during 1984 and after.
Source: Cooke (1990: 318).
By the end of 1986, the Basle Committee had succeeded in the formulation of a 
series of common definitions for a plethora of off-balance sheet instruments and the 
degree of risk they entailed, and a complex definition of capital on which all countries 
roughly agreed. When the Fourth International Conference of Banking Supervisors 
was held in the Amsterdam in October 1986, H. J. Muller, Chairperson of the Basle 
Committee and Executive Director of the Netherlands central bank, presented the 
results of the Committee’s developing consensus on the issue of capital adequacy. 
Emphasising the cardinal importance of capital adequacy, a reference in the press 
communique issued at the end of the conference noted “there was broad measure of
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agreement on what should constitute the composition of capital...[and] that the risk 
ratio approach was the preferred approach”.68
4.4 Developments in Japanese Capital Adequacy Requirements in the mid-1980s
4.4.1 The Incompetent 1986 Administrative Guidance
Japanese regulators tried to update the Japanese capital adequacy regulation in parallel 
with the development of the Basle efforts. Despite the fiasco of the 1981 revision of 
the Banking Act, the MoF’s intention to strengthen capital standards never 
disappeared. In June 1985, the FSRC came out with another report which particularly 
pointed out the cardinal importance of a more effective method of regulating bank 
capital adequacy. Tetsuro Nishizaki, a journalist and one of the FSRC members, said 
that the 1985 report was a turning point for capital adequacy regulation in Japan.69 Of 
particular note is that the diffusion of regulatory norms through the interaction at the 
Basle Committee stimulated the development of capital adequacy rules in Japan. As 
seen above, at that time, alongside American and Canadian counterparts, Japanese 
regulators still adopted a non-risk-weighting, or gearing, approach to measuring bank 
assets. However, a pitfall of the gearing approach became apparent later. Through the 
learning process in Basle, Japanese regulators started to share the idea of the 
risk-weighting approach as the best measure of capital adequacy. Initially, the
International Finance Bureau of the MoF which represented on the Committee at the
70time, began to prepare for its introduction in the summer of 1985. This was deemed 
to bring Japanese regulation more closely in line with those of other Basle Committee 
members.
Based upon the 1985 FSRC report, the Banking Bureau of the MoF issued new 
administrative guidance on banks’ capital ratios, revising the ratio from 10 percent to a 
more realistic figure, in May 1986. This revision was, in fact, conciliatory. The 
guidelines consisted of main rules and sub-rules. The main rules required all banks to 
hold 4 percent of non-risk-weighted assets as the capital base (narrowly defined). In 
addition to the main rules, banks with overseas branches were also subject to the 
sub-rules: (1) the capital-to-asset ratio, including 70 percent of unrealised capital gains 
in part of capital, should be over 6 percent; and (2) risk-weighted overseas assets 
should be less than 3.5 times the amount of capital.
It was not a straightforward process defining regulatory capital. The definition of 
capital, or more exactly, the degree to which unrealised capital gains on banks’ 
securities holdings should be counted as a source of capital, sparked controversy 
between regulators and banks. Banks traditionally possessed a sizeable amount of 
long-standing holdings of marketable securities of other firms, and realised these
71capital gains to repay loan losses when necessary. Though the view of unrealised
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capital gains as an effective means to cover loan losses prevailed, regulators were 
aware of the side effect that the inclusion of a large amount of unrealised capital gains 
in the capital base might have. The more banks’ capital bases became dependent on 
unrealised capital gains, the more unstable banking operations would be due to their 
reliance on unpredictable market prices of securities. Given this concern, regulators 
wanted to reduce the portion of unrealised gains in capital instruments, but banks 
agitated for a broader definition of capital. Finally, as a compromise, while the main 
rules of the 1986 guidelines excluded unrealised gains as capital, the sub-rules 
explicitly counted 70 percent of unrealised gains as a form of capital. This 70 percent 
cushion was expected to absorb price fluctuations to some extent, and was large 
enough to be accepted by banks.
The new guidelines were a victory for banks, on balance. The guidelines were 
numerically more lax than the MoF initially intended, and did not come with any 
means of strengthening the MoF’s capacity to enforce bank compliance. The private 
banks responded positively to the downward revision of capital definition, but not with 
great interest in living up to the lower standard of capital-to-asset ratios. Thanks to the 
inclusion of unrealised capital gains, all the major banks easily met the sub-rules of the 
1986 guidelines. However, the banks neither complied with the stricter main rules nor 
made serious efforts to improve their capital ratios. Rather, 8 city banks out of 13
decreased their main-rule-based capital-to-asset ratios during the year of 1987 (see
n ' l
Table 4.2). Notwithstanding, those failing to improve their capital ratios in line with 
the 1986 guidelines continued to do business without being subject to regulatory 
scrutiny and sanctions, because the MoF did not have authority to punish them. 
Japanese banks still aggressively engaged in thin-margin international loan markets 
without due capitalisation.
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Table 4.2 Capital Adequacy Ratios of City Banks 
based on the 1986 Administrative Guidance
unit: %
March 1987 September 1987
The main rules The sub-rules The main rules The sub-rules
Dai-ichi Kangyo 2.87 9.66 2.98 9.99
Sumitomo 3.1 9.1 3.0 9.1
Fuji 3.31 9.70 3.0 9.91
Mitsubishi 3.2 11.3 3.2 11.0
Sanwa 3.02 9.36 3.1 9.7
Tokai 2.92 9.7 2.65 9.91
Mitsui 2.97 10.94 2.71 10.79
Taiyo-Kobe 2.77 9.0 2.6 9.2
Kyowa 2.81 10.61 3.15 11.85
Daiwa 3.59 10.82 3.46 11.92
Saitama 3.09 8.84 2.95 8.78
Hokkaido Takushoku 2.59 8.73 2.75 9.37
Bank of Tokyo 3.53 9.19 3.26 9.22
Notes: The main rules of the 1986 administrative guidance required banks to hold more than 
4% of capital-to-asset ratios (unrealised capital gains were excluded from capital). In 
addition to the main rules, banks with overseas brunches were subject to the sub-rules 
that required them to hold more than 6% of capital ratios to risk-weighted assets (70% 
of unrealised capital gains were counted as capital).
Source: Kin-yUBijinesu [Financial BusinessJ, January 1988, p.7.
4.4.2 The International Expansion o f Japanese Banks
Throughout the 1980s, Japanese banks expanded their international operations and by 
the late 1980s they emerged as a dominant force in global finance. The market share of 
Japanese banks in terms of foreign assets stood at only 5 percent in 1980, but increased 
to 23 percent in 1984 and 38 percent in 1988 (see Figure 4.3). In contrast, the market
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share of American banks decreased since 1984, and their share shrunk to one third of 
the Japanese in 1988. This section considers implications of competitive pressures 
from Japanese banks for the Basle process o f international convergence o f capital 
adequacy requirements.
Figure 4.3 Positions of International Bank Assets 
by Nationality of Ownership
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The increase in Japanese banks’ presence was remarkable especially in the U.K.
and the U.S. (see Table 4.3). Market share of Japanese banks in the City of London
stood at 8 percent level in the 1970s.74 However, when American banks with high
exposure to Latin American countries scaled back their lending rather significantly in
the course of the debt crisis, Japanese banks enlarged their market share by intensively
purchasing FRNs (Floating Rate Notes), the most notable subcategory o f  the
Eurobond market, in London.75 The liberalisation o f Euroyen regulations (Euroyen
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loans, Euroyen CDs, and Euroyen bonds), after the 1984 Yen-Dollar Committee’s 
Agreement, gave Japanese banks a renewed incentive to deal in these financial 
instruments and accelerated the expansion of Japanese banks’ foreign assets.76 
Furthermore, Japanese banks raised U.S. dollar funds in inter-bank markets in London 
in order to make the “impact loan” (foreign-currency loans to Japanese manufactures). 
This activity also increased foreign assets.
Table 4.3 Market Share of Japanese Banks in Major Countries 
(in terms of financial assets)
unit: %
The early 1980s The late 1980s
The share o f total The share o f The share o f  total The share o f  
foreign banks Japanese banks foreign banks Japanese banks 
The U.S. 1L5 5 5^ 25J) 14X)
The U.K. 60.4 16.9 61.2 24.0
Germany 2.0 n.a. 4.2 1.0
Notes: The comparison o f  the U.S. markets is between December 1980 and December 1989;
the U.K., July 1982 and July 1988; and Germany, December 1971 and October 1986. 
Source: Kurosawa (1993: 252).
Among European countries, Japanese banks succeeded in establishing a 
beachhead in the U.K. to get access to local markets. In Germany, close relationships 
between major banks and industry, based upon the universal banking system, was an 
obstacle to Japanese challenge. In contrast, the success of Japanese banks in building
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up local client bases in the U.K. was impressive. Especially, Japanese banks 
concentrated on selected target industry sectors, such as government services, water 
supplies, building societies, and energy companies. In the first three of these U.K. 
industries, the market share of Japanese lending was over 30 percent respectively in 
1987.77
American banks also encountered Japanese competitive challenge in not only 
international but also domestic markets. In the Euromarket, the rapid increase of 
Japanese banks’ share was accompanied with the decline of American banks’ share. 
Yet, even at the domestic level, the Japanese challenge was formidable. One notable
78case was a regional niche in California. There were more than a thousand 
subsidiaries of Japanese industrial firms in California, and many Japanese banks 
opened their subsidiaries and branches to follow their clients. Some of the banks even 
acquired local banks there in a rather aggressive fashion: Mitsubishi Bank bought the 
Bank of California in 1984, Sanwa Bank Lloyds Bank of California in 1986 and Bank 
of Tokyo Union Bank of California in 1988. In the aggregate, Japanese banks owned 
424 branches and had a market share of 25 percent in California as of the late 1980s, 
according to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.79
Japanese banks expanded their wholesale operations in the money centres in New 
York and Chicago. Being armed with low interest rates, they took the low-spread/
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high-volume strategy in loan syndication, and engaged in leverage-buy-out. By the 
end of 1987, Japanese banks’ total share of the U.S. commercial and industrial loan 
market rose to 13 percent, making them the biggest foreign banking group in that 
market, up from less than 1 percent a decade earlier.80 Some also became very active in 
guaranteeing municipal and state debts, where they had an edge over many of their 
American rivals because of their better credit quality. Moreover, Japanese banks’ 
activity in M&A of foreign financial firms was impressive. Following Daiwa Bank’s 
acquisition of CBO (a commercial bank) in 1980, Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank bought a 60 
percent stake in CIT (a finance company subsidiary of Manufacture Hanover), Fuji 
Bank bought Walter E. Heller in 1984 and Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) acquired J. 
Henry Schroder Bank & Trust of New York at the beginning of 1986. Furthermore, IBJ 
and Sanwa Bank bought primary dealers in US treasury bonds (IBJ: Aubrey G. 
Lanston in 1986; Sanwa: Prophy Gestal Knigh & Co. in 1988), and Sumitomo Bank 
bought a 12.5 percent stake in Goldman Sachs in 1986 (although a decision by the US 
supervisory authorities forced Sumitomo to remain a passive investor for the time 
being), and Mitsubishi Bank acquired control of the Bank of California New York 
Trust in January 1987.81
Such various factors as the strength of the domestic Japanese economy, its 
mounting current account surplus, on-going liberalisation of its financial system,
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burgeoning international operations of Japanese manufactures, low domestic interest 
rates (1986-89), the strong yen after 1985, and rising domestic stock and property
O')
markets contributed to the Japanese financial expansion outside Japan. Among these 
factors, low capitalisation of Japanese banks drew attention of both regulators and 
their foreign competitors. Despite the MoF’s several attempts to introduce effective 
capital adequacy requirements, Japanese banks continued to engage in thin-margin 
international loan markets and enlarge their foreign currency assets, especially in the 
American and British markets, without due capitalisation. This behaviour of Japanese 
banks provoked anxiety among Japanese regulators about the banks’ ambitious 
international business (see the next chapter). Simultaneously, from foreign bankers’ 
viewpoint, Japanese banks’ razor-thin capital operations meant that their 
competitiveness in international markets was leveraged by liberal domestic capital 
requirements. It contributed to the Japan-bashing mood among American and British 
bankers.
Japanese banks typically seemed to operate with lower level of capital than U.S. or
European banks for a variety of reasons, and it was argued that the low capital ratios
0-1
gave Japanese banks an unfair competitive advantage. Whether Japanese banks do 
indeed use return on equity as their main pricing determinant is a moot point. In theory, 
however, capital divergences cause “unfair advantages” for banks with lower capital
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ratios: they can accept lower returns when quoting for business to achieve a given 
return on equity. According to this account, a main reason that Japanese banks 
increased their market share in international and overseas markets so dramatically was 
not that they offered a superior product or superior service. Rather, it was because they 
were able to quote prices, which other banks under tougher capital regulations were 
not able to meet. As early as 1982, in a survey of the Group of Thirty, U.S. bankers 
pointed to the existing capital adequacy standards as a factor that contributed to their 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis Japanese banks.
The concern for competitiveness by American banks influenced domestic disputes 
over the resolution for the debt crisis and the reform of banking regulation in the early 
1980s. In response to pressure by the banking industry and statements by American 
regulatory authorities during the 1983 hearings of ISLA, Congress became 
considerably sensitised to the competitive inequalities that might arise from 
cross-national divergent banking regulations in a highly integrated global banking 
market. Representatives from the banking industry expressed their grievances that any 
unilateral imposition of higher capital ratios would prove to be a major nuisance for 
American banks to compete in international and domestic markets. They warned that 
any new unilateral regulations could give rise to the decrease in domestic and 
international lending, as well as a loss in relative competitiveness of American
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commercial banks with regard both to foreign banks and to non-bank financial 
institutions. Paul Volcker, the then U.S. Federal Reserve Board Chairperson, also 
mentioned:
There are intense competitive pressures in these markets, and this is an area 
where it is important, to the degree possible, to have a common international 
approach...I would also note that—not as any kind of excuse, but as a 
fact—banks undoubtedly have felt under very heavy pressure internationally, 
and carrying more capital is a cost. From the viewpoint of an individual 
institution, if it feels its competitors, particularly in this business which is 
literally worldwide, have competitive advantage, this is not an atmosphere in 
which it is easy to get capital increases...It is an area that has international as
Q C
well as domestic dimensions.
As seen in the previous sections, Japanese banks politically succeeded in blocking 
Japanese regulators’ attempts to introduce tougher capital adequacy requirements into 
the Japanese regulatory system in the early half of the 1980s. They, as a result, enjoyed 
the domestic regulatory institution that effectively allowed them to engage in 
low-margin, asset-intensive operations to corporate sector and governments outside 
Japan. Given the very rapid expansion of Japanese financial institutions in the 1980s, 
this behaviour of Japanese banks gave rise to political reaction from foreign 
competitors, and sparked off the “levelling a playing field” argument. Together with 
the slow progress in Basle and the U.S. domestic pressure exerted upon American 
regulators, the Japanese banks’ challenge eventually led to the 1987 U.S.-U.K.
bilateral agreement on capital rule harmonisation. As seen in the next chapter, this 
bilateral agreement was a political breakthrough that accelerated the pace of the Basle 
process, and Japanese regulators used the international harmonisation process to push 
ahead with the statutory base for domestic capital adequacy requirements.
4.5 Conclusion
The Japanese regulatory system did not meet any of the indicators of credible 
commitment to capital adequacy requirements during the period considered here (from 
the 1950s to the mid-1980s). Japan failed to meet the two primary indicators, let alone 
the other two; it lacked a statutory basis of capital adequacy requirements and banks 
significantly came short of meeting the required capital ratios. There was an absence 
of prudential regulation. This contrasts with what the two-level game model 
hypothesises (that is, the international and domestic interaction gives regulators room 
for improving regulatory manoeuvrability.)
Competitive pressures from low-capitalised Japanese banks in the 1980s and their 
stimulating influence on the Basle process have been well documented. Yet what is 
scant in the existing literature is that Japanese regulators tried to improve domestic 
capital adequacy requirements, but Japanese banks successfully fended off such 
attempts. It has three implications. One is that Japanese regulators and banks had
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different views of capital adequacy. Unlike the “Japan, Inc.” perspective of the 
international expansion of Japanese banks, regulators did not intentionally support 
such rapid expansion based upon aggressive thin-margin, asset-incentive strategies. 
Rather, lax capital regulation in Japan was a product of the domestic politics where 
private banks prevailed in regulation-making. Given the trend towards financial 
liberalisation, the MoF had the regulatory objective of establishing effective domestic 
capital requirements in order to countervail the greater degree of freedom enjoyed by 
banks. In other words, Japanese regulators did not see existing regulation as an ideal. 
Moreover, the way in which Japanese banks expanded their international operations 
became an anxiety to them.
The second, related to the first, is that it was necessary for Japanese regulators to 
shift the domestic power balance in order to introduce effective capital adequacy 
requirements. Institutional structures of the Japanese state were major obstacles to the 
regulatory goal. Power configurations under the domestic institutional structure of the 
time did not give the MoF autonomy vis-a-vis private banks in the field of capital 
adequacy requirements. The resistance of powerful private banks had been an 
impediment to the legislation and implementation of strict capital requirements. For 
regulators, the issues of bank capital adequacy were politically tough deals.
The third was the role that the learning process at the Basle Committee played in
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affecting preference formation of Japanese regulators, albeit with significant limits on 
its domestic implementation. Through interaction with their foreign counterparts in 
the Basle banking regulatory regime, Japanese regulators imported significant 
regulatory norms and means such as the risk-weighted approach to capital-to-asset 
ratios. A common recognition of problems and shared knowledge about risk-weighted 
capital ratios have been evolving out of interactive contact between member regulators 
in Basle. It should be also emphasised that Japanese regulators were not the only ones 
learning through the Basle process, but the Americans, too. Exclusive attention to 
American domestic politics and concerns for competitiveness tends to blur the picture 
of the Basle process.
In short, by the mid-1980s Japanese bank regulators began attempting to move 
Japanese capital standards more closely in line with those of many other Basle 
Committee members. However, Japanese bank regulators confronted the stubborn 
resistance of private banks, and Japanese capital standards remained insufficient and 
lacked any compliance mechanism. This lax capital regulation constructed a domestic 
platform from which low-capitalised Japanese banks aggressively expanded their 
market share in international finance, and this behaviour evoked outcries by their 
foreign competitors against Japanese banks’ low capitalisation. However, this situation 
was not a product of closely tied relationships between regulatory policies and private
initiatives, but rather a result of a political victory of Japanese banks over regulators. 
The following chapter will examine how Japanese regulators attempted to cope with 
politically powerful banks after the U.S.-U.K. joint initiatives accelerated international 
negotiations.
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Chapter 5
Negotiating the 1988 Basie Accord:
International Negotiations and Domestic Politics
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will consider the negotiation process leading up to the 1988 Basle 
Capital Accord. The international negotiations over regulatory harmonisation and 
domestic politics about capital adequacy provide the two-level-game model with its 
enticing example. The preceding chapter has argued that the model encounters 
problems when applied to the pre-Basle Accord development in capital adequacy 
requirements. It can be argued, however, that the pre-Basle Accord period did not 
have international forces substantial enough to generate the domestic and 
international interaction. By closely examining Japanese regulators’ preference 
formation, perception of market trends, international and domestic bargaining 
positions through a filter of the two-level game model, this chapter tries to analyse
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the degree to which the model can explain Japan’s commitments to the Basle Accord.
Most commentators rightly point out the importance of the U.S. initiatives in 
advancing international harmonisation of capital adequacy standards as well as the 
U.S. concerns on competitiveness behind such initiatives. Some writers like Oatley 
and Nabors go further, arguing that the Accord represents a redistributive 
international co-operation designed by American policy-makers to transfer income 
from Japanese banks to compensate American banks for the costs of regulation.1 
Many Japanese writers also frequently refer to the 1988 Basle Accord as an explicit 
turning-point in the rise and fall of Japanese financial power. The existing literature 
on the 1988 Basle Accord, however, is inadequate in terms of providing a 
comprehensive survey covering Japanese actors’ preferences and achievements.
The argument made here is a modified version of Kapstein’s account of the 
Basle Accord, viewed through the eyes of a country that negotiated its way into an 
international regulatory agreement that had been launched by the U.S. and the U.K. 
Kapstein explains how a regulatory dilemma between keeping domestic banks 
competitive and the financial system stable led to the Basle Accord. This chapter 
considers how Japanese regulatory officials dealt with the similar dilemma by 
participating in international negotiations. This argument presents a counterexample 
to a “redistributive logic” of the Basle Accord: American policymakers, together with
the British, whose banks were confronting the growing Japanese challenge, exercised 
financial power to push Japan into an unfavourable multilateral framework; thereby 
forcing Japanese banks to raise their capital ratios.4 The approach presented here also 
differs from a bank-centred analysis emphasising market pressure as a driving force 
for emulating the U.S.-U.K.initiative on regulatory standards.5 Moreover, the chapter 
not only provides additional evidence for, but also refines and revises the notion of 
Japan being a “reactive state”.6 Even in an issue-area of banking regulation, where 
the bureaucracy has been often deemed to enjoy a high degree of autonomy, the MoF 
was exposed to societal interests and had incentives to use external pressure, or 
gaiatu, to attain its domestic goals.
Despite these merits, the two-level-game model is less successful in accounting 
for the question of Japanese commitments to the Basle Accord. Specifically, it pays 
insufficient attention to domestic Japanese bureaucratic and political processes, 
where institutional inertia hampered a shift towards prudential regulation along with 
the Basle Accord. Implementation issues will be examined in chapter 7.
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5.2 The Formation of an International Agenda and Japanese Preferences
5.2.1 The U.S.-U.K. Bilateral Agreement
As seen in the precious chapter, American regulators began to embark on domestic 
banking regulation reform by the mid-1980s, especially in the wake of the debt crisis. 
Their effort to introduce a risk-weighted capital adequacy measure was an effort to 
manage to obtain their banks’ consent. Their regulatory concerns were over both the 
changes in banking activities (the rapidly growth in off-balance sheet exposure, in 
particular) and recognition of the growing divergence between U.S. capital standards 
and the risk-weighted capital adequacy measures introduced by other major 
industrial countries. The three U.S. federal regulators issued their proposal for public 
comment in January 1986. As expected, American commercial banks protested this 
unilateral measure, which was deemed to put them at a competitive disadvantage vis- 
a-vis their foreign rivals as well as American non-bank financial institutions. 
Meeting with stiff resistance, the regulators believed that their domestic efforts 
would have to be accompanied by similar international measures in order to be 
politically feasible.
Considering the institutional framework provided by the Basle Committee and 
the accumulation of its earlier work on this area, the Basle Committee was naturally 
seen as a vehicle for international harmonisation. However, the earlier work by the
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Committee failed to make substantial progress, and American regulators got 
frustrated by other members’ reluctance to commit themselves to international 
harmonisation. As Kapstein points out, at this point, American regulators had three 
alternatives: it could continue to negotiate with foreign regulators within the Basle 
framework; it could adopt new domestic standards; or it could seek a piecemeal 
extension of the proposed standard to countries that had already taken a similar 
measure.7 Initially, the U.S. regulators decided to pursue common standards outside 
the Basle framework, and found the Bank of England (BoE) to be an ally.
For the BoE, the joint approach was attractive for at least three reasons. Firstly, 
1986 was the year of the so-called Big Bang in the U.K., and the BoE began to 
embark on a radical reform of the British financial structure. The BoE was interested 
in developing a common framework to cope with the growing array of off-balance
Q
sheet transactions. Secondly, the joint approach with the U.S. was regarded as a 
powerful means of countering the emerging standard in the EC, to which the BoE 
had objected.9 Finally, as in the U.S., the City of London was under pressure from 
Japanese banks with low capitalisation.10 In the autumn of 1986, negotiations began 
between Brian Quinn of the BoE and William Taylor of the Federal Reserve, the two 
officials in charge of the banking supervision divisions in their respective 
organisations.
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In spite of conceptual similarity between their risk-weighting asset systems, 
problems remained over the appropriate definition of capital, since each country 
brought its own definition to the negotiations.11 Efforts to overcome problems 
resulted in a creative solution to it. As the Basle Committee previously forged the 
“tiered framework” in order to cope with cross-national differences in the definition 
of capital, the two countries set up their “two-tiered” definition of total capital in 
order to deal with the same problem. “Unlimited capital”, consisting of traditional 
forms of capital immediately available to cover losses, would be counted as the 
measure of regulatory capital on an unlimited basis. “Limited capital”, consisting of 
other types of capital instruments, would be restricted to the amount of base capital 
held by banks. Capital instruments under dispute (i.e., those that were not universally 
regarded as capital) were included in limited capital. For example, such controversial 
capital instruments as certain types of convertible bonds, which the Americans saw 
as part of capital but the British not, and some types of perpetual preferred stocks, 
which the British regarded as part of capital but the Americans not, were included in 
limited capital.12
In January 1987, the U.S.-U.K. Agreement was announced. One American 
regulatory official said that “in light of the importance of New York and London as 
international banking centres, agreement on a single risk-based capital framework to
be applied in both the U.S and the U.K. would indeed represent a major step forward
11in international convergence”. Thus, the two countries appealed to other countries 
to join the programme. This was consistent with competitiveness concerns of bankers. 
Ira Stepanian, president of the Bank of Boston, expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
bilateral agreement: “serious concerns with the.. .proposal as it related to competitive 
equity, not only between US banks and those overseas, but also between US banks 
and non-bank financial institutions...[A] major segment of worldwide banking had 
been left out—including Japan, which now had seven of the top ten banks in the 
world”.14
One of chief concerns was how to bring Japan, of which banks occupied more 
than one third of international lending in the mid-1980s, into a multilateral 
convergence scheme for bank capital adequacy.15 Prior to the announcement of the 
U.S.-U.K. Agreement, both countries began to make contact with Japanese regulators. 
In November 1986, Gerald Corrigan, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, asked Toyoo Gyoten, vice minister for international finance of the MoF, to 
dispatch his officials to New York in order to discuss the possibility of international 
regulatory co-ordination, in particular capital adequacy requirements. Three MoF 
officials from the Banking Bureau, the Securities Bureau and the International 
Finance Bureau met with Corrigan at the N.Y. Fed in early December. At the dinner
meeting, Corrigan, though he did not clarify concrete contents, revealed that the U.S. 
Fed and the BoE had been negotiating over the convergence of capital adequacy 
measures and standards and would announce a bilateral agreement soon. He also 
sounded the Japanese regulatory authorities out on their participation in the 
convergence process.16 During the course of international negotiations on capital 
standards in Basle, MoF officials had indicated both publicly and privately their 
commitment to increased co-operation among regulatory authorities of other 
countries. At this stage, however, the MoF officials did not explicitly decide their 
attitude to this matter because of lack of sufficient information. They brought the 
issue to Japan and started to discuss it within the Banking Bureau and consult with 
the banking industry about it.
5.2.2 Preferences o f Japanese Actors
Japanese private bankers, who were caught up in the euphoria of the “bubble 
economy”, vocally complained about the U.S.-U.K. proposal. Japanese bankers felt 
their capital holdings were sufficient to cover loan losses and that criticism of their 
low capital levels in the U.S. was “politically motivated and triggered by a Japan-
17bashing mood”. They thought that the ulterior objective of the joint proposal was to 
put a brake on the rapid growth of Japanese banks, by eliminating the funding-cost
advantage of Japanese banks. Among these criticisms, Mitsui Bank, whose president 
occupied the chair of the Federation of Bankers’ Associations of Japan (FBAJ), sent 
an official public comment to the Japanese MoF as well as the U.S. and British
1 Rauthorities. The points of the public comment were: (1) banks were allowed to hold 
securities, and their unrealised gains were large and had been functioning well as 
buffers for loan losses; (2) bank loans were, in principle, secured by mortgage or 
property; and (3) the soundness of banks’ assets was continuously supervised by 
Japanese regulators. If we consider that Japanese banks were not complying with 
domestic capital rules, these claims seemed less than convincing. However, in the 
late 1980s the flourishing Japanese banks had strong confidence in their business 
style and did not want to lose part of their regulatory advantage vis-a-vis their 
international competitors.19
Japanese banks could not reject the U.S.-U.K. proposal however. Though they 
were unhappy with the U.S.-U.K. proposal, the importance of the U.K. and U.S. 
financial markets left to them no choice but to negotiate over more favourable 
conditions.20 Japanese banks perceived the U.S.-U.K. proposal as a real threat of 
market closure: exclusion from the New York and London markets meant that it 
would spell disaster to Japanese banks in their international operations. This fear 
caused the banks to take the situation seriously. The Japanese banking industry
fiercely demanded that unrealised capital gains on marketable securities be counted 
in the definition of capital, whereas they were excluded from the U.S.-U.K proposed 
capital instruments. While their transnational lobbying ended with little success, they 
put pressure on Japanese regulators to achieve this objective. Inputting this demand 
into the harmonisation process was thought by Japanese bankers to be a way of 
winning favourable conditions that would lower the compliance costs of Japanese 
banks to the upcoming stricter capital adequacy rules.
From the Japanese MoF’s point of view, international regulatory co-ordination in 
itself was not necessarily unacceptable. MoF officials perceived the need for some 
form of international co-ordination of capital adequacy rules. As other Basle 
Committee members recognised, one of MoF’s motivations was the increasing 
difficulty of attaining the soundness and stability of the national banking system in a 
highly integrated and competitive international banking market. Disparities in 
national regulations as regards both the way in which capital adequacy was measured 
and the amount of capital which banks were required to hold could have several 
harmful consequences for national banking supervision, and could result in an 
increasing difficulty for individual national supervisors and individual banks to
91maintain, let alone raise, prudential standards. With these concerns, the MoF and 
the BoJ had previously co-operated in the Committee’s early work on attaining
internationally comparable capital standards and initial data collection on 
international banks’ capital positions in the early and mid-1980s.22
Another set of anxieties over Japanese banks’ international operations also turned 
the MoF’s attention to international regulatory co-ordination. Despite the MoF’s 
domestic attempts to raise bank capital ratios, Japanese banks operated with 
relatively low levels of capital, so that the worries in the MoF grew that the banks’ 
foreign assets were not backed strongly enough by an adequate net worth. 
Furthermore, the MoF officials were worried about Japanese banks’ ability to 
manage risk as the government had largely absorbed credit risk under the “policy-of- 
not-letting-any-bank-go-bankrupt”.23 Government-guaranteed control of credit risk 
(through various forms of implicit subsides arising from competition-preventing 
regulations) discouraged Japanese banks for developing, or catching up with, state- 
of-the-art risk management. Perceived underdevelopment of Japanese banks’ risk 
management skills, together with their thin margin operations in the international 
loan market, provoked the MoF officials’ anxiety that the surge of such Japanese 
banks’ presence in the international loan market would cause some problems in the 
international banking system.24
Therefore, the MoF had different objectives at the international and domestic 
levels, respectively. On the one hand, the MoF insisted as a condition of Japanese
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participation that unrealised capital gains be counted as capital. The MoF had to take 
distributive issues into account. For Japanese banks, the inclusion of unrealised 
capital gains on banks’ securities holdings was regarded as crucial to preserving their 
positions in the international banking market. On the other hand, the MoF saw the 
strengthening of domestic capital adequacy rules and compliance mechanisms as its 
domestic objectives. Although the MoF had to consider the competitiveness bias of 
the international capital rule harmonisation scheme which would negatively affect 
Japanese banks, it continued to have a normative desire that domestic capital rules 
should be upgraded further to catch up with the on-going financial liberalisation. The 
former led the MoF to negotiate with foreign counterparts for the inclusion of 
unrealised capital gains in the capital definition. The latter gave the MoF an incentive 
to use the Basle negotiation to realise its desired outcomes regarding tough domestic 
issues such as capital adequacy rules.
155
5.3 Negotiations: International and Domestic Interactions
5.3.1 International Bargaining' Power and Innovation o f an Acceptable 
Framework
The diversity in interests regarding distributive issues meant that interactions among 
the Basle members took on an atmosphere of bargaining and negotiation. Stimulated 
by the U.S.-U.K. proposal, a multilateral meeting at the Basle Committee took 
significant steps towards regulatory harmonisation. In April 1987, the Committee 
members decided to move swiftly towards the establishment of internationally 
harmonised capital standards based on the U.S.-U.K. proposal.
At that meeting, Japanese representatives objected to use the U.S.-U.K. proposal 
as a basis for further discussion. They insisted that banks’ unrealised capital gains 
had long played adequate roles in repaying banks’ non-performing assets in Japan 
and that it was unrealistic to exclude them from the capital base. Most of the other 
participants, however, objected to this Japanese request. The delegates from the U.S. 
and the U.K. claimed stock prices were so volatile that unrealised capital gains could 
not be included in capital. German regulators also clarified its stance against any 
effort to widen the definition of capital. The MoF was isolated, but withheld its full 
commitment to the international harmonisation process unless the role of unrealised 
capital gains as capital was taken into account.
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As Japan was one of the biggest financial powers, how to bring Japan into a 
multilateral convergence scheme for bank capital was the biggest challenge for the 
U.S. In early June 1987, a high-level delegation led by William Taylor of the Fed 
met in Japan with Japanese regulators to discuss Japanese participation. The 
definition of capital, in particular the treatment of unrealised capital gains on 
marketable securities, was a crucial stumbling block. While the Japanese delegation 
continued to be adamant that unrealised capital gains be included in the capital base, 
the U.S. side did not recognize such gains as relevant.
The strength of Japanese banks in the international markets enabled the MoF to 
prevail at the negotiation table. The MoF presented the capital-to-asset ratios of 
major American, British, and Japanese banks that were broadly calculated in line 
with the formula of the original U.S.-U.K. proposal.26 While the estimated ratios of 
the Japanese banks were extremely low, those of the British banks were extremely 
high. The American banks stood between the two (see Figure 5.1). This estimated 
result was at odds with credit ratings provided by private agencies. For example, 
Moody’s Investors Services, an American credit agency, rated all the major Japanese 
banks at higher than Aa2, and nine of them obtained the highest rate, Aaa. In contrast, 
many of top U.S. banks had been downgraded to less than single A or triple B, due to 
their bad loans to the U.S. oil and agricultural sectors and to debt-ridden developing
countries (see Table 5.1). The Japanese side drew attention to the potential pitfalls of 
a regulatory scheme whose outcomes would be incompatible with a market 
perspective. The U.S. delegation came to a better understanding of the Japanese
7 7authorities’ point, and effectively dropped its wholesale opposition. The U.S. had to 
make a compromise with Japan, which had seven of the top ten banks in the world at 
the time in terms of asset size. At the end of the bilateral meeting, the U.S. delegation 
implied part of unrealised capital gains on marketable securities would be counted as 
capital.28 The Japanese participants informed the US delegation that they would be 
committed to taking part in the international effort to establish common capital
70adequacy rules. For the MoF, the inclusion of unrealised capital gains was the first 
step towards its full participation in the convergence process.
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Figure 5.1 International Comparisons of Capital-to-asset Ratios 
based on the U.S.-U.K. Proposal
10 
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0
Japanese banks American banks British banks
Notes: The figure of Japanese banks is the average of 13 city banks (March 1986). That of the 
American is the average of top 10 banks (December 1985). The British are the average o 
major 4 clearing banks (December 1985).
Source: Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, quoted in Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 17 August 1987.
Table 5.1 Long-term Debt Ratings of 
Selected International Banks (June 1987)
Japanese banks American banks British banks
Aaa IBJ, LTCB, DKB, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, 
Fuji, Sanwa, Mitsubishi Trust, Sumitomo 
Trust
J.P. Morgan NatWest,
Barclays
Aal Bank of Tokyo, Mitsui Trust
Aa2 Tokai Bank,
Aa3 Bankers Trust
A1 Citicorp
A2 Chase Manhattan, Chemical 
Banking, First Chicago
A3 Manufacturers Hanover
Baal
Baa2
Baa3 Continental Bank
Bal BankAmerica
Notes: IBJ, LTCB and DKB stand for Industrial Bank o f Japan, Long-term Credit Bank o f Japan,
and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, respectively. Lloyds Bank, the other major U.K. clearing bank, 
did not seek rating because it did not issue bonds on the U.S. markets.
Source: Moody’s Investors Service
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Following this progress, at the Basle Committee meeting in Brussels in June 
1987, Japanese regulators officially indicated, for the first time, that they could, in 
principle, accept the new harmonisation proposal. The meeting also reached an 
important agreement on an acceptable framework of capital, namely the two-tier 
capital structure. As on the asset side, a prototype of the framework of measuring 
capital had already been created. In making efforts to compare cross-national bank 
capital in the early 1980s, the Committee had adopted a “tiered capital” framework 
to allow countries to slot into various definitions of capital and to produce illustrative 
figures which could be read alongside those for other countries.31 Based upon this 
idea, the U.S.-U.K. bilateral proposal took a “two-tier capital” framework and the 
1987 Brussels framework also divided capital into two tiers. The first tier of capital, 
or core capital, consisted exclusively of equity stock and retained earnings. The 
second tier of capital, or supplementary capital, included other less pure forms of 
capital. Unrealised capital gains on securities, therefore, were expected to be 
included in supplementary capital.
Besides the inclusion of unrealised capital gains on banks’ securities holdings in 
capital, in the course of the international negotiations, Japanese regulators recognised 
other two policy issues with which they had to deal: mutual holdings of banks’ 
capital instruments and the categorisation of risk-weights. The first issue was
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related to a problem as to which assets should be deducted from both the capital base 
and total risk-adjusted assets. Investments in other banks’ capital instruments were 
totally deduced from capital in several countries (for instance, France and the U.K.) 
in order to prevent banks from artificially increasing capital bases by mutually 
holding equities. Yet, such holdings prevailed in other countries. In Japan, mutual 
shareholdings were not negligible at the time. Dai-ich Kangyo Bank (DKB), for 
example, owned 3.4 percent of Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, which in turn held 
2.7 percent of DKB. Six of Nippon Credit Bank’s largest shareholders were city 
banks. Furthermore, keiretsu relations (industrial grouping), such as Sumitomo and 
Mitsubishi, had strong links among city and trust banks in terms of mutual 
shareholdings. American banks also held equity positions in other banks in 
anticipation of the relaxation of inter-state banking laws.34 Since this sort of holdings 
was widely accepted in certain countries, especially in the two largest financial 
powers, the Basle Committee did not propose to require an across-the-board 
deduction, and allowed discretion to each national regulatory authority to determine 
whether deduction of banks’ cross-shareholdings from the capital base would be 
applied or not.
Of particular note with regard to the re-categorisation of risk weights was the 
treatment of collateral. Although the U.S-U.K. bilateral agreement proposed to
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charge both secured and unsecured corporate loans with a 100 percent risk-weight, 
Japanese regulators insisted that with regard to credit risk, there should be a 
difference in risk-weightings according to whether loans were secured or not. A role 
of collateral in Japan, where bank loans were a main funding source for corporate 
finance, was different from that in the U.S., where indirect corporate finance was 
dominant. American commercial banks made loans on the short-term basis, and did 
not usually require collateral. When Japanese banks lent money to their corporate 
clients, however, they always required collateral from borrowers, even from blue- 
chip companies. Japanese regulators argued that collateral was important in reducing 
potential loan losses and therefore a risk-weight for secured loans should be lower 
than that for unsecured loans. In the final Basle framework, the collateral concept 
related to the risk-weight measurements was in part introduced. This re­
categorisation of risk-weights for secured and unsecured commercial loans was in 
line with Japanese regulators’ request.35
5.3.2 MoF’s Domestic Manipulation' Domestic and International Interactions 
While engaging in international negotiations with foreign counterparts, the MoF 
pursued domestic strategies to require Japanese private banks to raise their capital-to- 
asset ratios and to reinforce domestic capital adequacy rules. These policies were
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motivated by both international and domestic considerations. Internationally, the 
MoF intended to evade the critique of its lax regulation of Japanese banks and to 
improve its bargaining position in the international negotiations. One MoF official 
said that banks’ capitalisation would favour Japanese negotiators in the Basle 
negotiations.36
Domestically, these policies were seen as means to strengthen the soundness of 
the domestic banking system. Taking advantage of their superior access to 
information regarding the Basle negotiations vis-a-vis the private banks, the MoF 
attempted to induce the banks to raise their capital levels. As the banks did not have 
direct access to the negotiation table, they had to depend on regulators for 
information about the content of the on-going international negotiations. The MoF 
took advantage of this information imbalance and selectively leaked information in 
order to induce banks to raise their capital. Through unofficial contact with private 
bankers, the MoF officials continued to warn them that the outcomes of the 
international negotiations might end up with very severe terms, and encouraged 
their re-capitalization. Private bankers themselves also recognized the significance 
of the U.S.-U.K. proposal, and started massive re-capitalization as early as in April 
1987. Thanks to booming stock markets, they were able to carry out low cost equity 
finance, amounting to 10 trillion yen for three years (1987-89). However, as Table
5.2 exhibits, total assets also increased in parallel with the pace o f re-capitalisation in 
the same period. Thus, Japanese banks’ asset-incentive lending operations effectively 
remained same until 1989.
yen, trillion
16
14
12
10
Figure 5.2 Capitalisation by City Banks 
(1981-1994)
I Capital (left axis)
•Total assets (right axis)
trillion
II
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Notes: Capital consists of common stock, legal reserves and earned surplus.
Total assets are the whole (non-risk weighted) sum of cash, loans, bill boughts, 
securities holdings, and foreign exchanges.
Sources: various issues of Financial Statements o f All Banks (Federation of Bankers' 
Associations of Japan)
While attempting to encourage the banks to improve their capital-to-asset ratios,
the MoF also planned to adopt the stricter domestic capital rules. The ministry
announced the expanded domestic application o f the risk-weighting approach in
August 1987.39 The 1986 guideline applied the risk-weighting measures only to
banks’ overseas assets. The M oF’s new plan, however, was an across-the-board
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application, by wiping out the line between overseas and domestic assets. Moreover, 
in September 1987, the MoF announced that the maximum permitted ratio of foreign 
assets to foreign net worth would be reduced from 3.5 to 2.5 in order to call a halt to 
“unhealthy and highly risky practices of Japanese banks”. 40 These plans were 
intended to be complementary to the 1986 guidelines on bank capital adequacy until 
new Basle rules were agreed. Yet the plans did not come into force, because the 
Basle Committee reached an agreement more quickly than the MoF had expected 
and the plans gave the way to the new Basle rules.41 These actions can be interpreted 
in terms of both the MoF’s international and domestic strategies. At the international 
level, the MoF could improve its bargaining position by signalling to other Basle 
Committee members that it was making efforts at reinforcing domestic regulation. At 
the domestic level, the MoF used international negotiations to reinforce the domestic 
regulation of banks’ balance sheet ratios.
Meanwhile, Japanese banks became somewhat conciliatory. In order to widen the 
win-set of Japanese banks, the MoF Banking Bureau took several measures both to 
reduce assets and to raise capital.42 Compared with the U.S. and European banks, 
Japanese banks’ securitisation of assets—parcelling loans into small lots and selling 
them to institutional investors, thereby removing assets from banks’ balance sheets— 
was underdeveloped. Accordingly, promoting securitisation became the first policy
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choice. However, once the issue of securitisation moved into concrete discussions, it 
turned out to be a tug of war over vested interests. Neither long-term credit banks nor 
trust banks wanted city banks to make inroads into their business field. For example, 
housing loans, which accounted for 10 percent of city banks’ assets, were the most 
obvious target for securitisation. However, long-term credit banks opposed to the 
plan since such securitised assets would compete with the bank debentures that long­
term credit banks alone were allowed to issue.43 Measures to increase banks’ capital, 
such as domestic convertible bonds, also aroused controversy within the banking 
industry. The political gridlock left no alternative but to issue subordinated debts, 
which sparked off fewer disputes but were a costly means of re-capitalization.44 In 
short, the attempts to expand banks’ win-set by linking stricter capital rules with 
reliable securitisation and re-capitalization means—synergistic issue linkages—were 
not particularly effective.
Similarly, measures to increase banks’ capital, such as banks’ issuance of 
domestic convertible bonds, preferred stocks and subordinated debts, also aroused 
controversy within the banking industry and resistance from the securities 
community.45 The failure to aggregate preferences led to a political gridlock among 
complex vested interests. The political gridlock left no alternative but to issue 
subordinated debts, which sparked off fewer disputes but were a costly re-
capitalisation means.46 In short, the intra-industry divisions among banks on the 
securitisation and re-capitalisation issues were so deep that banks were not able to 
swiftly reach compromises among them. This cleavage rendered the MoF’s 
“synergistic issue linkage” policy less than effective.
The banks’ concession rather came from their optimistic views of market trends. 
As the rapid rise in stock prices expanded the volume of unrealised capital gains on 
their securities holdings, they optimistically anticipated that their ability to meet 
stricter capital standards would strengthen. In August 1987, the FBAJ announced that 
their banks were no longer insisting on counting 70 percent of unrealised capital 
gains as capital: “We can’t accept zero, but we are flexible”.47 This meant that the 
MoF no longer needed to insist on the figure of 70 percent in the international 
negotiations. The change in private banks’ attitude gave Japanese regulatory officials 
more leeway to reach a compromise with their foreign counterparts.
5.4 Multilateral Agreement and the Limits of its Domestic Implementation
5.4.1 Japan’s  International Achievements and Unpredicted Domestic 
Consequences
The regulatory authorities from three countries, Japan, the U.S., and the U.K., met on 
13 September 1987 in London. At the trilateral negotiation, several major issues
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were addressed. Among them, the degree to which unrealised capital gains on 
securities could be counted as supplementary capital was a main theme. The 
regulators from the three countries agreed that Japanese banks could count 45 
percent of their unrealised capital gains as Tier II capital.48 When realising capital 
gains, Japanese banks were taxed at 50 to 60 percent. This fact of life was reflected 
in the figure finally agreed at 45 percent of unrealised capital gains that would be 
allowed to count as part of capital.49 The figure of 45 percent was much less than the 
initial Japanese request for a 70 percent inclusion, but Japanese banks were broadly 
satisfied with this outcome. They felt that in view of the booming stock market, the 
inclusion of 45 percent of unrealised capital gains in capital would be sufficient to 
allow them to boost their capital fairly easily.
In July 1988, the Basle Committee reached an agreement of International 
Convergence o f Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, which became known 
as the Basle Capital Accord. In substance, it differed little from the agreement 
reached by the trilateral meeting in September 1987. The minimum ratio of 8 percent 
eventually appeared at the final stage. The figure of 8 percent was not derived from 
any economically rational grounds. According to Peter Cooke, then Committee chair, 
the minimum ratio was set “by the seat of the pants”.50 The figure was roughly 
equivalent to the capital ratios held by the relatively well-capitalized banks at the
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time. The Japanese delegation did not object to the provisional figure, as they had 
expected the minimum ratio to be in the range of 7 to 9 percent.51
Flourishing Japanese financial markets in the late 1980s generated optimistic 
expectation of the future market trends among Japanese bankers. At the time, the 
Tokyo stock market index almost reached 39,000 and a leading securities house and 
its research body expected the Nikkei index would reach 80,000 by the mid-1990s.52 
In such a situation, the booming stock prices contributed to the increase in Tier I 
capital through equity finance, and the inclusion of 45 percent of unrealised capital 
gains in Tier II was thought to enable Japanese banks to clear the Basle minimum 
standards with ease. Indeed, one officer of Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank said that once the 
bank boosted its capital ratio up well above 8 percent it would use this as a marketing 
tool, much as it had already used its status as a holder of the largest asset size in the 
world and its top rating of triple A.53 Some foreign observers also argued that by 
inducing Japanese banks to relate their capital to their assets’ risk profiles, the Basle 
Accord enhanced Japanese banks’ international competitiveness further.54
Alas, as we now know all too well, things did not go according to those rosy 
expectations. Ironically, in the aftermath of the 1990 collapse of the financial bubble, 
the MoF’s negotiation achievement of getting unrealised capital gains incorporated 
into regulatory capital ironically revealed the fragility of Japanese banks’ capital
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bases and even worsened that fragility. For much of the early half of the 1990s, the 
Nikkei 225 index was languishing at around the 19,000 mark, less than half of the 
historic peak of just under 40,000 recorded at the end of 1989 (see Figure 5.2). 
Japanese banks’ heavy dependence on the unrealised gains on their securities 
holdings for clearing the minimum standards caused difficulties for them. Their 
unrealised capital gains evaporated, and their capital bases quickly shrank. Salomon 
Brothers estimated the effect which different levels of the Nikkei index had on each 
bank’s capital base (see Table 5.3). Although the table provides a very rough guide 
as the banks can operate different policies with their stock portfolios, they largely 
illustrate the extent to which the capital levels of the banks were subject to swings in 
the Nikkei index.
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Figure 5.3 Nikkei Stock Average (TSE 225 issues): 
1970-1998 (quarterly)
(yen)
45,000
40,000
35.000
30.000
25.000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
oo  oo  g o  Op o p  oo  Op 
Os Os Os O . O ' O
Source: M. Hall (1998) Chart 2.9, p. 56.
Table 5.2 What the Nikkei means for City Banks’ Basle capital
unit: %
'^ ^ -^ N ik k e i  level 
city banks
18,500 19,500 20,500 21,500 22,500 23,500 24,500
Dai-Ichi Kangyo 7.21 7.41 7.61 7.80 8.00 8.20 8.40
Mitsui Taiyo Kobe (Sakura) 7.01 7.30 7.35 7.35 7.35 7.35 7.35
Sumitomo 7.61 7.70 7.96 8.14 8.31 8.48 8.66
Fuji 7.51 7.70 7.90 8.09 8.28 8.48 8.67
Mitsubishi 7.39 7.59 7.80 8.01 8.21 8.42 8.63
Sanwa 6.99 7.19 7.39 7.59 7.79 7.99 8.18
Tokai 7.50 7.73 7.96 8.05 8.05 8.05 8.05
Daiwa 7.42 7.71 8.00 8.29 8.58 8.87 8.93
HokkaidoT akushoku 8.25 8.46 8.67 8.74 8.74 8.74 8.74
Bank of Tokyo 6.85 7.01 7.17 7.33 7.49 7.65 7.81
Kyowa Saitama (Asahi) 7.56 7.79 8.01 8.24 8.47 8.69 8.92
Average 7.40 7.61 7.80 7.97 8.12 8.26 8.39
Source: Salomon Brothers, Japanese Stock Research, 9 July 1991 (quoted in The Banker, 
January 1992. 44)
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5.4.2 Domestic Legislation: Establishing a Statutory Basis fo r  Capital Rules 
A six-month period for public comment followed the publication of the Basle 
Committee’s December 1987 proposal. The member regulatory authorities published 
the results and took comments from interested parties. During the period for public 
comment, on 22 December 1987, Ken-ichi Kamiya, chairperson of the FBAJ, 
announced that the FBAJ would set up a special section on capital adequacy 
problems mainly to harmonise interests regarding capital adequacy rules among its 
banks and inject the interests into the MoF’s domestic implementation of the Basle 
Accord.55 Taking the 8 percent minimum ratio and the inclusion of 45 percent of 
unrealised capital gains as given, the special section dealt with remaining issues such 
as the type of banks to which the Basle Accord and national discretion would apply. 
With regards national discretion, one of their chief issues of concern was the 
treatment of cross-shareholdings by banks.
On 7 April 1988, after taking comments from the Japanese banking industry, the 
MoF published a proposal of how to apply the Basle Accord to Japanese banks. The 
proposal stated that mutual shareholdings by banks would be deducted from the 
capital base only when deliberately arranged solely to boost capital levels.56 The term 
of “deliberately” was interpreted in the kindest possible way. In other words, it was,
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in principle, possible for Japanese banks to count their mutual equity holdings among 
banks as the capital base.57
After the sharp decline of asset prices in 1990, growing difficulties for Japanese 
banks in meeting the minimum standards triggered outcries against the Basle Accord 
in Japan. However, Japanese regulators resisted political pressures from the banking 
sectors calling for revision of the Accord. Yoshimasa Nishimura, the then director of 
the MoF Fiscal and Monetary Research Institute, argued that any lenient domestic 
implementation or postponement of the Accord would only result in an international
co # #
crisis of confidence in the Japanese financial system. In May 1992, in testimony 
before the Upper House finance committee, Masaki Tsuchida, then Director General 
of the MoF Banking Bureau, rejected bankers’ claims for a lowering of the 
regulatory standards at the next Basle Committee meeting.59
The culmination of Japanese regulators’ commitment to the Basle Accord was 
the 1992 revision of the Banking Law: for the first time ever, the regulators 
succeeded in legislating for the statutory form of capital adequacy requirements. This 
process of legislation can be understood in terms of “reverberation” of an 
international agreement. In early 1991 the MoF drafted proposals of a financial 
system reform that allowed cross-entry of banks and securities houses into each 
business, but a series of major financial scandals followed in the summer of 1991.60
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This called into question the existing method of banking regulation based upon non- 
legal administrative guidance and opaque relationships between the regulators and 
the regulated. This regulatory style was deemed to impede “proper competition” in 
the market, thereby preventing banks from exercising due self-responsibility. The 
Financial System Research Council urged the early enforcement of financial 
systemic reform, which would promote “proper competition” in the Japanese 
financial system, and at once the introduction of transparency regulatory rules, which 
would shore up the stability and confidence in the financial system.61 As part of the 
transparent rules, the statutory form of capital adequacy requirements drew attention.
The fact that other Basle Council member countries were also legislating for 
capital adequacy rules in line with the Basle Accord legitimised the MoF’s effort to 
give Japanese capital rules a legal basis. In addition, two domestic factors prevented 
private banks from openly opposing the legislation. One was growing anti-bank 
sentiment from the public in the wake of a series of financial scandals. The other was 
that, since the statutory form of capital rules was tied up with the approval of cross­
entry into banks and securities business—something that the banks had desired for 
decades—the banks did not fend off the proposals as they had done previously. In 
this climate, the MoF was able to incorporate a provision of capital adequacy 
requirements in the revised Banking Law of 1992.62
Perception of the market trend by regulators also encouraged them to take a 
regulatory hard line. Despite the rapid fall of stock prices, the Japanese government 
still held an optimistic view of the economy at the time. Until the autumn of 1991 
government forecasts predicted a steady upturn, and even as late as the spring of 
1992, Japanese regulators did not see the drop in stock prices as critical and
/ ' I
structural, as banks were reporting increased operating profits. These views helped 
the regulators to prioritise the regulatory objective over the banks’ claims for 
leniency. Yoshimasa Nishimura of the MoF said that comparison with the pre-war 
banking sector showed that the thin capital of Japanese banks from the 1960s to the 
1980s was an “anomaly”.64 For him, the Basle Accord was a positive measure that 
would bring Japanese banks back onto the right track. Evidently, as Granirer 
observes, Japanese regulators did not see their behaviour as a “sell-out” of Japanese 
banks.65 The international agreement on capital adequacy requirements helped 
Japanese regulators achieve their objective of that period, which was to establish 
statutory capital adequacy requirements.
It should be noted, however, that the introduction of statutory capital adequacy 
requirements alone was neither an adequate condition for the change of bank 
behaviour nor the strict implementation of capital adequacy rules in Japan. In other 
words, the above-mentioned development in the Japanese capital rule just met two of
the four indicators of credible commitment to international capital adequacy 
standards outlined in Chapter 3. The MoF established the statutory form of capital 
rules, and Japanese banks began to meet the required capital ratios. However, more 
crucial indices (accounting principles and regulators’ prompt corrective action) were 
left untouched. Rather, without these policy indicators, the statutory capital rules and 
private banks’ numerical compliance do not ensure the credible commitments of 
Japan to the Basle Accord.
In fact, it is difficult to say that Japanese regulators became tough regulators after 
the 1992 legislation. In the wake of the collapse of the financial bubble, the MoF 
continued to take a “forbearance policy”, allowing banks to hold non-performing 
loans without radical remedies in the hope that the economy would recover soon. In 
addition, when some of major Japanese banks began to fail to meet the Basle 
standards, the regulators changed accounting rules for banks’ stockholdings
appraisals, which were designed to increase the apparent level of capital ratios,
without any efforts to improve the quality of capital components. This suggests the 
de facto defection from the strict implementation of the international regulatory 
standards. The development of regulatory norms and methods at the Basle
Committee and the statutory and legal changes in Japanese banking regulation did
not automatically bring about the credible implementation of capital adequacy rules. 
The issue of implementation will be addressed in detail in Chapter 7.
5.4 Conclusion
Employing the two-level-game approach, this chapter contributes to the 
understanding of a process in which Japanese regulators specified their preferences 
towards the Basle negotiations, and a way in which they behaved in pursuit of 
different policy goals, domestically and internationally. At the international level, the 
MoF pursued the prime goal of having new international capital rules that include 
unrealised capital gains on banks’ securities holdings in the definition of capital, 
because the inclusion of these unrealised gains was deemed to help Japanese banks to 
maintain their international competitiveness. The distributive effect of international 
capital adequacy regulations inclined Japanese banks to put pressure on the MoF, and 
the MoF itself did not want to see Japanese banks lose their international 
competitiveness. Thanks to Japanese banks’ strong market positions and the Basle 
innovation of the two-tier capital structure, the MoF succeeded in injecting their 
demands into the negotiation outcomes. Japanese banks were allowed to include 45 
percent of unrealised capital gains on their securities holdings as part of regulatory 
capital.
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A bullish market sentiment in the late 1980s predisposed Japanese banks to hold 
an idea that the inclusion of unrealised capital gains in capital would be a quick and 
easy way to boost their capital bases. They were satisfied with the negotiation 
outcome in the expectation that it would make the compliance costs for the banks 
low. Japanese regulators, who steeped in the idea of unrealised capital gains as 
capital were also receptive to the banks’ claims at the time. For the regulators, the 
Basle Accord was satisfactory too, because it was deemed to help Japanese banks 
maintain their international competitiveness and simultaneously to force them to 
raise their capital-to-asset ratios. Contrary to Oatley and Nabors’ argument, at the 
time of 1988, both Japanese regulators and banks assessed the outcomes of the Basle 
negotiations as successful.66
Retrospectively, however, the MoF’s policy goal based upon the belief in ever- 
rising stock prices was misguided. The inclusion of unrealised capital gains on 
holding securities under the Basle framework left the capital levels of Japanese banks 
sensitive to stock market fluctuations. Their capital composition heavily relying on 
unrealised capital gains eventually caused massive negative effects on the capital 
levels of Japanese banks especially after the 1990 collapse of Japanese stock markets. 
In hindsight, had the MoF attempted to tackle this problem of Japanese banks’ large
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exposure to market risk from their equity portfolios at a time when the banks were in 
a position of strength, their capital structures would not have become so fragile.
Whereas the MoF miscalculated the source of Japanese banks’ assumed strength, 
the ministry pursued the domestic goal of establishing effective capital rules in order 
to countervail the greater degree of freedom enjoyed by banks. This corresponds with 
what Putnam calls reverberation or the synergy strategy: international actions are 
used to reinforce state negotiators’ policy autonomy vis-a-vis societal interests. 
Inadequate domestic institutions and policy tools motivated the MoF to use external 
pressure to manipulate the domestic politics of capital adequacy requirements. The 
MoF’s efforts culminated in the 1992 legislation for capital adequacy requirements. 
In the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism, however, the 1992 legislation 
left the regulators with a scope of forbearance in handling banking problems in the 
1990s. In this sense, it was not effective in terms of prudential regulation. Yet the 
interplay between international and domestic politics enabled the MoF to achieve its 
objective of establishing the statutory basis for capital rules, which the ministry had 
wanted since the early 1980s but had effectively failed to do so under political 
pressure at the domestic level.
As regards regulators’ strategies to manipulate domestic politics, the politics of 
the securitisation of bank assets showed that the success of synergistic issue linkage
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was largely contingent upon the domestic interest configuration of concern. Although 
bank assets’ securitisation was deemed to help banks to raise their capital-to-asset 
ratios in general, it caused intra-industry divisions among the types of banks—city 
banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks—on the issue of what sorts of assets 
should be securitised and on what conditions. Specifically, long-term credit banks 
and trust banks opposed the securitisation plans that would threaten their privilege. 
This cleavage hindered the MoF’s efforts at linking the generally favourable policy 
packages with tough capital adequacy requirements. The complex vested interests in 
the domestic politics proved to be political gridlock that culminated in a very limited 
result of securitisation. Consequently, it also negatively affected the Japanese banks’ 
struggle for meeting the Basle standards.
The findings of this chapter have implications for the two standard, systemic- 
level explanations: the redistributive logic and the market pressure logic. The chapter 
has revealed that the interplay between international and domestic politics enabled 
the MoF to achieve its objective of establishing the statutory basis for capital rules. It 
means that the MoF’s domestic regulatory goal was similar to the American 
regulators’ goal of re-capitalizing U.S. banks. At least as regards the domestic goal 
of regulators, therefore, the Basle Accord is more closely attuned to what Putnam 
and Bayne call a “mutual reinforcement” type of international policy coordination,
which enables each participant to obtain external pressure for one’s domestic policy, 
than Oately and Nabors’ characterization of it as “redistributive cooperation”.
The other explanation for the Japanese banks’ rapid increase in their capital ratios 
focuses on market pressures. Yet this bank-cantered explanation and the 
explanation made above are not necessarily incompatible with each other, but rather 
complementary. While the market pressure logic focuses on the banks’ perspective, 
the approach presented here has put the MoF in the context of domestic politics and 
taken account of its motivation. Like the redistributive logic, the bank-centered 
explanation is likely to lead to an image that Japanese regulators were forced to 
accept the Basle Accord, and blurs the Japanese domestic politics that motivated the 
regulators to pursue their domestic goal of strengthening capital requirements.
Moreover, the case of the 1988 Basle Accord not only provides further evidence 
for, but also revises the argument of Japan as a “reactive state”—the Japanese 
political system incorporates a mechanism in which actors use foreign political 
pressure, or gaiatsu, to shape or pursue domestic policy agenda. Kent Calder argued 
that Japan’s reactive state behaviour had been typical in policy issue-areas where the 
decision-making authority was fragmented and/or where domestic interest groups 
established clientelistic relationships with the ruling party politicians.69 This chapter 
has added to the reactive state argument that even in a policy area of banking
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regulation, where the bureaucracy is often deemed to enjoy a high degree of
7 0autonomy, regulators were exposed to societal interests. The autonomy of Japanese 
regulators was not institutionally given in the realm of capital adequacy requirements, 
but rather was a product of their statecraft in overcoming institutional impediments. 
The interaction between domestic and international politics gave the regulators a 
political tool to create autonomy and improve their manoeuvrability over financial 
regulation.
Explanatory power of the two-level-game model, however, should not be 
overestimated. It is true that the two-level-game model holds as long as the 
negotiation process is concerned. However, the logic of two-level game model, 
which privileges neither international factors nor domestic politics, leaves important 
questions unanswered. What did happen once the debate of capital adequacy 
becomes enmeshed in domestic Japanese bureaucratic and political processes at the 
post-negotiation implementation stage? Chapter 7 will discuss the question and 
significantly qualify the validity of the two-level game mode for accounting for 
compliance.
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Chapter 6
Negotiating the 1996 Amendment: A New International Power 
Configuration and Domestic Financial Turmoil
6.1 Introduction
The 1996 Amendment to incorporate market risk represented a sea-change in the 
development of the Basle capital standards in terms of regulatory norms and methods. 
In addition to credit risk, the 1996 Amendment applied capital charges to the risk of 
losses in on- and off-balance-sheet positions arising from movements in market prices 
(so-called market risk). Besides the new scope of capital requirements, the 
Amendment included several important changes to the way in which banks measured 
their market risks. The biggest of these was that the Basle Committee, for the first time, 
allowed banks to use their own internal risk models for estimating capital requirements 
for market risks that they were taking. “Using internal models is a profound innovation
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in the methods and philosophy of regulation”, said Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, the 
then Committee Chairman.1
A main concern of this chapter is to elucidate how Japanese bank regulators were 
engaged in the issues of the 1996 Amendment, internationally and domestically, 
through a lens of the two-level-game framework. Section 6.2 investigates Japanese 
regulators’ preferences and bargaining positions in the international negations on the 
1996 Amendment. It addresses questions as to how domestic conditions affected 
Japanese regulators’ preference formation and where the regulators fitted in a newly 
emerged political configuration of international banking regulation. Section 6.3 
considers domestic impact of the 1996 Amendment. Questions considered in that 
section are such as the following. What was the driving force behind the mid-1990s 
banking regulation reform in Japan? And, to what extent does the two-level-game 
model can prevail in explaining Japanese regulators’ behaviour and the domestic 
regulatory change as a whole?
6.2 Japanese Regulators in International Negotiations
6.2.1 American and European Preferences towards Market Risk Regulations
Liberalisation of financial markets, financial innovation, and sharpened competition
squeezed margins on traditional banking business since the early 1980s. On the other
hand, the growth of derivatives markets made it easier and cheaper for banks to move
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into trading. This switch in focus has transformed the character of the risks faced by 
banks. A new concern has been added to old concerns like liquidity risk (the risk that 
the cash available to a bank could be exceeded by customers’ calls on it) and credit 
risk; that of market risk. The Basle Committee recognised the need for action in this 
area.
The Basle Committee, first of all, had to address the question of the scope and 
coverage of market risk regulations: What categories of financial assets should be 
covered by the market risk regulations? Although the 1988 Basle Capital Accord 
stated that issues related to interest rate risk and market risk would be addressed later, 
the scope and coverage of the capital charges for market risk remained open to 
question. With regard to this issue, regulators’ domestic considerations played 
significant roles in defining the scope of market risk regulations. As in the case of the 
1988 Basle Accord, member regulators’ preferences and behaviour largely reflected 
domestic concerns. That is to say, regulators tried to make a new regulatory framework 
consistent with their own domestic considerations.
It was American regulators that were keen to get on with capital requirements for 
market risk from the outset. They proposed to apply new Basle rules to a wide range of 
market risks. There were domestic considerations behind this U.S. initiative. At the 
end of the 1980s, the American economy confronted a “financially induced recession”
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that was caused by so-called “three Ls”: LDC (non-performance loans to Least 
Developed Countries), LBO (leverage-buy-out), and LAND (loans to real estate).2 A 
steep increase in the number of bank failures gave rise to a sharp increase in expenses 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). With the aim of minimising the 
loss to the FDIC, the U.S. Congress passed the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 
December 1991. The Act introduced a so-called “prompt collective action scheme”, 
which linked the graduated intensity of regulatory intervention to the degree of banks’ 
capitalisation. The FDICIA required American regulators to look at a broad range of 
financial risk exposures (including institutions’ interest rate risk, market risk, and loan 
concentration) in the capital assessment process of the prompt collective action 
scheme, and set the deadline of June 1993 for implementation. The U.S. Federal 
Reserve Board (Fed), often expressing its staunch opposition to any relaxation of 
regulatory capital requirements, published its own proposal for a new domestic 
regulatory scheme covering a broad range of non-credit risks.4
The above domestic factors determined American regulators’ preferences with 
regard to the scope of new Basle capital requirements. The regulators insisted that the 
capital charges of the new Basle rules should cover the whole loans and investments in 
securities that banks carried on their books.5 Thus, the eagerness of the American 
regulators to add the wide range of non-credit risks to the Basle framework reflected
their intention to make the Basle framework consistent with their domestic efforts.
In contrast, the European members of the Basle Committee had a strong political 
motivation to narrow the scope of market risk regulations. In the European financial 
markets, European banks had already made a considerable effort and expenditure on 
reporting systems to comply with the European Union’s Capital Adequacy Directive 
(CAD)—new capital requirements for banks and securities houses adopted as part of 
the Single Financial Market programme.6 The CAD divided the activities of a 
financial institution into two books: a banking book and a trading book. The capital 
charges for market risk under the CAD rules were employed to cover only a trading 
book consisting of short-term transferable securities. For EU members, if new and 
different capital requirements were agreed at the Basle Committee, they would have to 
require their banks to prepare another new set of reporting systems. Therefore, 
European members had a strong incentive to limit the scope of the new Basle rules to 
the CAD trading book.
6.2.2 Japanese Preferences towards Market Risk Negotiations
Like the European members of the Basle Committee, Japanese regulatory authorities
wanted to limit the application of market risk regulations to short-term trading
portfolios. Their preference also came from their concerns over their domestic banking
system. When market risk undertaken by banks became an urgent issue at the Basle
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Committee, the financial environment of Japan was serious enough for Japanese 
regulators to ponder potential effects of new regulatory capital requirements on their 
troubled private banks. The regulators wanted to somehow mitigate negative impacts
n
of the new requirements for market risk on Japanese banks’ performance. At the same 
time, there were accumulating complaints from the Japanese banking industry about 
the minimum capital standards of the Basle Committee throughout the 1990s. After 
the 1990 collapse of the financial bubble, Japanese banks went to great lengths to meet 
the requirements of the Basle standards.
In fact, in the mid-1990, rumoured proposals for tighter Basle capital adequacy 
standards reached Tokyo. The rumour was that, in order to take into account foreign 
exchange risk and exposure to investments in securities, the Basle Committee was 
planning to introduce new standards to add banks’ holdings of foreign exchange, 
stocks and bonds to their total asset figure.9 As seen above, reflecting their own 
domestic concerns, American regulators proposed the broad scope of market risk 
regulations covering banks’ securities holdings for investment purposes. Japanese 
bankers expressed considerable dismay over the U.S. proposal because they possessed 
a large quantity of stocks and bonds that amounted to 14 percent of their assets on 
average.10 Given the huge stock and bond holdings, such an expansion of the 
definition of bank assets would compel the Japanese banks to raise capital and add
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more burdens on Japanese banks.
Strained domestic financial conditions made Japanese regulators circumspect 
about additional burdens that new market risk regulations might impose on Japanese 
banks. The regulators feared the strong political reaction from banks and politicians 
that additional capital requirements would inevitably provoke.11 The scope of the 
application of market risk regulations became a major concern to the regulators. 
Considering Japanese banks’ huge holdings of stocks and bonds, they favoured the 
application of market risk regulations on a restricted basis. The domestic situation, 
thus, made the Japanese delegation to the Basle negotiations to prefer the restrictive 
application of capital requirements for market risk, which seemed to impose fewer 
additional burdens on the banks than the broad application would.12
At the Basle Committee, the already-established EU CAD constructed a “focal
11point”, a base on which others ’ ideas could converge. In exchanging views with other 
members, American regulators started to recognise the technical difficulty of their 
broad application proposals and were inclined to agree on the restricted coverage of 
capital requirements for market risks.14 With regard to the technical feasibility of the 
broad coverage of market risk, there was no concrete idea on how to quantify various 
market risk factors that an array of loans and investments in securities generated.15 The 
limited scope of market risk was a product of a compromise made between American
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regulators who urged the early introduction of market regulation, on the one hand, and 
Japanese and European regulators who preferred to narrow the scope, on the other 
hand. The Basle Committee finally decided to apply market risk regulations to the 
trading risk of marketable securities and commodities positions and the exchange rate 
risks of foreign exchange positions.16 The Basle definition was in effect consistent, 
albeit in less detail, with the definition of the trading book in the EU CAD.17
The above outcome enabled Japanese regulators to stress their “achievement” of 
narrowing down the regulatory scope. Namely, the outcome gave Japanese regulators 
chances of convincing Japanese banks and other interested parties to accept the newly 
agreed intentional capital standards, by emphasising that they made great efforts to
1 Rlimit the scope only to trading portfolios and foreign exchange positions. The MoF 
also stressed that the newly proposed regulation did not intend to impose additional 
regulatory requirements, but it rather aimed at establishing a more accurate regulatory 
system to capture and control risks.19 Indeed, the Japanese banking circle received the 
1993 proposal with relief. Thanks to the narrow scope of the application, it was 
expected that top city banks would need to increase their capital bases by 0.1 to 0.2 
percent, and long-term credit banks and trust banks would be to raise their capital 
bases by 0.2 percent.20
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6.2.3 A New Political Configuration: The Issue o f Internal Models
The second issue of market risk regulations, which the Basle Committee had to cope
with, was the method of measurement frameworks. The method issue included
questions of how to measure the market risks undertaken and how to set regulatory
capital requirements against the market risks. The Basle Committee initially came out
in favour of a so-called building-block approach, which the EU CAD had already
adopted. The building-block approach differentiated requirements for “specific market
risk” (the risk of loss caused by an adverse price movement of a security due
principally to factors related to an individual issuer of the security) from those for
“general market risk” (the risk of loss arising from adverse changes in market prices)
and summed up the two elements of the risk profiles. The first fruit of this
regulator-led initiative was the 1993 consultation paper.
The 1993 proposal, however, encountered serious reactions from leading banks
possessing advanced risk management systems. The building-block approach imposed
the simple rules laid down by regulators on all banks to determine their regulatory
capital. Namely, the same basic formula for determining minimum regulatory capital
was applied to all banks, regardless of differences in their risk management skills and
capabilities, their actual portfolios, or their attitudes towards risk taking. This crude
“buckets” method provoked a series of objections from banks with cutting-edge risk
management techniques. For example, the Institute of International Finance, a
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Washington, D.C.-based lobby group and research organisation for international banks, 
published a counter-report challenging the 1993 proposal. The paper said that the 
proposed methods “fail[ed] to create sufficient regulatory incentives for banks to 
operate more sophisticated risk measurement systems than those necessary to meet the 
regulatory minimum”.21
In response to harsh comments from the banking industry, the Basle Committee 
published the 1995 proposal. The new proposal permitted banks to have a choice 
between the use of their own internal models to calculate market risks and the use of 
the standardised measurement framework originally set out in the 1993 proposal. 
Banks, whose internal risk management systems were judged adequate, were allowed 
to use their own models to estimate how much capital they should hold against market 
risks. The 1995 proposal became a prototype for the Market Risk Regulation, which 
was formally announced in April 1996.
The process leading up to the 1996 Amendment had at least two outstanding 
features. One is increased technical complexity. The assessment of market risk was a 
complex task because the value of securities and foreign exchange rates were highly 
volatile. Accordingly, capital adequacy requirements for market risk became esoteric. 
The other is that the rapid development of private banking operations which has 
outpaced the ability of regulators to grasp this has induced private organisations, such
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as the Group of Thirty (G-30) and the IIF, to commit them to lobby the Basle 
Committee in pursuit of self-governance for the banking industry. These two features 
are related, since knowledge is not only something technical and instrumental, but also 
something associated with power and thereby affects the nature of interaction between 
regulators and private banks.
The increasingly esoteric nature of banking regulation significantly increased the 
ability of leading international banks to achieve their desired objectives using the 
power derived from knowledge about sophisticated risk management. The power
99phenomena were both relational and structural. The banks engaged in direct political 
lobbying activities. Relevant knowledge about risk management enabled the leading 
banks that possessed it to directly challenge the regulator-led 1993 proposal, and to 
suggest other alternatives.
The powerful banks also had covert influence over the regulators’ causal belief 
concerning capital adequacy requirements for market risk. When JP Morgan chairman 
Dennis Weatherstone, who was also the then head of the G-30, made its VAR 
(value-at-risk)-based internal model—RiskMetrics—available to the world free of
9 -3
charge in October 1994, the bank gave VAR a decisive boost. VAR is an estimate of 
the potential losses that banks face in their day-to-day operations.24 Given the 
increasing sensitivity of the industry to various types of risks, it was in JP Morgan’s
7Sinterest to ensure that its customers were managing their risks properly. Soon after, 
Bankers Trust, another leader in the field, unveiled its RARCO (risk-adjusted return 
on capital) 2020 system, hoping to rebuild its reputation, which had been damaged by 
a legal dispute with a former client over derivatives deals, with the launch of a model
76which took risk management a giant step forward.
The releases of private banks’ internal models had a significant impact on the 
regulatory evolution towards the use of banks’ internal models. First, VAR became the 
de facto standard of risk management systems that other banks followed, as the 
concept of VAR was widely seen as a convenient device to measure their risks. Second, 
the unveiling of VAR-type internal models gave regulators an indication of where they 
could go with regard to risk management, and provided them with guidance as to how
27to achieve their preferred objectives to ensure the soundness of the financial system. 
As for the method of measuring risk, a clear consensus emerged that some form of 
VAR was a convenient means of estimating market risk in financial circles, including 
the regulators and the regulated. This consensus formation can be regarded as a 
power phenomenon generating legitimacy for the worldview of leading banks and 
affecting regulators’ perspective in conformity with such a worldview. In sum, the 
public releases of cutting-edge internal models by a few leading banks made some 
regulators see banks’ internal models as a possible regulatory measure and be more
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receptive to the idea of delegating part of the regulatory functions to private banks.
Through the overt and covert exercise of power by private banks, a conservative 
belief in simple, big numbers of capital-to-asset ratios dwindled among regulators. 
The Basle Committee decided to allow private banks to use their own internal models 
for regulatory purposes. The leading international banks with sophisticated portfolio 
adjustment and reliable internal risk management had much to gain from this decision, 
as the regulatory use of internal models effectively reduced the regulatory burden on
90them. This represented a political victory for the leading banks.
The market-oriented form of capital adequacy requirements, however, put great 
strains on banks lacking relevant knowledge, at least in the short run. Banks which did 
not have sufficient risk management systems would remain stuck with the crude 
“buckets” system laid down in the 1993 Basle proposal, and found themselves at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis those using their internal models for regulatory 
purposes. Likewise, those that wanted to engage in lucrative trading business but 
lacked adequate internal risk management systems had to establish such expensive 
systems. What is obvious is that knowledge in the field of risk management crucially 
mattered. While banks with relevant knowledge obtained powerful influence in the 
process of forming international regulation, those lacking such knowledge were 
effectively shoved out of the regulation-making process. The international banking
community did not have a set of coherent preferences with regard to the regulatory 
facilitation of internal models and within it there was a differential in terms of relevant 
expertise. The differential gave rise to the asymmetric distribution of power among 
international banks. Adjustment costs associated with the 1996 regulatory changes fell 
on those that lacked relevant knowledge.
Within the Basle Committee, the spread of the idea of the regulatory use of banks’ 
internal models was promoted by regulators who recognised the potential usefulness 
of internal models as regulatory measures they would like to see brought into capital 
rules. The regulators armed with expertise took the initiative in shifting supervision 
towards the monitoring of banks’ own safeguards and internal managerial risk-control 
mechanisms, and in introducing banks’ internal models for regulatory purposes. 
Moreover, the failure of Barings, a British merchant banking group, brought the 
importance of banks’ internal risk management systems into sharp focus. The 
incident revealed limitations of externally imposed regulations, and discredited the 
validity of the existing system. It was under these circumstances that the idea of the 
regulatory use of banks’ internal models came to prevail within the Basle Committee.
The final content of the 1996 Market Risk Regulation did not appear as private 
interests prescribed. The decision by the Basle Committee to adopt the regulatory 
facilitation of banks’ internal models was not through a simple, automatic process. The
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regulators who promoted the idea of the regulatory use of banks’ internal model held 
pronounced views on institutionalising internal models and established strict criteria 
for the use of internal models for regulatory purposes. They did not leave everything to
* i
market participants, and their intentions had a great bearing on the outcomes. Thus, 
the consequent outcomes were not dictated by private interests, but rather influenced 
by a belief system that regulators held independently of inputs from private banks. 
Regulators did not abolish the belief system that gave priority to a public concern: the 
maintenance of the soundness and safety of the financial system. The introduction of 
banks’ internal models for regulatory purposes was seen as neither the abandonment of 
the idea of capital adequacy requirements nor a simple victory of markets over 
regulators.
It should be noted that the new 1996 rules were possible as long as they did not 
contradict the interests of the most powerful state in the domain of global finance, the 
U.S. Some U.S. banks were taking the lead in innovative risk management as well as 
prevailing in important private sector organisations such as the G-30 and the IIF. The 
U.S. regulators also had relevant knowledge. Thus, both the U.S. regulators and 
bankers had powerful influence over the knowledge-demanding process of making 
international banking regulations, and benefited most from the new rules. The U.S. 
remained at the centre of the knowledge-based power configuration in the politics of
international banking regulation.
As the importance of knowledge as power increased in the politics of international 
financial regulation, the locus of power became elastic. This locus cannot be captured 
by a simple “state versus market” perspective. Generally, private banks with 
sophisticated risk management skills took the lead, but regulators were still able to 
counterbalance such technical lags with new regulatory norms and methods that aimed 
at reinforcing internal managerial risk-control mechanisms in line with the goal of 
prudential regulation. In the realm of international banking regulation, asymmetrical 
power relations emerged between knowledgeable actors and less knowledgeable ones, 
rather than between regulators and private banks. This means that while political 
opportunities were potentially open to both private banks and regulators with relevant 
knowledge, those lacking such knowledge were effectively sidelined. The newly 
emerged political foundation of international banking regulation stands on a 
knowledge-based power configuration.
6.2.4 Japanese Role in Knowledge-based Networks
The newly emerged political foundation of international banking regulation stands on
a knowledge-based power configuration. Where and how did Japanese actors fit in this
knowledge-demanding process of regulation making? Did Japanese banks, which
were still major players in terms of asset size, play any practical role in such a process?
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What roles did Japanese regulators play between the esoteric subject of the 
international negotiations on capital requirements and the growing scepticism about 
domestic regulatory system?
Through the network of knowledgeable experts, individual Japanese officials with 
mathematical and statistical expertise were able to take part in the process of forming 
the regulatory framework based on banks’ internal risk models. Japanese regulators 
were somewhat receptive to the introduction of banks’ internal models in general, and 
junior Japanese officials in particular with relevant expertise were keen to commit 
themselves to this new idea.32 However, the American, British and German officials, 
and to some extent the French, played leading roles in determining concrete contents 
and substantive meanings of the intemal-model-based regulation. 33 Japanese 
regulators provided various statistical data that were useful for laying out criteria for 
the regulatory use of internal risk models, but their contribution to the specific criteria 
and rule-making process was limited. Knowledge and experience crucially mattered. 
What put Japanese regulators on the fringes of the regulation-establishing process was 
relative lack of knowledge and experience of risk management systems and market 
risk regulations.
Unlike the U.S. and U.K. authorities, Japanese regulators focused narrowly on 
credit risk and did not pay close attention to other risks including market risk when
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implementing the capital adequacy requirements based on the 1988 Basle Accord. The 
U.S. and U.K. authorities were eager to take the management factor and various risk 
exposures into account in the assessment process and to set requirements on an 
individual bank-by-bank basis. It is true that Japanese regulators also began to urge 
banks to develop comprehensive risk control functions to cover credit risk, market risk, 
and country risk and so on.34 Yet, in practice, Japanese authorities required from banks 
no more than the minimum agreed at the Basle Committee. This was mainly because 
the scale of Japanese banks’ involvement in trading activities was small. The scope of 
the capital adequacy requirements, as implemented after March 1993 in Japan, was 
limited to credit risk, and Japanese regulators did not yet develop supervisory and 
monitoring systems to capture market risk. Therefore, Japanese bank regulators lacked 
enough knowledge and experience in this realm.
Japanese banks also could not propose substantive alternative plans to the Basle 
proposal. Japanese banks’ organisational structures and strategic choice of expanding 
their international market share by massive, low-margin corporate lending hindered 
their financial innovation and prevented them from creating an internationally
o r
competitive edge in risk management. In fact, Japanese banks were outstripped by 
leading American and European banks in the competitiveness of providing 
sophisticated products and services. As a Japanese banker observed in the late 1980s,
the financial innovations were introduced first in the U.S. and spread first to London 
and then Tokyo. This observation still holds. The mounting bad debts of Japanese 
banks also put them in a difficult position in derivatives activities because their credit 
ratings were downgraded. International Swaps Dealers’ Association (ISDA) for 
example, allows swaps participants to cancel their swaps contract when their 
counterparty’s credit rating is downgraded below A.
With regard to derivatives activities, Japanese banks’ participation was heavily 
biased towards “plain vanilla” international interest and currency swaps, of which 
margins were low.37 Even in these fields of derivatives, Japanese banks with 
inadequate risk management techniques found themselves at a disadvantage against 
American rivals. A financial daily, for instance, reported that in March 1994, when 
Yen interest rate swaps market kept on moving in one direction, Japanese banks were 
forced to temporarily suspend their market-making, while such leading American 
banks as JP Morgan continued their business. Even in the one-direction market 
situation, JP Morgan could transfer risk to those who were willing to take the risk, 
helped by risk management techniques and whole-scale banking connections with 
various types of multinational corporations.38 Japanese banks built up their 
international presence primarily through traditionally defined banking, i.e., 
asset-intensive, balance-sheet lending operations, rather than market-related trading
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and off-balance-sheet activities, and lagged far behind the adoption of sophisticated 
internal risk management systems.40
Such state of Japanese banks’ internal risk management systems had profound 
implications when private banks with sophisticated risk management increased their 
influence in the Basle process. It was the American and European banks possessing 
adequate knowledge and experience in trading activities that exercised influence over 
the process of the 1996 Amendment. Japanese banks were not included in this political 
enterprise; in fact, Japanese banks neither had expertise concerned nor influence in 
such important private organisations as the G-30 and the IIF.41 On the contrary, in its 
public comments on the 1995 Basle proposal, the Federation of Bankers Associations 
of Japan (FBAJ), an umbrella industrial association of Japanese banks, demanded that 
conditions for the use of internal models should be applied more flexibly because the 
proposed conditions were too strict for them.42 Furthermore, the 1996 Amendment 
imposed extra costs on some Japanese banks wishing to deal in lucrative trading 
activities, by pressurising the Japanese banks to improve their internal systems in 
order to compete with American and European rivals under the new regulation 43 Thus, 
in the new power configuration in the 1996 Basle process, Japanese banks had little 
influence and their preferences were not represented.
Although Japanese contributions were marginal in the rule-making process in
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Basle, their participation in the knowledge-based network within the Basle Committee 
gave the MoF a domestic political tool. This issue will be taken up in the next section.
6.3 Domestic Regulatory Reform: International and Domestic Interactions
6.3.1 Politics o f Banking Disasters: Domestic Conditions for Transnational Ideational 
Diffusion
Domestic financial turmoil in the 1990s had the MoF meet the most severe criticism 
that the ministry had ever gone through. The MoF had to launch a political campaign 
to mitigate the harsh criticism and to preserve its organisation. In doing so, it was 
necessary for the ministry to show a new direction of banking regulation. Although the 
1998 establishment of the Financial Supervisory Agency as an independent agency 
meant that the MoF’s efforts ended with failure, it is worthwhile to recognise the 
ideational diffusion of the Basle market risk regulation to Japan.44 As John Odell 
points out, the potential influence of ideas may be most evident in the wake of an 
economic crisis.45 This section considers how a widespread crisis created domestic 
conditions for the transnational diffusion of new regulatory ideas, and its limitations.
In the first half of the 1990s, the MoF’s attempts to cope with problems in the 
Japanese financial system were piecemeal, rather than offering a radical solution. 
Typically, the MoF called on healthier banks to bail out insolvent financial institutions, 
merging them or shoring them up with loan packages based upon arrangements
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directed by the MoF. In this manner, all depositors were fully protected, a contagion 
effect was contained, and no costs were imposed on taxpayers. However, when the 
MoF proposed the liquidation plan of two troubled credit co-operatives (Tokyo Kyowa 
Credit Co-operative and Anzen Credit Co-operative) in 1994, this policy line 
backfired. The MoF asked private banks to create a new bank to which the on-going 
business of the liquidated two credit co-operatives would be transferred. The MoF’s 
intention was to assure financial stability by guaranteeing all deposits of the failed 
financial institutions. The MoF officials feared that pay-off (i.e., deposits would be 
ensured up to a maximum of ¥10 million) might jolt other banks’ depositors and spark 
deposit runs. Once the sloppy management and fraud of the two institutions was 
revealed, however, a public outcry against the MoF’s liquidation plan emerged. The 
MoF’s plan was accused of being “a rescue plan for the sloppy credit co-operatives 
made behind closed doors” for the sake of the rich with large deposits.46 To make 
matters worse, in the course of inspecting the two institutions, unprecedented scandals 
in which MoF officials were involved came to light. These consecutive financial 
scandals caused the bank-bashing mood and amplified the criticism and distrust of the 
MoF.
The MoF’s ability to handle domestic financial unrest also began to be noticed 
with suspicion by international financial markets. Since the summer of 1995, the
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so-called “Japan premium”, an addition to the interest rate in international money 
markets, loomed (see Figure 6.1). When Japanese banks raised funds from interbank 
markets, extra interest charges, ranging from 0.2 to 0.5 percent, were imposed on 
LIBOR (London Interbank Offer Rate). The collapse of Cosmo Credit Co-operative in 
July 1995 triggered the emergence of the Japan premium.47 The following collapse of 
two financial firms, as well as Moody’s Investor Service’s announcement that credit 
ratings of Japanese banks would be downgraded in August, continued to extend the 
Japan premium.48 The Japan premium reached its first peak when the over $1.1 billion 
losses of Daiwa Bank in the New York markets were divulged on 26th September 
1995. At that time, a 0.5 percent premium was imposed even on top city banks and no 
less than 1.0 percent was imposed on several trust banks.49 A lack of distinction in the 
management functions between front and back offices of the market division at Daiwa 
Bank enabled one trader to cause such huge losses in unauthorised transactions. This 
fact revealed the inadequacy of the bank’s internal control functions and also raised 
widespread concerns about risk management practices at Japanese banks.
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Figure 6.1 Japan Premium: 1996-1998 (daily)
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Note: The Japan premium is an extra expense that Japanese banks must pay for raising funds in overseas 
financial markets. The Japan premium in this figure is calculated as follows: Japan premium = 
interest rate quoted by Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi -  interest rate quoted by Barclays Bank in the 
Eurodollar market (London).
Source: Hall (1998: 186). Balloons are added.
Furthermore, the MoF’s misconduct cast serious international doubts on the
Japanese methods of banking regulation. Daiwa Bank had initially attempted to cover
up its huge losses in the New York markets and to cope with the problem under the
guidance o f the Japanese MoF, and had not reported the losses to the American
authorities. It demonstrated that the MoF was not a “tough” supervisor because o f its
overriding concern with the short-term stability of the financial system. Its failures to
take tough and timely action to deal with Daiwa Bank’s transgressions and to report to
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the U.S. authorities damaged the reputation of the MoF. Testifying before the Senate 
banking committee, Alan Greenspan, chairman of the U.S. Fed, said that it was 
“regrettable” that the Japanese authorities had not alerted the U.S. authorities to the 
problem earlier.50 This practice of the MoF conspired to undermine the credibility, 
both at home and abroad, of Japanese banking regulation and the MoF as a supervisory 
body. Market participants became increasingly uneasy at the way in which the reported 
figures for bad debts were being calculated, thereby giving rise to the Japan premium 
in international capital markets.
A final blow to the MoF came from a jusen (the housing-loan companies) problem 
that exercised politicians, bankers, agricultural co-operative lobbyists and bureaucrats 
in the early and mid-1990s.51 As jusen had lent vast sums for speculative property 
development in the days of the bubble economy, the consequent collapse of asset 
prices left the jusen suffering huge amounts of non-performing loans that in turn 
caused them to default on their borrowings from financial institutions. It was estimated 
that, out of a total loan book of 10.7 trillion yen, 6.27 trillion yen would be proved 
irrecoverable, with other losses of 0.14 trillion yen anticipated.52
Two factors made the jusen problem particularly complex. One was that a 
number of Japanese banks made loans to the jusen. The jusen, which were originally 
started up by big banks (founding banks) borrowed from a number of other banks
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(creditor banks). However, the big banks refused to pay to rescue the jusen. Even 
relatively healthy banks had some bad debts so that they were loath to share an extra 
burden. The other factor was that financial institutions linked to agricultural 
co-operatives, which had already fallen into financial difficulties but which had still 
been politically powerful, were also lending huge amount of money to the jusen. 
Agricultural financial institutions asserted that the banks concerned should take full 
responsibility and refused any sharing of costs. These agricultural financial 
institutions were organising large voting constituencies for LDP politicians in rural 
areas, and therefore the politicians could not ignore their interests. Furthermore, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) supported them. In sum, the 
political dispute over the resolution plan revolved around the issue of sharing costs 
among the founding banks, the creditor banks and the agricultural financial 
institutions.54
Despite strong public opposition, the Murayama Coalition Cabinet decided in 
December 1995 to spend 685 billion yen of taxpayers’ money to compensate the 
creditors of the jusen.55 This liquidation plan was politically inspired by the horse 
trading between the MoF and the MAFF.56 Initially, the three-party coalition 
government established the Finance-Securities Project Team in order to deal with the 
jusen problem, but complex vested interests prevented the politicians-led initiative
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from reaching any effective conclusion.57 In addition, the MoF could not take the 
initiative. The MoF thought that the jusen should be capitalised immediately in order
c o
to maintain confidence in the Japanese financial system. As seen above, international 
concerns over the Japanese financial system had already triggered the “Japan 
premium”. Yet, its flip-side was the loss of MoF’s prestige. The MoF failed to fill the 
gulf between the banks and agricultural co-operatives. In particular, the latter’s 
political muscle ensured that their contribution was kept to a minimum, and hence the 
total contribution from the banks and agricultural financial firms did not fully make up 
the liquidation plan. In the end, the shortage was met by the government, using public 
funds. The government feared a public outcry against the use of taxpayers’ money, but 
could not find any alternative. The coalition government tried to blur responsibility for 
this problem by announcing the liquidation plan under the joint signatories, ensuring 
that the criminal liability of jusen managers and debtors should be duly investigated, 
criticising bank managers, and forcing the Administrative Vice-Minister for Finance to 
resign.59 More importantly, as seen below, politicians began to insist on the MoF 
break-up in order to avoid being blamed for their decision to use public money to 
resolve the crisis.60
The use of public funds for resolving the jusen problem culminated in an 
avalanche of the MoF criticism. The MoF’s failures to prevent and subsequently cope
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adequately with the deterioration of balance sheets of the jusen and other banks called 
the MoF’s credibility and legitimacy into serious doubt. What the MoF officials were 
worried most about was growing argument for the dissolution of the MoF. The 
combination of the failure to respond to the financial turmoil with bad macroeconomic 
management put the organisation and function of the MoF itself under criticism. In 
particular, the sheer extent of its powers, ranging from budgetary considerations, 
taxation, financial supervision, monetary policy to the management of state-owned 
assets (including privatisations), became a symbol of the structural problems of the 
Japanese economy. Such concentration of powers was seen as the ultimate cause of the 
MoF’s organisational malfunction and of scandal-hotbed relationships with the 
financial industry. The widespread crisis created a condition under which the 
prevailing regulatory ideas would be discredited.
6.3.2 Domestic Reform o f Banking Regulation: Transnational Ideas as a Domestic 
Political Tool
The ideas most likely to spread politically are the ones which are deemed to offer a 
relevant resolution to the current problem and those whose advocates launch the most 
successful publicity campaign.61 In this respect, a set of new regulatory norms and 
methods, which emerged in the course of the discussion of market risk regulations at 
the Basle Committee, was an obvious candidate for political selection. Their emphasis
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on internal risk management, internal control systems, and, above all, the 
self-responsibility of market participants was regarded as an alternative to the 
“protective convoy system” that characterised post-war Japanese banking regulation. 
Although the infusion of the new regulatory system running contrary to the existing 
ones was not easy, the harsh criticism of the existing system and the MoF itself drove 
the MoF to tackle this task. Thus, the MoF was politically motivated to advocate new 
ideas in order to protect its organisational interests.
On 26 December 1995, the same day on which the use of public money to resolve 
the jusen problem was announced, the MoF’s Banking Bureau published a reform plan 
for banking regulation and administration, which was radical enough to take even BoJ 
officials by surprise.62 The announcement was partly a tactic by the MoF to head off 
the mounting criticism of the jusen problem and to divert the focus of the criticism 
away from the dissolution of the MoF.63 The MoF turned its emphasis away from the 
conventional “protective convoy” regulatory system towards an arm’s length 
regulatory system emphasising the banks’ internal control functions, risk management 
systems and strict disclosure.
The MoF’s reform plan, named “Financial Regulation and Supervision as It Ought 
to Be, and its Concrete Measures”, was seen as a starting-point for comprehensive 
reforms in Japanese banking regulation and administration.64 In the statement, the
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MoF acknowledged the inadequacy of the traditional “protective convoy” style of 
banking administration, and admitted that it had placed too much trust in financial 
institutions (which led to insufficient checks on management and internal control 
functions) and that banking supervision had not been transparent enough. The MoF 
proposed many changes based upon two principles: first, that the management of 
financial firms should exercise more self-responsibility; and second, that supervision 
should be more transparent and based on market discipline (see Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2 MoF’s Plan for New Banking Regulation 
(December 1995)
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As for the improvement of internal control functions, financial firms were advised 
to reinforce their in-house inspections, encouraged to carry out external audits of their 
overseas branches, asked to enhance their internal audit and compliance functions
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(especially, in respect of overseas operations) and urged to improve their risk 
management systems for market-related operations. The MoF’s guidelines on in-house 
inspections covered quality of assets, internal controls including compliance with laws 
and regulations, risk management for market-related business including derivatives, 
and computer systems. The guidelines on market risk control covered the following: 
basic policies on risk control; organisational control arrangements promoting sound 
risk management (including the checking of functions and the independence of risk 
management sections); and procedures for controlling risks (including the 
measurement of risks, reporting to the Executive Board, and the assignment of risk 
limits or stop-loss limits). In addition, the MoF promised that it would closely monitor 
institutions’ in-house inspections, and also demanded that those financial institutions 
carrying out market-related business on a global basis should adopt the most advanced 
risk management systems available.
The content of the MoF’s reform plan largely followed new regulatory norms and 
methods that the Basle Committee had developed in response to critical public 
comments on its 1993 proposal for market risk regulations. This new consensual 
knowledge about how to regulate and supervise highly complex financial transactions 
was directed towards a greater reliance on market-enforced discipline. Along with this 
line of the argument, the MoF emphasised the importance of private banks’ internal
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risk management and internal control systems, and argued for arm’s-length, rule-based 
regulatory practices. Generally speaking, a painful experience running contrary to 
prevailing policy made those ideas dubious among policy-makers, turning them 
towards alternatives, and thereby led to corresponding policy changes.65 In addition to 
this general condition, as mentioned at the outset of this section, a sense of crisis from 
the MoF’s consecutive failures to handle regulatory issues motivated the MoF officials 
to adopt the Basle-originated regulatory norms and methods in order to protect their 
organisation. The domestic and international interaction made it possible for the MoF 
to use what they learned from Basle as a domestic political tool to mitigate against the 
mounting criticism.
Each of the Basle Committee members was expected to put the market risk 
regulation into force by the end of 1997. In December 1997, the MoF revised its 
notification regarding capital adequacy requirements, based on Article 14 of the 
Banking Act, in order to introduce the 1996 Amendment into Japan.66 The revised 
notification stipulated new rules for capital requirements for market risk, including 
qualitative and quantitative criteria for the use of banks’ internal models and 
measurement methods based upon the standardised building-block approach, in 
conformity with the 1996 Amendment. The MoF also clarified conditions under which 
banks could be exempted from the new rules. A bank, of which the sum of their trading
book’s assets and liabilities is less than 100 billion yen and the ratio of the sum to total 
assets is less than 10 percent, does not need to add market risk to capital adequacy 
requirements. Arguably, due to the small impact that the 1996 Amendment had on 
Japanese banks’ capital levels, and partly because Japanese banks were so preoccupied 
with settling the jusen problem, the introduction of the 1996 Market Risk Regulation 
did not draw much attention in Japan.
The new rules posed three challenges, however, to Japanese banks: first, the banks 
needed to perceive market risk on the current market value basis. Second, they had to 
capture the risk on the quantitative basis using, for example, VAR. Third, they had to 
build up organisations for effective managerial risk-control mechanisms.67 Japanese 
banks had to tackle these three tasks in order to compete with international rivals in the 
lucrative field of trading activities. Once the 1996 Amendment was recognised as an 
international regulatory arrangement, it started imposing its discipline on banks 
through the market. In addition to a minimum level of capital, the market required the 
sophistication of banks’ internal risk management systems, among other things. In 
order to obtain higher credit ratings, a minimum level of capital is required, but any 
excess over this minimum does not guarantee an automatic upgrade to the next rating
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level. Building proper internal risk management systems has become an integral 
condition for such upgrade. Most city banks have developed internal managerial
risk-control systems which were able to meet the Basle/MoF required criteria, and 
have been publishing detailed information on internal risk management in their annual 
reports.
6.3.3 MoF Losing Ground: Towards a Politician-led Reform
The domestic introduction of Basle-originated, market-oriented regulatory norms and 
methods was seen as the MoF’s attempt to manoeuvre itself away from the danger of 
dissolution. However, the MoF’s political efforts to protect its organisation failed 
afterwards in political and economic upheaval.
After the sudden resignation of Prime Minister Murayama who was exhausted by 
the jusen problem, the three-party coalition formed the Hashimoto Cabinet in January 
1996. To wipe out the unpleasant image that the jusen problem had caused, the new 
cabinet launched a series of new policy lines: a sound budget policy; the 
administration reform programme; and the “Big Bang” programme.69 These policies 
culminated in a backlash against the MoF. The allegedly premature return from a 
stimulus fiscal policy to a sound budget policy threw the still-weak economy into a 
deflationary spiral and triggered the second financial crisis in 1997. This time, big 
financial firms such as Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities
7 0collapsed. In both cases, a combination of downgrading of the institutions’ credit
ratings and a sharp fall in their stock prices, followed by a drying up of the availability
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71of overnight or other short-term credit, forced the institutions to go out of business. 
These incidents revealed that market forces had begun to work and again highlighted 
the clumsiness of the MoF in this new situation. In particular, the fact that the MoF 
turned a blind eye to Yamaichi’s losses concealed by tobashi—the practice of shuffling
79losses between different accounts—embarrassed the ministry again.
In the course of the administrative reform, the determination of the MoF not to 
relinquish any of its powers made the ministry a symbol of stubborn resistance to 
change. Furthermore, the avowed “Big Bang” goal to create “fair, free and global” 
financial markets required a complete departure from the traditional Japanese means 
of financial regulation. However, the bungling performance of the MoF conveyed the 
impression that the 1995 regulatory reform plan was just on paper. What was worse, 
the Tokyo prosecutors arrested two MoF officials on suspicion of accepting bribes 
from banks. It transpired that several major banks had been offering lavish 
entertainment—including wining and dining, golf, and trips to sex bars—to the MoF 
officials who were supposed to be regulating them. The financial minister and several 
senior MoF officials resigned, but it was no longer possible for the ministry to regain 
public support.
More importantly, the necessity of using public money to resolve the 1998 banking 
crisis changed politicians’ attitude towards the MoF. As Nobuhiro Hiwatari argued, the
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unpopular policy of using taxpayers’ money to cope with bank failure led politicians to 
take blame avoidance behaviour. That is, politicians do not always seek to claim 
credit, but they also try to avoid blame. When politicians have to make unpopular 
decisions that are necessary for, say, the stabilisation of a financial system but impose 
costs on the electorate in the short-term, they try to avoid being blamed for the 
decision. In particular, given the increased public criticism against the MoF, in the 
course of the 1996 general election, the dissolution of the MoF became an attractive 
election pledge.74 The use of public money to resolve bank failure is a typical example 
of this blame avoidance, and the much-criticised MoF was a good target on which 
politicians placed the blame.
Under these circumstances, the MoF was dissolved and its regulatory functions 
were transferred to a newly established financial watchdog, the Financial Supervisory 
Agency (FSA), in June 1998. In 2001, the agency was renamed the Financial 
Services Agency. The FSA is independent of the MoF, being part of the Prime 
Minister’s Office. Thus, the MoF’s attempts to protect its organisation failed. In the 
new regulatory environment, relationships between the regulators and the regulated 
were designed to be much more transparent and be conducted at arm’s length. The 
extent to which this new regulatory institution affected the implementation of capital 
adequacy rules in a practical sense will be considered in Chapter 7.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter has considered how Japanese regulators were engaged in the international 
negotiations of the 1996 Amendment and how the interaction between the 
international development of new regulation and domestic unrest affected Japanese 
regulators’ behaviour. The two-level-game framework, which places regulators at the 
interface between the domestic political context and the international institutional 
context, makes the behaviour of regulators more intelligible in terms of material 
interest concerns and ideational diffusion.
Domestic considerations heavily affected Japanese regulators’ preferences with 
regard to the international negotiations of the 1996 Amendment. Their concerns over 
domestic banking troubles formed their preference for the narrow application of 
market risk regulations. The narrow application was deemed to minimise additional 
regulatory burdens on Japanese banks because their huge securities holdings for 
investment purposes were exempted from market risk regulations. Thanks to European 
preferences for the narrow application and the technical difficulty of the broad 
application of market risk regulations, the Basle Committee eventually adopted the 
narrow application of market risk regulations (circumscribing the regulatory scope 
within short-term trading activities) and Japanese regulators’ preferences were 
advanced in this respect.
The other side of the coin is, however, that Japanese regulators did not sufficiently
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address the problem of Japanese banks’ large exposure to market risk from their equity 
portfolios, especially the cross-shareholdings of their corporate clients, since the 
collapse of the financial bubble. Such hesitation crippled Japanese effective 
commitments to the Basle Accord. Opacity in Japanese banks’ exposure to market risk 
resulted in a considerable gap between real and putative capital. As seen in Chapter 3, 
a failure to reduce uncertainty on banks’ financial states leads to weak compliance with 
the Basle Accord. This problem will be discussed in the next chapter in detail further.
With regard to the issue of the regulatory usage of banks’ internal models, one of 
the most significant elements in the recent development of international banking 
regulation, Japanese regulators’ influence was of little significance. This chapter has 
revealed that Japanese regulators’ lack of sufficient experience of capital requirements 
for market risk hampered their influence over the issue of banks’ internal models, and 
Japanese banks also lay quite a way behind in the realm of risk management. This 
backwardness eroded their power in the politics of international banking regulations. 
Control over relevant knowledge has become an important source of power in the 
politics of international financial regulations. This emergent power configuration 
negatively affected Japanese public and private influence in the Basle 
regulatory-making process.
Meanwhile, the interactions between domestic politics and the role of the Basle
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Committee in facilitating ideational diffusion also shed light on Japanese regulators’ 
domestic behaviour. It was a domestic crisis in the regulatory realm that set conditions 
under which the Basle-originated regulatory norms and methods were diffused into the 
national level. The introduction of the new regulatory norms was politically inspired 
by the much-criticised MoF in order to mitigate the criticism. Consecutive failures to 
deal with troubled banks and a series of corruption scandals eroded the MoF’s 
influence in domestic politics and the MoF faced mounting pressure to dissolve its 
organisation. It was necessary for the MoF to show a new direction for banking 
regulation and to demonstrate its own ability to reform Japanese banking regulation. 
The domestic political dynamics of the time needed the new regulatory norms and the 
Basle process provided them. That is, the MoF used the new regulatory norms to 
mitigate the growing criticism. Though the MoF’s political efforts eventually failed 
under pressure from politicians who wanted to put the blame for the use of public 
money to resolve the banking crisis on the MoF, a new, more transparent regulatory 
regime was established.
Overall, the two-level game framework gives us a better understanding of how the 
domestic and international interplay affects the preference formation and bargaining 
position of Japanese bank regulators in the mid-1990s. The two-level game framework 
also shows a process through which the two-level interaction triggered a shift of the
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Japanese regulatory system towards more transparent one, albeit with significant
limits. However, the issue of implementation and compliance is closely related to
domestic institutions in which domestic capital adequacy requirements are embedded.
A question of the extent to which the new regulatory system observed in this chapter
served the actual implementation of capital adequacy requirements remains unsolved.
The two-level game framework in itself does not shed light on this question.
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Chapter 7
Implementation of the Basle Capital Adequacy Requirements: 
Domestic Politics and International Regulatory Standards
7.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at the Japanese implementation of the Basle Capital Accord 
between 1992 and 2001. Although the proposed changes to the Basle Accord have 
been made to come into effect in 2006, it has been a keystone of a global regime for 
financial regulatory standards. The Basle Accord has now been adopted by over 100 
countries, and the Core Principles fo r  Effective Banking Supervision, a reference for 
the “best practices” in banking regulation published by the Basle Committee, endorses 
the Accord as one of the main tools of prudential banking regulation.1 For 
international regulatory standards to be promulgated widely, however, they must be 
general enough to accommodate variations in national traditions and economic
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cultures. Precisely because of this nature of international standards, the Basle Accord 
gave national regulators wide discretionary powers to determine the exact way in 
which it was operationalised within their jurisdiction. In addition, merely meeting the 
minimum requirements alone may be questionable when accounting standards are 
inadequate and when definitions of impaired loans and required provisions are loose, 
since there can be considerable slippage between actual and putative capital. Japan has 
been accused of both.
Just looking at numerical compliance is, therefore, not enough to evaluate effective 
implementation. It inherently requires a considerable element of judgement about real 
compliance—the degree to which national regulators adhere to international 
regulatory standards for the purpose of prudential regulation. A wide range of 
national discretionary powers allows the implementation issue to be open to the 
influence of domestic factors. The conflict among domestic interests and the 
arrangement of domestic institutions affect the course of the implementation of 
international regulatory standards, and can be the domestic source of inadequate 
implementation or defection. That is, as regards implementation the actual 
international “negotiations” may be of limited importance.
This chapter aims to capture the political sources of a particular form of the 
discretionary implementation of the Basle capital adequacy standards in Japan, where
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the domestic financial system went through crises and changes throughout the 1990s.4 
The two-level-game approach hypothesises that developments in international 
standards towards prudential regulation give bank regulators external leverage to cope 
with domestic status quo interests and to deliver on what they agree with foreign 
counterparts. However, this chapter points out the importance, first, of domestic 
institutional capacity to deliver, and, second, of the relationship between state and 
society in the policy-making process. At the domestic level, such factors as 
institutional frameworks and political interests may press for leniency in 
implementation. This chapter answers two related questions. Firstly, how did these 
various forces, both international and domestic, operate and interact during the 
implementation stage in Japan? Secondly, how was the locus of implementation 
determined?
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 examines the issues involved in 
the implementation of international regulatory standards and identifies various 
international and domestic forces pulling in various directions. Section 7.3 presents 
three cases of the banking policies taken in Japan, which affected the degree of the 
compliance with the Basle Accord. They include the non-performing loan problem 
(NPLs), the 1998 changes in regulatory and accounting rules, and the 2001 
introduction of market-value accounting rules. Section 7.4 evaluates the network state
hypothesis that dysfunctional domestic institutions hamper Japanese credible 
commitments to the Basle Accord, and discusses two domestic-level alternative 
explanations.
7.2 The Key Issues of Implementation
7.2.1 Indicators o f Credible Commitment
Maximilian Hall argues that the real impact of the Basle Accord is identified 
within the individual national context, since national regulators possess discretionary 
powers to affect the quality of regulatory capital and the sensitivity of risk assets.5 
Thus, even when adopting international standards as domestic ones, domestic factors 
still have a great influence on the mode of implementation. In this sense, accounting 
principles also have a significant effect on the regulatory regime (in particular, the 
measurement of capital adequacy), although the Basle Accord itself contains nothing 
about accounting definitions.6 Inadequate accounting standards are likely to cloud the 
picture of the banks’ capital compositions and thereby obscure the accuracy of capital 
adequacy ratios. Thus, when accounting rules are insufficient, numerical compliance 
is unlikely to ensure real compliance, but rather may imply “hidden defection”. It 
should be noted that capital adequacy ratios in Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia
n
were often more than 8 percent before the 1997 crisis.
Chapter 3 outlined the four indicators of credible commitment to the Basle Capital 
Accord or lack thereof. They were as follows: (1) numerical compliance with required 
capital adequacy ratios; (2) statutory capital adequacy rules; (3) accounting principles, 
and loan classification and provisioning rules; and (4) regulators’ prompt corrective 
action. Previous chapters showed that the first and second indicators were fulfilled.
Apparently, as Figure 1.1 (p. 17) showed, major Japanese banks managed to meet 
the eight percent minimum capital requirements in the 1990s. One city bank 
(Hokkaido Takushoku Bank) and two long-term credit banks (Long-term Credit Bank 
of Japan and Japan Credit Bank) failed to clear the minimum requirements just before
e»
they went bankrupt in 1997 and 1998. In the wake of the Daiwa Bank incident of 
1995,9 the bank withdrew from overseas business and adopted domestic rules for 
capital adequacy, rather than the Basle rules. The domestic rules require banks without 
overseas operations to adhere to a four percent capital adequacy ratio, and under the 
rules unrealised capital gains on banks’ securities holdings cannot be counted as 
capital. Of seven trust banks, four also took strategies to stop taking part in 
international operations and to adopt the domestic rules by March 2000, although their 
ratios of capital adequacy were well above eight percent. This is all evidence that the 
capital rules had “bite” in Japan, and the rest of the major banks continued to meet the 
Basle minimum capital adequacy ratios.
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During the course of the Basle negotiations, Japanese regulators succeeded in 
established the statutory basis for domestic capital adequacy rules, which they had 
wanted since the early 1980s but had effectively failed to do so under political pressure 
at the domestic level. It should be noted, however, that neither the introduction of 
statutory capital adequacy requirements nor the numerical compliance alone was an 
adequate condition for the strict implementation of capital adequacy rules in Japan. 
The MoF established the statutory form of capital rules, and Japanese banks began to 
meet the required capital ratios. However, more crucial indices (accounting principles 
and regulators’ prompt corrective action) were left untouched. Rather, without these 
policy indicators, the statutory capital rules and private banks’ numerical compliance 
do not ensure the credible commitments of Japan to the Basle Accord.
The degree of compliance with the Basle Accord is subject to domestic politics and 
the domestic institutional frameworks in which capital adequacy requirements are 
embedded. Capital adequacy rules will be ineffectual if such institutional frameworks 
are inadequate. For national regulators to strictly comply with the Basle Accord, 
therefore, they must ensure that policies related to capital adequacy requirements 
support the goal of prudential regulation, thereby making individual banks more 
resilient. In other words, discretionary policies working against this regulatory goal 
are deemed to move away from meeting the principles for the best practices in capital
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adequacy requirements. Reaching an agreement on international standards and even 
adopting them as domestic standards (formal compliance) should be distinguished 
from effectively implementing them (real compliance). If the locus of the 
implementation of international regulatory standards is under the influence of 
domestic political economy, what sorts of domestic forces operate at that stage, and 
how do international forces interact with domestic ones? These questions are 
addressed in the next section.
7.2.2 A Two-level Game Analogy at the Implementation Stage 
A two-level game framework was initially designed to examine the international 
negotiation process in which state negotiators negotiate with their foreign counterparts 
to reach an agreement at the international level, and simultaneously engage in 
domestic politics to get the international agreement ratified at the domestic level.10 
This logic of two-level game approach can be applied at the implementation stage, 
locating regulators as the link between international and domestic pressures. The 
international and domestic pressures at the implementation stage are examined here.
7.2.2.1 International Pressures for Compliance
The international relations literature gives us some insight into the question of why
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states adhere to international agreements without a formal enforcement mechanism. 
Regime theories demonstrate that international institutions create a framework in 
which the temptation to defect can be significantly reduced among players who expect 
to meet again.11 International regimes institutionalise reciprocity and the iterated 
games among players, and make an international agreement have political weight, 
because reneging would have high political and reputation costs. The epistemic 
community literature stresses the role of institutional settings in disseminating
1 9regulatory norms and methods. An epistemic community in the realm of banking 
regulation—a knowledge-based network of regulators sharing common policy goals 
and expertise—can be the medium of diffusion of specific knowledge, such as the best 
practices in banking regulation, and such knowledge can prevail in national regulatory 
systems. From this viewpoint, institutional frameworks facilitate the learning process 
among regulators as they forge a common ground with regard to what causes the 
particular problems concerned and how to address them. These approaches presume 
that the institution-induced processes can generate “peer group” pressures in the 
learning process among the Basle Committee members, and that it anchors national 
regulations to international regulatory standards.
The cross-border contagion effects of banking crises may induce countries with 
international financial centres to exercise official or political pressure on those
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1 'X •countries with lax domestic regulation. In international finance, there is a possibility 
that a banking crisis in one country will threaten to destabilise the international 
banking system, and international financial centres are likely to be the most vulnerable 
to such externalities. These externalities drive the policy-makers of those countries 
with major international financial centres (i.e., the US and the U.K.) to focus their 
attention on the domestic policies of other countries. This underpins international 
standard-setting in areas such as banking regulation, auditing and accounting, and 
corporate governance. Major financial powers put official or political pressure, 
bilaterally or multilaterally, on other countries with lax domestic regulation to adhere 
to international “best” practices, which they set. International standards, therefore, are 
a political tool of major financial powers to reduce their costs of coping with the 
contagion effects of a crisis.
The pressure from international financial markets may also be at work once a 
regulatory framework for capital adequacy ratios is established as an international 
standard. International banks themselves are aware of the costs, in terms of credit 
ratings and international business reputation, of the low level of capital adequacy 
ratios. Therefore, they boost their capital bases and/or shed assets in order to meet the 
Basle capital adequacy standards. Regulatory changes in the dominant financial 
centres not only give the rest of the world competitive incentives to adopt the
regulatory changes in order to maintain or attract business, but also lead to market 
pressures to conform to the regulatory environment of the dominant centre.14 This 
process favours states with major international financial centres. This line of argument 
suggests that the market-driven pressure and the politically-driven pressure are 
connected.
In sum, there are at least three sources of systemic-level pressure for the 
implementation of international regulatory standards, which in turn regulators can use 
as external leverage to withstand domestic opposition, to legitimise unpopular policy 
goals, and thereby to shore up their autonomy vis-a-vis domestic interest groups. 
Firstly, in line with regime theories and the epistemic community approach, the Basle 
Committee generates institutional pressures. The institutionalisation of regulators’ 
meetings increases the incentives for compliance with international regulatory 
standards through two different mechanisms: reciprocity and the learning process. 
Secondly, given the powerful contagion effects of banking crises, major financial 
powers encourage those countries with weak banking regulation to adopt international 
regulatory best practices through official or political pressure. Thirdly, by rewarding 
some actions and punishing others, highly integrated financial markets put increased 
pressure for compliance on the part of both regulators and banks themselves. By 
assuming some compliance benefits and defection costs, in short, this line of argument
hypothesises external pressures for compliance.
7.2.2.2 Domestic Politics o f Compliance
At the domestic level, regulators have to interact with other social groups, such as 
banks and politicians, in the policy-making process, and these groups do not 
necessarily share the same policy goal. This potential tension between regulators and 
other social groups raises the question of whether the defection from international 
regulatory standards at the implementation stage is “voluntary” or “involuntary”, 
using Robert Putnum’s terminology.15 While voluntary defection means that a state as 
a unitary actor fails to implement an international agreement, involuntary defection 
means domestic groups override or subvert an agreement apparently supported by a 
regulator.16 In addition to the notion of “hidden defection” previously outlined, this 
distinction also has implications for the domestic source of defection.
The argument presented here suggests that a combination of inadequate domestic 
institutions for solving NPLs and the relationship between state and society was a 
source of defection. Lack of institutional capacity to deal with NPLs might not be seen 
as explicit and deliberate defection from international capital adequacy standards but 
in effect it hindered the effective implementation—hidden defection. Moreover, 
institutional arrangements for the Japanese Diet’s oversight of bank regulators induced
the regulators to exercise forbearance policy in dealing with NPLs (leaving loan 
classification rules and provisioning rules lenient, in particular). This delayed response 
deteriorated the situation and contributed to the outset of credit crunches for small- and 
medium-sized businesses with which ruling LDP politicians established personal and 
clientelistic relationships. In such circumstances, the politicians got involved in 
policy-making and pressed for leniency in order to take credit for representing such 
politically powerful private interests. This led to further involuntary defection.
A principal-agent problem between regulators and politicians under the Japanese 
institutional arrangements for regulatory decision-making is a theoretical 
underpinning of that argument. When principals (politicians) and agents (regulators) 
are not equally well informed, more informed agents are able to take opportunities and 
not to implement appropriate practices in dealing with less informed principals. Diet 
members are not in a perfect position to monitor and assess the behaviour of the MoF 
due to institutional deficiency of the oversight of regulators, and therefore they employ 
“fire alarm” rather than “police patrol” oversight of the MoF.17 As long as the financial 
system is perceived as stable, politicians neither closely watch over the regulators nor 
participate in the regulatory policy-making process, but rather they focus their political 
resources on more politically sensitive niches of the economy such as agriculture, 
small- and medium-sized businesses and construction sector. In other words, the MoF
has incentives to conceal the real picture of NPLs from politicians, since the disclosure 
of regulatory breakdown is likely to trigger political intervention and reduce its 
policy-making autonomy—one of the MoF’s main organisational interests. The MoF 
officials continued to hope that the problem would go away by itself. This is an 
institutional source of regulatory forbearance.
Once it becomes obvious that financial instability hits the LDP’s base of support, 
however, LDP politicians will take part in the regulatory policy-making process. For 
politicians whose prime concern is to be re-elected, the pursuit of prudential regulation 
is secondary. This contrasts with the argument of Rosenbluth and Thies: the new 1994
1Relectoral system provided a potential basis for prudential banking regulation. Unlike 
the old electoral system of multimember districts, the new system was based upon a 
combination of single-seat constituencies and large-district proportional 
representation, and therefore politicians no longer need to divide up party platforms 
and to depend narrowly on specific interests.19 They claim that politicians began to 
adopt a “new sensitivity to majority concerns” and became ready to allocate costs to 
the banking industry to achieve policy goals that broadly appealed to voters, rather 
than taking credit for representing the interests of banks. However, politicians’ 
involvements do not often pull in the direction of prudential regulation.21
Compared with regulatory authorities and banks, politicians are less worried about
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the costs of defection and sometimes prioritise policy objectives other than the strict 
implementation of prudential banking regulations. In particular, during an economic 
downturn, politicians are often willing to sacrifice regulatory prudence in order to pull 
the economy out of recession. This is in particular the case for capital adequacy 
requirements, since they are frequently seen as a main source of a credit crunch, and in 
a country already suffering financial distress, their strict implementation leads to the 
deterioration of the existing credit crunch. Furthermore, the costs of credit crunches 
are concentrated in politically sensitive sectors such as small- and medium-sized 
businesses and construction. Unlike big businesses with access to international 
financial markets, these politically powerful borrowers are highly dependent on bank 
credit, thereby being vulnerable to credit crunches. Thus, the severity of the domestic 
banking crisis politicises the issue of capital adequacy requirements and activates 
politicians who are less keen to strictly comply with international standards.
In short, domestic factors can determine the modus operandi of implementation 
and the degree of compliance. The following section empirically examines how 
domestic factors overrode international pressure for the implementation of prudential 
regulations and actually put for leniency.
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7.3 Examples o f  Implementation Policies
The three cases examined in this section—the non-performing loans (NPLs), 
the 1998 regulatory and accounting changes, and the 2001 introduction of 
market-value accounting rules—show how domestic and international factors affected 
the implementation policies in Japan. Such cases are also related to the indicators of 
credible commitments outlined above. The problem of the NPLs presents the case that 
a lack of adequate domestic institutions coping with that problem led to hidden 
defection. The case of the 1998 regulatory changes demonstrates how a banking crisis 
mobilised politicians and led to further involuntary defection from the Basle Accord in 
the face of international pressures for strict compliance. The 2001 policy change 
indicates the new direction towards the transparent implementation of capital 
adequacy rules in Japan under international pressures, but domestic institutional 
factors still rendered the Japanese implementation weak. These cases highlight the 
importance of domestic factors in affecting the course of implementation policies and 
the degree of compliance.
7.3.1 Forbearance Policy in the Non-performing Loans
While the clean-up of NPLs is not explicitly about the implementation of capital 
adequacy requirements, it is crucial. The inadequate write-off of NPLs and lax loan
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classification and provisioning rules make capital adequacy requirements ineffectual, 
since less NPLs are provisioned for (i.e., the provisioning requirements are not 
adequately deducted from capital base calculations). As widely recognised, the 
mountains of NPLs have been a central cause of the sluggish Japanese economy after 
the collapse of the financial bubble. However, the pace of dealing with NPLs was 
painfully slow, despite market pressures via the downgrading of Japanese banks’ credit 
rating and official pressures from the U.S. and the International Monetary Fund.
In the issue of NPLs, regulatory forbearance was taken in the form of weak loan 
classification standards, which allowed banks to resist classifying as non-performing 
their dubious or even underwater credits, as well as in the form of lenient reserving 
rules, which allowed banks not to put up enough loan-loss reserves against NPLs.
The definition of bad loans outstanding, which had been initially very lax, 
improved gradually and its total figures amounted to 32.1 trillion yen, 6.2 percent of 
total loans, in September 2000. However, most economists thought Japanese banks 
still understated the real situation. The more broadly defined bad loan figures, the 
so-called total “classified loans” of banks (not disclosed on an individual basis), were 
published by the Financial Services Agency, and amounted to 65.5 trillion yen. Banks 
were required to classify their loan portfolio into four categories (normal, sub-standard, 
doubtful and estimated loss loans), taking account of the default risk of borrowers and
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the quality o f collaterals. Based on this classification, banks estimated their loan-loss 
reserves and the amount of write-offs. As the classified loans are more broadly defined 
than disclosed NPLs, the amount of classified loans is much bigger than the disclosed 
NPLs. However, compared with those of the U.S. banks, the total loan loss reserves of 
Japanese banks have been quite low.24
Figure 7.1 C om parison o f Bad Loan Situations in Japan  
and the United States
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2) Figures after FY 1997 do not include data of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Tokyo City 
Bank, Kyoto Kyoei Bank, Naniwa Bank, Fukutoku Bank, and Midori Bank.
3) Japanese bad loan ratio = Risk control loans/total loans
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Source: Fukao (2002), Chart 2. Japan Center for Economic Research, Monetary Policy Under 
Deflation, March 2001 (in Japanese).
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Given these huge NPLs, uncovered losses and the lenient reserve policy, market 
analysts commonly came to a conclusion that Japanese banks were still under- 
capitalised and in aggregate the entire banking industry was potentially insolvent. If 
NPLs were fully provisioned, critics argued, a number of Japanese banks would fall 
below the minimum 8 percent of the Basle Capital Accord.26 Thus, the slow progress 
in dealing with NPLs not only hampered the implementation of capital adequacy 
requirements in a practical sense, but also made the level of banks’ capital adequacy 
wholly misleading, if the estimates of NPLs are to be believed.
There were institutional causes of the government’s delayed response to the NPL 
problem. The institutional characteristics of the “fire alarm” oversight of the MoF by 
Diet members allowed the MoF officials to (and gave them incentives to) hide 
negative information on the banking sector from politicians. Since the revelation of 
regulatory breakdown would invite political intervention and reduce the MoF’s 
policy-making autonomy, the MoF was reluctant to disclose the real state of NPLs and 
to take prompt action to deal with the problem. Indeed, by the mid-1990s, as admitted 
by Yoshimasa Nishimura, director-general of the Banking Bureau at the MoF between 
1994 and 1996, the regulators’ approach to NPLs was based upon the expectation that 
a resumption of economic growth would permit banks and borrowers to recover their 
financial soundness, and regulators thought lenient loan classification would reduce
the pressure on banks to withdraw credit lines from troubled firms, which would allow
97such firms to buy time until the economy recovered. The MoF did not adequately 
inform Diet members of the true state of the banking problem until the banking crisis 
began to surface. In an economy suffering from negative growth and price deflation, 
however, forbearance policy made the NPL problem worse and eventually led to 
political intervention in 1997/8 (see below).
Regulatory forbearance also reflected another lack of institutional frameworks 
enabling regulators to swiftly use public money. An alternative to forbearance policy is 
to close down insolvent financial institutions. Viable institutions, however, may 
require re-capitalisation via the injection of public funds, as in Indonesia, South Korea 
and Thailand. As the provision of public money in resolving banking failures was 
unpopular, like in the case of the U.S. through the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the 
effective institutional frameworks of using public money were slow to be established 
in Japan. As seen in the next section, this issue became politicised and led to 
politicians’ intervention in the regulatory policy-making.
7.3.2 Politicians' Intervention: the 1998 Regulatory and Accounting Rule Changes 
Failure to take quick and adequate action to deal with NPLs turned out to have a high 
price. In November 1997, the failure of major financial firms sharply increased
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financial instability, and many banks effectively failed to meet the Basle capital 
standards. The fact that many lenient policies were carried out intensively in the midst 
of the 1997-98 banking crisis suggests that such policies were deliberately used to 
pump up the capital bases of banks. What promoted these changes and to what extent 
did these policies affect banks’ capital ratios?
The banking turmoil of 1997-98 generated a strong downward pressure on already 
weak stock prices. The consequences of moribund stock prices were twofold—it made 
it difficult for banks to meet the Basle Accord, and caused a credit crunch. Under the 
Basle rules, Japanese banks were allowed to count 45 percent of unrealised capital 
gains on their securities holdings as part of regulatory capital. However, a drop of 
market value below the book value caused unrealised capital losses, and these losses 
necessarily eroded Tier I capital even if they could under-provision for NPLs under the 
lax loan classification and provisioning standards. At the end of fiscal year 1997 
(March 1998), major Japanese banks, for the first time in the post-war era, saw latent 
losses in their stock portfolios. Unrealised losses arose on the stock portfolios of five 
major banks: Daiwa Bank (67.5 billion yen), Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan or 
LTCB (21.9 billion yen), Nippon Credit Bank (21.3 billion yen), Yasuda Trust Bank 
(61.7 billion yen) and Chuo Trust Bank (5 billion yen). These banks were faced with 
the serious erosion of their capital bases and found it difficult to meet the Basle
minimum capital requirements.
Given that such capital composition was vulnerable to stock price movements, 
when stock prices declined sharply, the Japanese banks conforming to the Basle 
standards tightened their credit lines. As new stock issuance was almost impossible 
during times of market unrest, and the necessity to clean up NPLs prevented Japanese 
banks from accumulating profits that could become their own capital, they were 
obliged to shrink their lending volume to achieve the minimum capital requirements. 
Such stock-market induced credit crunches occurred in 1992, 1995 and 1997.29
Growing concern about credit crunches made politicians take the initiative in 
tackling the financial matters and paved the way for a capital injection into the biggest 
banks. International political pressure from the U.S. on Japanese banking issues and 
from the G-7 urging public money infusions also pushed politicians into making a 
decision to adopt the unpopular policy.31 By September 1997, the Asian financial 
crisis had spread well beyond the region and increased the macroeconomic costs of 
major countries. In the midst of the Long-Term Capital Management problem, the 
Clinton administration demanded that the Japanese government prepare a sufficient 
amount of public funds to fix the banking problem and inject these public funds as 
soon as possible. The same request was echoed at the G-7 meeting of finance ministers 
in October. Behind these demands there was a fear that the collapse of the Japanese
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banking system would accelerate the meltdown of Wall Street and the global economy. 
These international pressures endorsed the use of public money and made it easier for 
the Japanese government to do so.
Under the initiative taken by LDP politicians, however, the discussion on the use of 
public money considered domestic political concerns. The reasons for the injection of 
public money shifted away from the protection of depositors and the resolution of 
insolvent banks, and towards the capital build-up of weak banks and a stimulatory 
effect on the economy. After all, LDP politicians* main concerns were about the 
economic recovery in general, and about ensuring that small- and medium-sized firms 
got new credit lines in particular. In response to the LDP’s comprehensive policy 
package, in December 1997, the MoF announced policy measures to deal with the 
credit crunch, featuring the use of public money, and a change in accounting rules 
governing the valuation of banks’ securities holdings.33 The public money infusions 
took place twice, in March 1998 and March 1999, of which the aggregate amount 
reached around 9.3 trillion yen.
The new accounting rules were particularly designed to strengthen the capital 
positions of Japanese banks, if only merely for the books. At the end of March 1998, 
banks were allowed to use either the traditional “lower of cost or market method”, or 
the so-called “acquisition cost method” in evaluating their stock holdings. By allowing
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banks to use only the book value (acquisition cost), the new 1998 accounting rules 
prevented unrealised losses from reducing Tier I capital. Taking advantage of these 
changes in accounting methods, 16 of the 19 top banks switched from the 
lower-of-cost-or-market method to the acquisition cost method in evaluating their 
stock holdings.
The new accounting rules were inconsistent with internationally accepted 
regulatory principles in two ways. Firstly, by deliberately blurring the gap between 
actual and putative capital, the 1998 accounting rules made the objectivity of capital 
adequacy ratios ineffectual, and thereby prevented market participants from obtaining 
accurate information on Japanese banks’ financial health. The case of LTCB suggests 
the dubious criteria for calculating capital ratios: the bank’s capital adequacy ratio was 
among the highest for major Japanese banks under the 1998 rules, but in reality the 
bank incurred huge unrealised capital losses on their shareholdings. If such losses 
were properly considered, the banks failed to achieve the minimum capital 
requirements. LTCB indeed failed in October 1998. Secondly, the use of acquisition 
cost in accounting banks’ shareholdings obviously went against the growing 
international trend towards market-value accounting, which will be discussed in the 
next section.
In addition to this policy change, a series of measures to help banks clear the 8
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percent minimum capital requirements was launched in March 1998.34 The biggest of 
these was a LDP member’s (Ichizo Dhara) bill that allowed banks to count 45 percent 
of unrealised valuation gains on real estate holdings as Tier II capital. The value of 
these gains for the largest 19 banks amounted to 1.2 trillion yen.35 Prime Minister 
Ryutaro Hashimoto, who was worried that his sound budget policy might throw the 
still-weak economy into a deflationary spiral and lead to a financial crisis, strongly 
supported the bill.36 Risk-weights were also revised. The weights applied to loans to 
securities houses and to loans insured by credit guarantee associates were reduced 
from 100 percent to 20 percent and to 10 percent respectively. The aim of these 
changes in risk-weightings was not only to ease banks’ capital requirements and to 
attenuate the risk of a credit crunch, but also to improve incentives for new financial 
intermediation mechanisms for small- and medium-sized businesses—a bulwark of 
the LDP.37
It should be emphasised that LDP did not simply push the interests of banks. 
Rather, the intense political pressure to make new loans to small- and medium-sized 
businesses prevented banks from raising interest margins and partly contributed to the 
low profitability of the banking sector. Moreover, the Japanese Bankers Association 
did not publicly seek any type of capital injection to clean up NPLs or to boost capital 
ratios, since acceptance of such public assistance would signal the banks’ weak
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financial statements and would invite political interference in bank management and 
lending decisions.38 In October 1998, the LDP also stopped accepting political 
contributions from top banks that had received public money to reduce
' J Q
non-performing loans. The LDP-led regulatory policies aimed to revitalise the 
economy, not to serve the narrow interests of banks.
The 1998 changes in accounting and regulatory rules had a significant impact on 
the apparent capital level of banks. As Table 7.1 shows, without this sort of 
government support, 4 out of 9 city banks would have failed to meet the minimum 
capital requirements. Until September 2001, banks continued to list the positions of 
their securities holdings at book value, no matter whether they had gone up or down.
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Table 7.1 Capital Ratios under New Accounting Standards and 
Old Accounting Standards for the Major 19 Banks*
Total Capital Ratios Tier I Capital Ratios
Mar-97 Mar-98 
(old rules)
Mar-98 
(new rules)
Mar-97 Mar-98 
(old rules)
Mar-98 
(new rules)
Citv Banks
Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank** 9.28 8.20 8.54 4.97 4.27 4.27
Dai-Ichi Kangyo 8.76 7.51 9.09 4.38 3.76 4.63
Sakura 8.93 7.62 9.13 4.46 3.81 4.56
Sumitomo 8.75 8.33 9.23 4.50 4.17 4.76
Fuji 9.23 7.29 9.41 4.80 3.65 4.79
Sanwa 9.11 8.31 9.61 4.55 4.15 4.80
Tokai 9.09 8.82 10.26 4.55 4.41 5.41
Asahi 8.71 7.44 9.39 4.44 3.72 4.69
Daiwa 9.09 n.a. 10.30 4.73 3.56 5.35
Hokkaido Takushoku 9.34 6.20*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Lone-term Credit
Banks
IBJ** 9.04 9.31 9.74 4.83 4.79 4.95
LTCB 9.22 n.a. 10.32 4.61 3.82 5.16
NCB 2.99 n.a. n.a. 1.50 n.a. n.a.
Trust Banks 
Mitsubishi Trust** 9.68 n.a. 10.35 5.15 5.99 5.99
Sumitomo Trust 8.97 n.a. 9.90 5.45 4.22 5.27
Mitsui Trust 9.56 8.66 10.41 5.35 4.33 6.02
Yasuda Trust 9.87 n.a. 13.56 5.73 3.97 7.14
Toyo Trust 10.02 9.29 10.68 5.79 4.64 5.78
Chuo Trust 9.11 n.a. 12.73 4.93 5.03 7.95
Nippon Trust 11.24 n.a. 9.26 10.29 8.21 9.26
Source: Fitch IBCA, based upon published financial statements as of May 22,1998
Notes: *
* *
***
Under the old rule, securities holdings were accounted at the lowest of 
purchase (book) and market prices for the effect of computing Tier 1 capital 
(i.e., unrealised losses would reduce Tier 1 capital), and up to 45 percent of 
unrealised gains could be counted as Tier 2 capital. Under the new standard, 
banks can choose to use only book values (i.e., unrealised loss does not reduce 
Tier 2 capital and unrealised gains cannot be included in Tier 2 capital). 
These three banks did not adopt the new accounting methods for unrealised 
equity securities holdings.
This is the figure of September 1997. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank went 
bankrupt in November 1997.
Credit rating agencies remained unimpressed by this sort of financial juggling to
help banks achieve the minimum capital standards. Standard & Poor’s, for example,
said: “It’s very negative that many banks have chosen to adopt the book-value
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evaluation to revalue their stock portfolios. That kind of behaviour will further amplify 
the market distrust toward these banks”.40 Credit rate agencies understood that 
Japanese banks’ capital adequacy ratios would have been much lower if strict criteria 
had been used, like valuing stock holdings at market value instead of purchase price. 
However, the Japan premium, which was deemed to reflect both domestic structural 
problems and banks’ liquidity problem in international capital markets,41 vanished in 
April 1999. Some economists attributed the cause of the premium’s disappearance to 
re-capitalisation and the rigorous provisioning for NPLs.42 A Japanese regulatory 
official also reached a similar conclusion, saying that the market response resulted 
from a “sense of relief’ from government measures to stabilise the financial system.43 
However, considering the nature of the 1998 policy package, this line of account is not 
convincing. Although it is still not clear why the Japan premium disappeared,44 market 
pressures worked against Japan’s lax policy changes, as Japanese banks continued to 
be downgraded by credit rating agencies. However, the pressures from international 
financial markets did not sufficiently restrict the politicians’ ability to formulate the 
lenient regulatory policies designed to stimulate the national economy by easing 
capital adequacy requirements.
It should also be pointed out that in parallel with a series of lenient polices in 1998, 
regulators took some tough measures. In June 1998, regulators revised the definition
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of “double gearing”, and deducted cross-shareholdings between banks, which had 
been counted as Tier I capital in Japan, from regulatory capital.45 Such revision 
brought Japanese rules closer to the more stringent rules of Germany, the U.K. and the 
U.S. In addition, Japanese regulators expanded the scope of subsidiaries and affiliates 
subject to consolidated corporate reporting.46 The expanded definition resulted in 
downward pressure on the banks’ capital-to-assets ratios because they had to include 
debt-ridden related companies, to which banks had transferred their NPLs, in their 
consolidated reports. These policies reflected the general attitude of the Basle 
Committee towards the double gearing and the development of international 
accounting standards (see the next section). In this sense, these strict policies showed 
the commitment of Japanese regulators to internationally accepted regulatory practices. 
However, compared with the upward effects of the politician-led lenient policies on 
banks’ capital ratios, the downward effects of these tough policies were marginal.
In sum, the case of the 1997-98 banking crisis shows that domestic political 
intervention aiming to revitalise the economy led to the involuntary defection from 
internationally accepted regulatory practices. Contrary to Rosenbluth and Thies,47 
politicians favoured weak prudential regulatory rules in the circumstances of 1997-98.
7.3.3 Toward Strict Implementation?: The Introduction o f  Market Value Accounting 
Rules, the Unwinding o f Banks ’ Shareholdings and Prompt Corrective Action 
The 1998 lenient policies were emergency measures to help banks pump up their 
capital bases and to mitigate the credit crunch, but they made little effort to seriously 
tackle the problem of the banks’ large exposure to market risk from their equity 
portfolios, especially the cross-shareholdings of their corporate clients. This type of 
market risk was not covered by the 1996 Basle Amendment, which narrowed the 
regulatory scope to trading risk that arose from banks’ short-term trading activities.48 
The so-called investment securities held by Japanese banks on a cross-shareholding 
basis were not for short-term trading, but rather for building long-term relationships 
with their corporate clients. The major banks’ large equity holdings, whose market 
value was roughly two and a half times as large as the banks’ own equity, implied a 
significant exposure of capital to market risk.49 Figure 7.2 shows the effect which 
different levels of the TOPIX had on each bank’s capital base, which was estimated by 
BNP Paribas.
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Table 7.2 Stock Prices and Latent Gains/Losses of Major Four Banks 
(estimates based upon the data at the end of March 2001)
30 March 2001 = TOPIX1277.27 (consolidation base, unit: million
yen)
Latent gains/losses
31-Mar-01 TOPIX 1,000 TOPIX 1,100 TOPIX 1,200 ] TOPIX 1,300 TOPIX 1,400
Mizuho Holdings -307,719 -1,959,733 -1,363,919 -768,105 -172,290 423,524
Mitsubishi Tokyo FG 0 -708,429 -128,006 452,417 1,032,840 1,613,263
UFJ 301,822 -1,090,571 -588,392 -86,212 415,967 918,147
Sumitomo Mitsui -517,725 -1,820,802 -1,350,881 -880,868 -410,902 59,065
Source: BNP Paribas, quoted by Economisuto, 18 September 2001, p. 20.
Note: The value o f banks’ holding stocks were assumed to move similar to that o f  TOPIX.
In 2001, measures to remove the fundamental cause of this problem were finally 
taken. At the end of September, Japanese banks were required to value their securities 
holdings at market price, and to own up to the losses in their cross-shareholdings. 
Behind the adoption of market value accounting, there was a combination of 
international efforts to harmonise accounting standards and domestic concerns of the 
financial market reform. The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), 
a private sector organisation founded in 1973 and restructured as the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in 2001, has made efforts to establish 
international accounting standards (IAS) and to have them accepted as uniform 
standards usable in respective national capital markets.50 In August 1997, IASC
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proposed the first draft on accounting principles for financial instruments (IAS 39) and 
urged the broad use of market values in accounting for financial instruments. The 
preference for market value accounting principles reflected the intention to make 
companies’ financial statements more transparent, by requiring companies to have 
unrealised profits or losses on their financial instrument holdings properly reflected on 
financial statements. The ISA 39, which was approved by board members in 
December 1997, completed a core set of international accounting standards in March 
1998.
IAS 39 significantly increased the use of market values in accounting for financial 
instruments, compared to most countries’ national standards. The Basle Committee 
was still considering the issue of the extent to which market value accounting should 
be applied to banks’ financial statements, but largely expressed support for IAS and for 
efforts to harmonise accounting internationally.51 The IASC’s efforts to develop ISA 
were supported by other international bodies, such as G-7 Finance Ministers and the 
IMF, as measures to “strengthen the international financial architecture”, though U.S. 
authorities have not demonstrated any willingness to accept IAS. The European 
Commission was also a strong supporter of the IASC with the intention of using IAS 
as a common set of accounting rules within the single market, and presented 
legislation to require the use of IASC Standards for all listed companies no later than
2005.
The development of IAS stimulated an argument as to how to introduce IAS into 
Japan, although little progress had been made by the mid-1990s. In October 1996, 
the Business Accounting Council, an advisory panel to the MoF, began to discuss the 
issue of the introduction of market value accounting standards as part of the Tokyo Big 
Bang plan. Given the huge potential appraisal losses on their shareholdings, however, 
Japanese banks were worried about the broad adoption of market-price valuation. 
When the IASC published the draft IAS 39 in 1997, the Japanese Bankers Association 
openly demanded that the scope of fair value accounting for financial instruments 
should be limited to those financial instruments whose markets were fully developed
53and in which managers traded with the intention of pursuing short-term capital gains. 
However, this opinion was in a minority, and an international consensus over the 
broader application of market value accounting principles for financial instruments 
was already formed.54 In the autumn of 1997, the MoF began preparing to introduce 
the mark-to-market accounting in parallel with the advance of the Tokyo Big Bang 
plan.55 However, it should be noted that this did not mean that Japanese authorities 
conformed to a whole set of IAS.56 In particular, as regards loan classification and 
provisioning and loan impairment, the Japanese practices were not converged with the 
relevant IAS (i.e., IAS 36). This suggests that the authorities were selective in
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adopting IAS. The IAS perceived as being unfavourable for them were opted out, or at 
least postponed.
When the market valuation of banks’ securities holdings was introduced into Japan, 
the biggest problem was moribund stock prices. Market-value accounting rules no 
longer allowed banks to hide away their appraisal losses on their shareholdings. New 
accounting rules placed pressure on Japanese banks to sell off their shareholdings, 
which in turn put further downward pressure on stock markets. At the time of January 
2001, for the ruling LDP, the recovery of stock prices became a lifeline for the Mori 
administration, which had little public support.57 The LDP launched a series of policy 
plans to rejuvenate the stock markets, including the public money requisition of stock, 
the removal of a ban on treasury stock, and securities tax reforms. With regard to the 
composition of bank capital bases, the proposal for establishing either a public or 
private facility that would purchase banks’ shareholdings was of particular 
importance.58 By purchasing the stocks sold off by banks and re-selling them to the 
public, the stock-buying facility was expected to prevent the banks’ rapid 
cross-shareholding sell-offs from putting downward pressure on the stock markets. 
The LDP also proposed a plan that banks’ shareholdings would be either totally 
banned or forcibly limited to a certain level.
Though the banking industry expressed disapproval of such an idea, because they
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did not want to have their hands tied,59 the LDP no longer protected the narrow 
interests of the banking industry. In November 2001, the Bank Equity Holdings 
Limitation Act passed through the Diet. Bank equity holdings will be limited to 100 
percent of capital (narrowly defined as either shareholder equity or Tier I capital) from 
September 2004 onward. Under the legislation, the Bank Shareholding Acquisition 
Corporation (BSAC) was also established by the 10 billion yen contribution of private 
banks and the two trillion-yen government guarantees in order to facilitate the scaling 
down of cross-shareholdings.60 Since banks held investment shares worth an estimated 
130-150 percent of bank capital, a target exposure of 100 percent of capital implies 
that banks would have to sell 10-15 trillion yen in shares.61
The introduction of mark-to-market accounting for a wider range of bank assets 
also had some implication for the credible implementation of Prompt Corrective 
Action (PCA), which began to apply for Japanese international banks in 1998. PCA 
was a policy instrument borrowed from the U.S., which stipulated pre-determined 
regulatory interventions as a gradual ladder of responses to the degree of banks’ 
capitalisation (see Table 7.3).62 The major aim of PCA was to reduce the scope for 
forbearance by replacing regulatory discretion with rules designed to stimulate 
regulatory intervention as soon as a bank’s capital position deteriorated. To do so, it 
clarified rules for regulators’ interventions, improved the transparency in banking
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regulations, and indicated a departure from the traditional approach of forbearance 
adopted by regulators. This in principle meant that capital adequacy requirements 
were equipped with a formal enforcement mechanism and became a pillar of ex ante 
prudential regulation in Japan.
Table 7.3 Japanese Version of Prompt Corrective Action
Capital adequacy ratio Action to be taken
_________ trigger_________
Basle Adjusted
standards national
____________________________standards___________________________________________________
1 Less than 8% Less than 4% To order the formulation and implementation o f
management improvement plan
2 Less than 4% Less than 2%  To order such measures or implement such
restrictions as:
formulation o f a plan to increase capital; 
restraint on the increase o f total assets or 
reduction o f total assets; 
prohibition on entering new business field; 
curtailment o f current business operations; 
prohibition on opening new offices and 
curtailment o f offices currently opened; 
curtailment o f business activities o f subsidiaries 
and overseas affiliated companies, and 
prohibition on establishing such entities; 
restraint or prohibition on paying dividends; 
restraint on paying bonuses to directors and other 
senior officers;
restraint or prohibition on taking deposits at high 
interests rates.
3 Less than 0% Less than 0% To order the suspension o f some or all o f the business
activities
Sources: M. Hall (1998: 154), and Japanese FSA (www.sfa.go.jp)
The Japanese PCA framework, however, was less demanding than PCA applied in 
the U.S. and as compared, for example, to revised standards in South Korea (since
1998). For example, in Japan, banks’ operations are only suspended when capital falls 
below zero (or there are strong indications that this will shortly happen), while in the 
US and South Korea, regulators can suspend the banks when their capital ratios fall 
below 2 percent. In addition, while American banks with over 10 percent of capital 
adequacy ratios are subject to no intervention, in Japan the minimum ratios are over 8 
percent. More importantly, the Japanese version of PCA did not take into account the 
exposure of banks’ capital bases to market risk. This limited the effectiveness of PCA 
because without transparent measures of capital and assets at market values, it was 
difficult for regulators to monitor the moral hazard incentives of banks. The 1998 
changes in accounting rules also diluted the scope for the PCA framework to respond 
to the erosion of the banks’ true capital position. This flaw in PCA was mitigated by 
the wider implementation of mark-to-market accounting only in September 2001.
It is difficult to say, however, that the Japanese PCA combined with market-value 
accounting standards would provide a basis for the effective implementation of capital 
adequacy rules, given the laxity of the thresholds. Equally important, as seen in the 
previous section, the lenient loan classification and provisioning standards have 
effectively undermined the validity of Japanese banks’ capital adequacy ratios.
7.4 Evaluation and Alternatives
The opacity of non-performing loans held by Japanese banks prevented market 
participants and regulators from grasping the actual capital base of the banks, thereby 
hampering the effective implementation of capital adequacy rules, since the due 
write-off of NPLs would significantly reduce the size of bank capital. In this sense, the 
delayed response to the NPL problem weakened the degree of the Japanese 
compliance with the Basle Accord and in effect caused hidden defection ever since the 
Basle Accord came into effect in April 1993 in Japan. The numerical compliance, the 
statutory capital rules, and the establishment of the prompt action scheme did not mean 
that Japanese regulatory policies were geared up to deliver on the credible 
implementation of the Basle Accord.
As of writing, there are as yet few signs that NPLs will be cleaned up substantially 
in the near future. Despite the recent institutional shift towards rule-based, prudential 
regulation, including the 1998 introduction of PC A and the 2001 introduction of 
mark-to-market accounting for banks’ securities holdings, the NPL problem continues 
to distort the true picture of the capital adequacy ratios of Japanese banks. At the heart 
of the weak degree of the Japanese compliance was inadequate institutional capacity to 
deal with NPLs.
The institutional structure of the Diet’s oversight of the MoF—“firm alarm”
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oversight—gave the MoF leeway as well as incentives to conceal the adequate 
information on NPLs. In addition, in fear of political intervention into management 
and loan decisions, banks wanted to deal with the problem on their own and did not 
actively turn to ruling LDP members. Until the major financial institution failures of 
November 1997 and the onset of a serious credit crunch for small- and medium-sized 
businesses, LDP politicians also hoped that the problem would go away by itself and 
adopted a passive stance towards the problem. These institutional and political 
conditions formed impediments to the settlement of the NPL problem, i.e. a source of 
hidden defection from international regulatory standards.
During the 1997-98 domestic financial crisis, the intervention of politicians into 
banking politics led to the further, involuntary defection from internationally accepted 
regulatory standards. Under severe financial distress, LDP politicians were unwilling 
to take costly steps towards the strict implementation of capital adequacy requirements 
for fear of causing further deterioration in the existing credit crunch, which hit their 
political constituencies—small- and medium-sized businesses and construction sector. 
On the contrary, they pressed for leniency in implementation to spur banks into 
lending more money to these borrowers. Among others, the 1998 accounting rules that 
allowed banks to use book value for accounting their shareholdings were designed to 
increase the apparent level of capital-to-assets ratios and to give them some breathing
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space. Thanks to this sort of accounting trick, many banks were able to clear the Basle 
standards. This change not only widened the gap between Japanese banks’ actual and 
putative capital, but also went against the international trend toward market value 
accounting principles.
The weak degree of the Japanese compliance with the Basle Accord suggests the 
limitation of the two-level game hypothesis. The network state hypothesis, which 
argues that various actors concerned were embedded in an informal regulatory 
network in Japan and policy behaviour began to be constrained by the embedment in 
the 1990s, provides a better explanation for the issue of implementation.64 The 
informal forms of banking regulation turn out to be a stumbling block to credible 
commitment to the Basle Accord when they were stressed. As regards the 
MoF-politician relations, the “fire alarm” oversight by politicians induced the 
regulators to exercise forbearance policy in dealing with NPLs. In moments of crisis, 
the MoF had incentives to conceal the real picture of NPLs from politicians, since the 
disclosure of regulatory breakdown was expected to trigger political intervention and 
reduce policy-making autonomy—one of the MoF’s main organisational interests. 
This was an institutional source of regulatory forbearance and hidden defection.
There are two domestic-level alternative hypotheses for domestic sources of 
defection, which need further examination. One is a regulatory capture hypothesis:
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regulated groups with high stakes in the regulation-making process are so powerful 
that they can influence politicians and regulators to serve primarily the interests of 
those subject to the regulation.65 This regulatory capture represents a process through 
which well-organised groups can use their political resources to capture benefits for 
themselves at the expense of more dispersed groups. This hypothesis apparently 
corresponds with the weak compliance with international prudential regulations, from 
which banks can benefit.
The Japanese banking industry, however, did not actively turn to LDP politicians 
for lax rules throughout the 1990s.66 It may be possible to argue that even without 
explicit lobbying by banks, the interests of banks are inherently the major concern of 
government in all market-oriented societies.67 Politician-led lax policies, however, had 
mixed results for banks. While the lax regulatory and accounting rules helped banks to 
meet the minimum capital adequacy ratios, political pressure on banks to make new 
loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises, which was accompanied by the 
generous policies, began to bite. Any public assistance was not offered without any 
strings attached. In fear of political intervention in banking management and lending 
decisions, banks did not actively mobilise politicians. For LDP politicians, the strict 
implementation of capital adequacy requirements could only aggravate the existing 
credit crunch for small- and medium-sized enterprises and was therefore best avoided.
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LDP politicians did not push for the narrow interests of banks, but rather for those of 
more politically powerful groups such as small- and medium-sized business and 
construction companies.
A second alternative hypothesis is bureaucracy dominance: the interests and 
preferences of the MoF officials cannot be reduced to those of other societal groups,
/TO
and serve as the primary explanatory variable. The regulatory forbearance in dealing 
with the NPL problem seems to correspond with the MoF preferences to avoid 
political intervention in the initial years after the collapse of the bubble.
The ability of regulators to achieve their policy goals, however, is not always 
automatically given. Rather, it is a product of statecraft with which policymakers strive 
to attain their goals.69 The way in which regulators interact with social groups reflects 
institutional settings as well as the pattern of the domestic power relations among them. 
When the dysfunction of the old banking regulatory regime left no alternative but to 
use public money to stabilise the banking system, for example, the unpopular policy of 
using public money resulted in politicians attempting to avoid being blamed by
70insisting on a popular issue like the break-up of the much-criticised MoF. These 
political circumstances left regulators on the sidelines. Instead, politicians began to 
increase their influence on the regulation-making process by passing important laws to 
cope with the banking problem.71
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7.5 Conclusion
Based on the developments of international financial regulatory standards in the 
last few decades, it is important to understand how and to what extent they are 
disseminated and actually implemented. This chapter contributes to this debate by 
providing possible answers to the Japanese case of the Basle Capital Accord. Although 
important international pressures were identified, neither a unilateral effect from 
international forces nor a linear domestic pattern following the international 
developments was found. Rather, it was found that the locus through which Japanese 
regulators implemented the Basle capital adequacy rules was firmly placed in the 
domestic political and institutional context. It might be possible to argue that the 
long-term, overall pattern of Japanese regulatory policy trends towards the rule-based 
regulatory method supports the two-level game hypothesis that international 
developments can is used as external leverage to influence the course of domestic 
regulatory developments. However, a close look at the degree to which domestic 
policies were designed to pursue prudential regulation showed that international 
pressures were blocked by domestic factors during the 1990s.
The weak degree of real compliance with and the defection from international 
regulatory standards suggest the limitation of the two-level game hypothesis. 
Inadequate domestic institutional capacity to deal with NPLs posed serious
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impediments to the effective implementation of capital adequacy requirements. 
Furthermore, it was not until 2001 that regulators tackled the problem that the capital 
base of Japanese banks was exposed to market risk. Rather, Japanese regulators tried 
to get around the problem by allowing the banks to use lenient accounting standards. 
The network state hypothesis provides a better explanation for the weak degree of the 
Japanese compliance than the two-level game hypothesis does.
In the case of Japan, thus, domestic factors largely determined the pattern of 
implementation and the extent of compliance. Achieving an international agreement 
and formally adopting its rules as national standards is one thing; the real compliance 
with the international regulatory standards is another. In order to examine the latter, it 
is necessary to probe not only the statutory rules of capital adequacy, but also various 
related policies and institutional frameworks in which capital adequacy rules are 
embedded at the domestic level.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions
The Basle Accord was seen as a successful example of creating a global governance 
mechanism for international banking with special focus on capital adequacy 
requirements.1 In the mid-1980s, concerns over the surge of Japanese banks with low 
capital adequacy ratios were part of Anglo-American motivations for initiating 
international banking regulation. Japanese banks made great efforts to meet the 
Accord since it came into force in Japan but they were often accused of juggling their 
capital adequacy ratios. In addition, the Accord was also seen as a main cause for 
credit crunches in the Japanese economy in the late 1990s. These facts explain the 
importance of correctly understanding how the preferences and bargaining positions 
of Japanese actors evolved, to what extent the Basle Accord was effectively
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implemented in Japan, and which factors affected the Japanese implementation. I 
explored these questions by testing the two-level-game framework and alternative 
domestic- and systemic-level approaches, as well as providing detailed case studies.
The two-level-game framework is one of the most important conceptual 
approaches in the discipline of international political economy. The framework offers 
hypotheses about impacts of two-way domestic-international interactions on state 
negotiators’ preference formation, bargaining positions and compliance. By 
examining the extent to which the hypotheses can explain the preference formation 
and bargaining positions of Japanese regulators and compliance with the Basle Accord, 
I pointed out prospects and limitations of the two-level-game model. To articulate such 
potential and limitations, I considered alternative explanations including domestic- 
and systemic-level ones.
I argued that three norms support a given country’s credible commitment to 
international capital adequacy standards. First, capital adequacy rules must be a 
linchpin of prudential regulation, by monitoring banks’ solvency; second, regulatory 
capital adequacy ratios must accurately reflect the reality of banks’ financial strength; 
and third, regulators should take swift corrective action against banks with low capital 
adequacy standards. These norms help us define a set of policy behaviours and 
economic outcomes against which hypotheses on the behaviour of bank regulators in
the process of international regulatory harmonisation can be tested. Four indicators for 
credible compliance are as follows: 1) numerical compliance; 2) the legislation for 
statutory capital rules; 3) less discretionary rules for accounting, loan classification, 
and provisioning; and 4) prompt corrective action by regulators.
On the one hand, a close look at Japanese regulators’ preference formation and 
behaviour through a filter of domestic and international interaction allows us to better 
understand and explain their behaviour at the negotiation process. The thesis presented 
a counterexample to mainstream systemic-level explanations about the forces leading 
to the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s (MoF’s) negotiating position. On the other hand, 
the thesis had shed light on the importance of the implementation phase as regards 
international regulatory frameworks, and pointed out limits to the logic of two-level 
game approach concerning implementation and compliance issues. The negotiation 
literature so far paid little attention to the details of implementation and compliance. 
The hypotheses derived from the logic of two-level game approach, however, did not 
sufficiently explain ineffectual Japanese compliance with the Basle Accord. Both 
domestic institutional “capacity” and the “willingness” of regulators are important in 
determining the degree of compliance.
8.1 The Argument and Major Findings
A two-level-game model hypothesises, at least, two strategies that bank regulators
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can employ to attain their policy preferences under international and domestic 
interactions. Both hypotheses are assessed here. First, the domestic-international 
interaction creates an opportunity for regulators to reinforce their autonomy vis-a-vis 
societal interests in the course of international negotiations—Hypothesis 1. According 
to this hypothesis, regulators can use internationally agreed norms as a way to 
legitimise domestically tough issues, such as capital adequacy requirements, and to 
enhance their ability to implement such norms domestically. Second, the 
domestic-international interaction gives regulators strategies to reshape the 
configuration of the win-set of domestic constituents with the aim of reaching an 
international agreement and/or increasing their international bargaining 
position—Hypothesis 2.
The common feature in the two cases of the negotiations regarding international 
capital adequacy regulation (i.e., the 1988 Basle Accord and the 1996 Amendment) 
was that the MoF tactically used the internationally agreed norms to legitimise its 
domestic policies and to shore up its position in the domestic politics (Hypothesis 1). 
Hence, a perspective based upon this hypothesis in principle helps us understand and 
explain the regulators’ behaviour at the negotiation stage. The international and 
domestic interplay helped Japanese regulators legislate the statutory capital rules, 
which private banks had previously succeeded in fending off at the domestic level.
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However, as Chapter 7 has shown, where implementation issues were concerned, 
domestic factors crucially mattered. Inadequate domestic institutions for coping with 
banks’ non-performing loans, as well as willingness to help banks to overcome hurdles 
for meeting the Basle Accord, effectively made Japanese commitments to the Basle 
Accord problematic even after the Diet got capital adequacy requirements on the 
statutory book in 1992. In addition, the banking crisis of the late 1990s politicised the 
issue of capital adequacy requirements and the mobilisation of politicians put severe 
constraints on Japanese compliance with the Basle Accord. The ultimate success of 
implementation and compliance is dependent on domestic economic and political 
conditions. Thus, while Hypothesis 1 has some merits of explaining the negotiation 
stage, its validity is qualified, especially at the implementation stage.
At the outset, Japanese regulators thought that the 1987 U.S.-U.K. proposal for 
international convergence of capital adequacy requirements was too hastily proposed 
and too ambitious. However, once negotiations started, Japanese regulators attempted 
to reinforce domestic regulation in order to improve their international bargaining 
power, and at once saw the international negotiations as an opportunity to manipulate 
the power balance in the domestic policy network revolving around the issue of capital 
adequacy requirements. Since the early 1980s, in response to financial liberalisation, 
Japanese regulators had tried to establish effective capital adequacy requirements at
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the domestic level, but the private banks’ political muscle blocked the establishment of 
an effective compliance mechanism. As a result, Japanese banks continued to operate 
with low capitalisation and without any sanction by Japanese regulators. For Japanese 
regulators, this was a concern.
In this domestic context of banking politics, it was the international negotiations 
that gave the Japanese regulators an opportunity to pursue their desired policy 
objectives at home. The regulators used the international agenda to obtain domestic 
leverage in the establishment of statutory capital rules. The international agreement 
on minimum capital requirements legitimised the attempts of the MoF, which 
ultimately succeeded in legislating for capital adequacy requirements in 1992 in the 
face of complaints from the banking industry.
In the negotiation process of the 1988 Basle Accord, inadequate domestic 
institutions and policy tools motivated the MoF to use external pressure to prevail in 
the domestic battle over capital adequacy requirements. In other words, the Japanese 
regulators’ autonomy was not institutionally given in the realm of capital adequacy 
requirements but was rather a product of the regulators’ statecraft in overcoming 
institutional impediments. This contrasts with the bureaucracy-centred argument as 
well as a popular image of the strong state of Japan vis-a-vis societal actors in 
comparative politics.4 The interaction between domestic and international politics
gave the regulators a political tool to enhance autonomy. Thus, state autonomy is not 
static, but rather contingent. Nor is it simply a product of domestic political and 
institutional constraints.
By elucidating where Japanese regulators stood on the international and domestic 
negotiations regarding the Basle process of harmonising capital rules, the thesis 
refuted Oatley and Nabors’ claim that the Basle Accord was only achieved through the 
motivation of competitiveness-conscious U.S. policy-makers to force foreign 
counterparts, in particular the Japanese whose banks allegedly enjoyed 
lax-regulation-induced competitive advantage, to join the international regulatory 
harmonisation process in the interests of American commercial banks.5 Without doubt, 
the American initiative played a significant part, but Japanese regulators had domestic 
reasons for joining the Basle process. Under conditions of inadequate domestic 
institutions to effectively carry out banking regulations and of a domestic crisis 
generating political incentives to adopt internationally agreed issues, regulators had a 
reason to turn to international co-operation in order to resolve domestic issues. In 
contrast to a neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist assumption that states as 
unitary actors have incentives to defect from international co-operation in the absence 
of a formal compliance mechanism, weak domestic compliance power may push state 
actors to engage in international co-operation.6
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It should also be noted that the behaviour of the regulators in the manner of 
“bounded rationality”, which presumes the cognitive limitations of the decision 
maker—limitations of both knowledge and computational capacity — explains the
n ^
Japanese regulators’ legislation effort. Under the shadow of the past (the continuous 
rise in stock prices throughout the post-war era in general and the flourishing stock 
markets in the late 1980s in particular), Japanese regulators failed to grasp properly the 
nature of looming problems in the financial sector in the early 1990s. In 1992, despite 
the rapid fall of stock prices, Japanese regulators did not recognise the drop in stock 
prices as critical and structural. This optimistic perception of the stock market trend 
gave the backdrop to the regulators’ policy preference in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. What Japanese regulators pursued in the Basle international negotiations—the 
inclusion of unrealised capital gains in banks’ securities holdings—reflected their 
belief in the enduring rise in domestic stock markets. Ironically enough, in the 
aftermath of the 1992 collapse of the financial bubble, the MoF’s achievement of 
getting unrealised capital gains incorporated into regulatory capital revealed the 
fragility of Japanese banks’ capital bases and even worsened that fragility.
As for the mid-1990s, a sense of crisis motivated the MoF to use internationally 
emerging regulatory norms and methods to regain its eroded leverage over politicians. 
Widespread distress in the domestic financial system and the MoF’s failure to handle it
called into serious question the validity of the existing domestic regulatory system and 
the organisational ability of the MoF as a regulator. The banking industry, troubled by 
a series of scandals, reduced its political influence, and politicians and the public 
called for a drastic reform of banking regulation and even a dismantling of the entire 
ministry. Demonstrating the capability for self-reform was necessary for the MoF in 
order to mitigate such growing criticism. The Basle-originated regulatory norms and 
methods emphasising internal control mechanisms, greater reliance on the market, and 
more transparent modus operandi were obviously appealing points in this domestic 
context. The market-oriented regulatory norms and methods emerged in the Basle 
negotiations leading up to the 1996 Amendment, and provided Japanese regulators 
with the main thrust of their domestic regulatory reform needed politically. The 
domestic politics of banking crisis set the conditions under which the new regulatory 
ideas entered the domestic regulation-making process and replaced the old ones. The 
domestic regulatory reform based upon the Basle-originated norms and methods was 
partly a tactic by the MoF to head off the dissolution of the ministry.
By the mid-1990s, however, given the dysfunction of the existing regulatory 
regime, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians had no choice but to make an 
unpopular decision to use public money to resolve the crisis. They simultaneously 
launched a campaign for the dissolution of the much-criticised MoF in order to avoid
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obeing blamed. The involvement of politicians had a two-fold consequence. Firstly, 
one of LDP politicians’ main concerns was to mitigate a credit crunch, thereby helping 
their bulwark constituents such as small- and medium-sized businesses and 
construction companies. This political involvement resulted in a series of lenient 
regulatory and accounting policies in 1998, thereby substantially weakening Japanese 
commitments to the Basle Accord. Secondly, the MoF was finally broken up, and its 
powers to investigate and supervise financial institutions were transferred to a newly 
established, independent regulatory agency in 1998. In this sense, political efforts by 
the MoF to protect their organisation ended in failure. Under the newly established 
regulatory agency, the Financial Services Agency, capital adequacy requirements were 
equipped with a formal enforcement mechanism—prompt corrective action. The 
composition of banks’ capital bases became more transparent thanks to the 2001 
introduction of market-value accounting principles, which was accelerated by 
international developments in common accounting standards. Despite these 
institutional changes, lax loan classification and provisioning rules continued to 
challenge the validity of the Japanese compliance with the Basle rules in a practical 
sense.
Kent Calder argues that Japan is a “reactive state”.9 Namely, the Japanese political 
system incorporates a mechanism in which actors use foreign political pressure, or
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gaiatsu, to shape and pursue national policy agendas. According to him, Japan’s 
reactive state behaviour was typical in policy issue-areas where the decision-making 
authority was fragmented and/or where domestic interest groups established clientele 
relationships with the ruling party politicians. Issues of telecommunications, which 
created a new policy agenda crossing several bureaucratic boundaries, represented the 
former, and the issue of the liberalisation of agricultural trade was typical of the latter. 
In these politically controversial issue-areas at the domestic level, proactive initiatives 
directed towards change, for example trade liberalisation, have been seldom, and the 
impetus to change has necessarily come from outside. The case of the 1988 Basle 
Accord provides further evidence for this process. It strengthens but also revises the 
characterisation of Japan as a “reactive state”.
What this thesis has added to the reactive state argument is that even in a policy 
area of banking regulation, where bureaucracy was previously deemed to enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy, regulators were exposed to societal interests at both the 
negotiation and implementation stages. Accordingly, Daniel Okimoto’s typology of 
Japan’s policy-making processes needs reconsideration. 10 According to his 
classification, banking politics falls into the category of “generalised support”, in 
which the intervention of the LDP is less likely and regulatory authorities enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy. With regard to prudential regulation during the 1980s and the
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1990s, however, this view is not persuasive: societal interests extensively penetrated 
the process of formation and implementation of capital adequacy requirements.
The thesis has also contributed to the understanding of another aspect of Japan’s 
reactive behaviour by putting Japanese regulators in the context of international 
institutions, where they can absorb new ideas. In the case of the 1988 Basle Accord, 
institutional settings at the Basle Committee provided Japanese regulators with an 
opportunity of learning new regulatory norms and methods, which were deemed 
relevant to domestic application. The synchronous proliferation of risk-weighted 
approaches to capital adequacy requirements and the formation of a tiered capital 
framework designed to accommodate variety in the national definition of capital in the 
early half of the 1980s are typical examples of the learning process—“the process by 
which consensual knowledge is used to specify causal relationships in new ways so 
that the result affects the content of public policy”11—at the Basle Committee. The 
MoF’s experimental introduction with the risk-weighted capital adequacy 
requirements in 1986 was indicative of the impact of this learning process on the 
Japanese regulatory system. The case of the mid-1990s presents another example that 
the MoF tactically used the Basle-originated regulatory ideas to pursue its domestic 
political goal—the protection of its bureaucratic organisation—though it failed to 
achieve the goal in the end. The revised reactive state argument combines external
pressure with the knowledge diffusion through the institutional setting of the Basle 
Committee.
It is worth noting, however, that although international institutions served to 
facilitate the diffusion of trans-national ideas, the locus of such ideational proliferation 
was strongly affected by domestic politico-economic conditions. On the one hand, the 
strong economic conditions of the 1980s were the backdrop to the regulators’ abortive 
attempts to devise a scheme to adopt prudential regulation, and the thriving banking 
industry successfully mobilised politicians to block such attempts. The developments 
in international norms on capital adequacy requirements gave the MoF leverage in 
breaking through this political stalemate. On the other hand, by the mid-1990s, 
domestic financial instability had discredited the pre-existing domestic regulatory 
ideas, and at the same time given rise to the political necessity of adopting a new one. 
However, the severity of the 1998 banking crisis drove LDP politicians to take a series 
of lenient regulatory policies in order to pull the economy out of recession, thereby 
leading to deviation from the spirit of the Basle Accord. Their main concern was not to 
represent the narrow interests of the banking industry, but rather to serve the interests 
of their other bulwark constituencies—small- and medium-seized businesses and 
construction sector that began to be severely damaged by the credit crunch at the time. 
For LDP politicians, the strict implementation of capital adequacy requirements only
could aggravate the existing credit crunch and was therefore best avoided. These 
domestic factors were implicated in the development of capital adequacy 
requirements.
What the thesis has found regarding the Japanese compliance issues contrasts with
the Rosenbluth and Thies argument that the 1994 new single-seat-district electoral
rules formed a condition that politicians would support prudential regulation that
1would transfer some costs of protection away from consumers to banks themselves. 
Their argument may apply more to policy-making in non-crisis situations. However, 
when the banking crisis hit their important political supporters, LDP politicians were 
ready to avoid prudential regulation and to take credit for representing the interests of 
such specific groups. After all, the medium voter/taxpayer was not unambiguously 
better off due to post-1994 electoral system changes.
In sum, Hypothesis 1 has the merit of examining the negotiation process, but it is 
considerably weak at the implementation stage. On the one hand, the argument based 
upon Hypothesis 1 gives us new findings. It allows us to consider how Japanese 
regulatory officials dealt with a dilemma between the maintenance of a sound 
domestic banking system and the international competitiveness of domestic banks by 
participating in international negotiations. This approach presents a counterexample to 
analyses that emphasise the “redistributive logic” of the Basle Accord. It also provides
additional evidence for the notion of Japan being a “reactive state”, while also refining 
and revising that concept. On the other hand, the implementation phase challenges 
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 does not substantially fit in with the fact of weak Japanese 
compliance with the Basle Accord. Even after regulators succeeded in getting capital 
adequacy requirements on the statutory book and establishing a prompt corrective 
action scheme, lenient and discretionary rules for accounting, loan classification, and 
provisioning weakened Japanese compliance with the Basle Accord. Politicians’ 
involvement in the regulation-making process gave rise to the leniency and discretion. 
Approaches based upon domestic institutional capacity and the political willingness, 
such as the network state hypothesis, present more persuasive explanation than the 
logic of two-level games.13
Hypothesis 2 prescribes that regulators can reshape the configuration of the 
win-set of domestic interest groups by linking internationally negotiated issues with 
more popular policy measures. The aim of this strategy is either to improve 
negotiators’ bargaining positions against their foreign counterparts by obtaining 
domestic consent or to make a breakthrough in dead-end negotiations by winning 
domestic acceptance. Regarding Japanese involvement in the Basle negotiations, 
Hypothesis 2 also needs to be reserved for at least two reasons. One is that domestic 
distributional problems made it difficult for regulators to adopt this strategy. The other
is emerging power configurations in the politics of international banking regulation, 
which crippled Japanese power in the Basle process in general.
First, the politics of the Japanese banking sector on the securitisation of bank assets 
indicated that the success of “synergistic issue linkage” was largely contingent upon 
interest configuration in the policy network of concern. Although securitisation of 
bank assets would help banks to raise their ratios of capital to assets in general, it 
caused intra-industry divisions among the types of banks—city banks, long-term 
credit banks, and trust banks—over the issue of what types of assets should be 
securitised and on what conditions. Regarding this issue, the traditional 
compartmentalisation of banking business generated entrenched vested interests. A 
securitisation plan threatening particular vested interests encountered strong 
opposition from the group of banks whose privileges were under threat. Specifically, 
long-term credit banks and trust banks opposed the securitisation plans that would 
threaten their privileges. This cleavage among banks hindered the MoF’s efforts at 
linking the generally favourable policy packages with tough capital adequacy 
requirements. The complex vested interests in the policy network turned out to be a 
very limited result of securitisation.
Second, the statecraft capacity of Japanese regulators to link domestic and 
international domains in order to improve their bargaining positions was constrained
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by newly-emerging power balance at the international level. The esoteric nature of 
banking regulation crippled influence of both the Japanese regulators and the banks in 
the Basle process in the 1990s. The issue of the use of banks’ internal models for the 
purpose of capital adequacy regulation was negotiated in a new power configuration in 
which those regulators and banks with expertise increased their influence. Given the 
underdeveloped nature of the Japanese regulatory system for monitoring and 
examining banks’ trading activities, Japanese regulators had little capability to affect 
the course of argument at the Basle Committee, let alone to set a substantial alternative 
in their favour.
The finding that professional knowledge has become an important attribute of 
power in international banking regulation-making implies that individual international 
banks were not equally positioned in a newly emerged power configuration. Japanese 
banks were still dominant actors in international finance in terms of asset size in the 
mid-1990s, but they never affected the course of trading risk regulation. What 
separated Japanese banks from those who exercised power was whether or not they 
possessed relevant knowledge. Viewing international banks as some unified whole 
may lead us to overlook differences within it and therefore to misunderstand the 
politics of international financial regulation. In other words, with regard to the power 
of international banks, this emphasises the banks’ involvement in the political process,
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not capital mobility per se. The asymmetry of possession and access to a certain set of 
knowledge differentiated the standing of international banks, their preferences and 
degrees of power.
When banks with sophisticated risk management increased their influence in the 
Basle process, it was the American and European banks possessing adequate 
knowledge and experience in trading activities that exercised influence over the 
process of the 1996 Amendment. Japanese banks were not included in this political 
enterprise; in fact, Japanese banks had neither the expertise concerned nor influence in 
such important private organisations as the Group of 30 and the Institute of 
International Finance.14 Rather, the 1996 Amendment imposed extra costs on some 
Japanese banks wishing to deal in lucrative trading activities. The Amendment 
pressurised the Japanese banks into improving their internal systems in order to 
compete with their American and European rivals under the new regulation.15 Thus, 
Japanese banks had little influence and their preferences were not represented.
The new power configuration in establishing the international financial regulatory 
regime substantially revises Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 suggests that regulators can 
mobilise domestic politics in order to achieve their international policy goals. Behind 
this hypothesis, there is an assumption that bank regulators are the sole, formal 
interface between domestic and international domains. However, given the growing
arcane nature of banking regulation, private banks with expertise increased their 
presence in the Basle regulation-making process and bank regulators lost their 
privilege as the interface between domestic and international domains. The importance 
of regulators’ skill to manipulate domestic politics is not completely refuted. However, 
private banks with possession of sophisticated risk management expertise increased 
trans-national influence over the banking regulation-making process. This suggests 
the presence of “three-level games”, where the third-level game of autonomous 
trans-national processes is added to traditional two levels (i.e., domestic and 
international games).16
8.2 Implications for International Regulatory Standards
The cases and evidence presented here help to demonstrate the importance of domestic 
factors in mediating the impact of international regulatory developments. Negotiating 
process and researching an agreement on international regulatory standards are 
important in that such regulations construct institutional arrangement of markets that
17confer asymmetric advantages upon some and costs upon others. While considering
both international and domestic political factors, the logic of two-level games explains
forces leading to regulators’ negotiation positions, and shows that those banks with
risk management expertise increased their political influence over the direction of
international banking regulation. With regard to implementation issues, however,
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more persuasive explanations come from a domestic approach.
It is true that the Basle process and the Basle capital regulation itself became more 
complex and esoteric, thereby facilitating autonomous trans-national processes where 
private banks with risk management expertise increased their power considerably. 
Domestic factors, however, largely determined the modus operandi of implementation 
and the degree of compliance. Since international regulatory standards gave domestic 
actors leeway to operationalise the Basle Accord in their jurisdiction, real compliance 
must be distinguished from a formal one. Inadequate domestic institutions, including 
rules for coping with banks’ non-performing loans and accounting rules, hindered the 
effective implementation of capital adequacy rules, thereby reducing the degree of real 
compliance. This frames the implementation problem as one of domestic institutional 
“capacity”.
There was also a “willingness” factor. Regulators had intent to help banks to 
overcome hurdles for meeting international regulatory standards. In times of economic 
hardship, moreover, politicians’ intervention was likely to put prudential regulation on 
secondary and press for leniency, having every intention of pulling the economy out of 
recession. These institutional and intentional factors underlined the possibility that the 
Basle rules could be sabotaged by vested interests at the implementation phase. In 
countries already suffering from financial distress, domestic actors put strong pressure
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for leniency in the implementation of the Basle Accord in order to mitigate the existing 
credit crunch. This sort of political intervention can be a main domestic source of 
hidden defection from international regulatory standards.
The importance of domestic factors leads one to look at institutional meanings that
strongly influence policy behaviours. The Japanese case of regulatory change in the
1990s shed doubt on mainstream economists’ argument for regulatory conversion
along the Anglo-American practices of banking regulation. The conceptual framework
of two-level games under which the preferences of state negotiators (i.e., bank
regulators) and private banks are deduced from their positions in international
financial markets needs to stand on the contextual lexicon of domestic political culture.
Theorisation of two-level games without paying adequate attention to domestic
1 8institutions is prone to be criticised for its “sweeping aspirations of universalism” 
into whose self-proclaimed universal framework Japan is squeezed. Big mess and little 
substantial change in Japanese capital adequacy regulation in the 1990s indicated that 
Japan did not fit into a simple argument of globalising financial market.
Japanese compliance with the Basle Accord can be seen as a series of defensive 
attempts to adapt to the evolving Anglo-American market norms and practices of 
global finance. A question of how momentum for real compliance with international 
regulatory standards gathers depends upon domestic environments—political
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institutions, economic situations, and preferences of major domestic groups. Domestic 
political institutions disabled Japanese regulators from taking timely corrective actions 
against troubled banks and contributed to regulatory forbearance. Under sluggish 
economic situations, rigid implementation of capital adequacy rules became 
politically difficult. Indeed, some politicians of the ruling LDP saw the Basle Accord 
as one of the fundamental causes of the credit crunch in the late 1990s, which hurt their 
bulwark constituencies (i.e., small- and medium-sized enterprises). These domestic 
factors hindered Japanese capital adequacy rules from gearing with arm’s length, 
prudential regulatory norms. There was a great fuss, but few substantial changes. This 
weak compliance, as argued above, challenges some of the ruling hypotheses made in 
the International Political Economy theory about international regulatory 
harmonisation, including the hypothesis of the two-level interaction as external 
leverage for regulators, and that of market forces as the driving force behind emulation 
of the regulatory standards.19
The importance of domestic factors in implementing international banking 
regulatory standards can also be interpreted in terms of the issue of regulatory 
independence. Regulatory and supervisory independence of the financial sector is seen 
as a key element in maintaining financial stability, but in reality many national
9 0authorities lack such independence. The regulation-making process is likely to be
exposed to pressure from both the banking industry and politicians. As the 
two-level-game approach has shown here, joining an international regulatory 
agreement can be seen as a supplementary policy for resolving a lack of regulatory 
independence. However, neither agreeing on international regulatory standards nor 
adopting them as national standards alone ensures a country’s credible commitments 
to the international regulatory regime. Related domestic rules, such as accounting 
principles, also need gearing towards the purposes of the regime. The more domestic 
factors are involved, the more difficult it is to prioritise and pursue the goal of 
prudential regulation. This means not only it is inherently difficult to achieve the 
effectiveness of international regulatory standards, but also it is important to explore 
the domestic circumstances under which regulatory change is promoted or hindered. 
The locus of policy behaviour is determined in a social context and a range of its 
possibility is not set by the MoF (or the Financial Services Agency after 1998) itself. 
The MoF (or FSA) has some institutional advantages in policy-making process, but it 
has no means as a prerogative.
These findings have some broader implications for research on international 
regulatory regimes. Since the global financial turmoil of the late 1990s, the debate on 
reforming the international financial architecture has been raised and various 
initiatives have been taken in promoting particular regulatory norms and methods as
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91the best practices. However, the existence of international regulatory standards itself
does not necessarily endorse their meaningful dissemination. It is necessary to probe
the domestic political economy in order to examine not only the formation process of
international financial regulatory regimes, but also effective implementation and real
compliance. As the Japanese case shows, there are huge domestic obstacles before
international financial regulatory regimes effectively bite into domestic prudential
regulations.
1 For example, Kapstein (1992) and Reinicke (1998).
2 For example, see Odell (2000).
3 For a similar point, see Kapstein (1992: 282-83).
4 On the former see, for example, Johnson (1982) and Vogel (1996). On the latter, Katzenstein 
(1978a) gives an example.
5 Oatley and Nabors (1998).
6 See Waltz (1979), Keohane (1984) and Keohane ed. (1986).
7 On bounded rationality, see Simons (1997) and Odel (2002).
8 Hiwatari (2000).
9 Calder (1988).
10 Okimoto (1989).
11 E. Haas (1990: 23).
12 Rosenbluth and Thies (1999).
13 See Amyx (forthcoming).
14 Interviews with Japanese bank officials, London, December 1999.
15 Hatagawa and Imai (1996).
16 See Risse-Kappen, ed. (1995) and Cemy (2002).
17 See Underhill (1991; 1993; 1994; 1997a).
18 Williams (1996: 171).
19 On the latter, see Simmons (2001).
20 For normative views on regulatory independence, see Barth, Caprio and Levine (2002) and 
Quintyn and Taylor (2002).
21 Eichengreen (1999) summarises the debate over the new international financial architecture.
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